iiiii! 


The  Making  of 
Modern  Germany 

'Ferdin  an d  S c  hevi  1 1 


ill     i 


!1 1 1 1    •lit; 
I 


THE  MAKING  OF  MODERN  GERMANY 


X-W/^LjS*^ 


Stulfltr: 


STATUE  OF  FREDERICK  a  IN  BERLIN 


THE  MAKING  OF 
MODERN  GERMANY 

Six  Public  Lectures 
Delivered  in  Chicago  in  70/5 


By 

FERDINAND  SCHEVILL 

Professor  of  Modern  European  History  in 
The  University  of  Chicago 


CHICAGO 
A.  C.  McCLURG  &  CO. 

1916 


Copyright 

A.  C.  McCIurg  &  Co. 
1916 


Published  February,  1916 


W.  f.  HALL  PKINTINC  COMPANY,  CHICAGO 


pp 


PREFACE 

np  HE  following  six  lectures  were  delivered  in  the  year 
*•  1915  at  the  invitation  of  the  University  Lecture 
Association  (in  cooperation  with  the  University  of  Chi- 
cago).  In  preparing  them  for  publication  I  considered 
myself  free  to  reshape  them,  to  add,  subtract,  and  fuse, 
with  a  view  to  presenting  as  close  and  connected  a  story 
of  the  evolution  of  modern  Germany  as  was  possible 
under  the  circumstances.  Various  features  have  been 
added  —  Footnotes,  Maps,  a  Select  Bibliography,  and 
a  body  of  eight  Appendices  —  of  which  I  entertain  the 
hope  that  they  will  be  found,  each  in  its  own  way,  to 
supplement  and  enhance  the  text. 

The  lecture  form  has  for  the  historian  many  disad- 
vantages, but  also  undeniably  one  advantage;  as  such 
I  look  upon  the  necessity  of  marching  onward  by  a  sin- 
gle designated  highway  in  order  that  the  audience  may 
not  lose  the  sense  of  movement  and  direction.  Among 
the  often  painful  disadvantages,  I  am  particularly  im- 
pressed with  the  obligation  of  avoiding,  in  the  interest 
of  a  smooth  and  swift  journey,  many  matters  which  lie 
off  the  highway  and  yet  arouse  a  most  legitimate  curi- 
osity. It  was  to  meet  this  drawback  that  I  have  added 
the  features  spoken  of  above,  more  particularly  the 
Appendices,  each  of  which  presents  some  subject  having 
an  immediate  value  and  interest  for  the  reader.  The 

[v] 


vi  Preface 

Bibliography  is  of  course  only  a  first  aid  to  beginners, 
and  offers  no  more  than  a  list  of  books  which  may  prove 
useful  to  such  as  desire  to  penetrate  farther  into  the 
origin  and  development  of  the  German  state  and 
society. 

As  these  lectures  were  arranged  for  in  the  spring  of 
1914,  they  were  not  planned  with  an  eye  to  the  present 
terrible  conflict.  Inevitably  however,  the  great  Euro- 
pean war,  overwhelming  and  monopolizing  the  thought 
of  the  whole  generation  of  living  men,  pointed  my 
inquiry  toward  the  economic  and  other  causes  which 
produced  the  struggle.  Although  this  is  in  no  sense  a 
war  book  and  the  military  happenings  since  August, 
1914,  lie  wholly  outside  my  scope,  I  hope  none  the  less 
that  I  have  added  to  our  understanding  of  the  issues 
involved  in  the  struggle  and  illuminated  somewhat  its 
significance  for  the  Germany  of  today  and  of  the  future. 

It  is  Goethe,  I  think,  who  says  that  no  subject,  not 
even  the  natural  history  of  the  beetle  nor  the  summer 
cycle  of  a  seed  of  grass,  can  be  profitably  examined  with- 
out a  fundamental  basis  of  sympathy.  I  need  there- 
fore offer  no  apology  for  treating  with  sympathy  the 
Making  of  Modern  Germany.  But  a  sympathetic 
approach,  I  venture  to  hope,  has  no  kinship  with  blind 
bias  and  does  not  preclude  that  patient  search  and  philo- 
sophic objectivity  which  should  be  the  historian's  staff 
and  scrip  upon  his  pilgrimages.  Moved  by  the  desire 
to  understand  in  order  to  explain,  I  have  put  to  myself 
the  question  which,  according  to  Ranke,  should  light 
the  way  for  every  worker  in  the  field  of  history:  Wie 
ist  es  eigentlich  gewesen?  Accordingly,  how  Germany 


Preface  vii 

came  to  be  and  what  she  is  at  the  present  moment  in 
state  and  in  society  —  such,  putting  it  summarily,  is  the 
line  of  approach  represented  by  these  lectures. 

If  we  assume  —  and  most  of  us  imbued  with 
modern  science  are  inclined  to  assume  —  that  life 
in  society  is  not  all  blind  chance,  but  that  it  proceeds  in 
part  at  least  under  the  control  of  man's  operative  intel- 
ligence, it  becomes  our  right  and  duty  to  learn  as  much 
as  possible  not  only  concerning  our  own  American  soci- 
ety but  also  of  every  other  commonwealth  which  cour- 
ageously, though  with  mixed  success,  struggles  with  the 
problems  of  our  time.  Such  a  human  commonwealth  is 
Germany.  Better  knowledge  of  it  is  devoutly  to  be 
wished,  for  the  study  will  supply  our  people  with  matter 
for  an  enlightened  self-criticism,  as  well  as  with  creative 
suggestions  that  may  lead  to  an  improved  control  of 
the  many  confused  and  complicated  aspects  of  modern 
community  life. 

F.  S. 
The  University  of  Chicago,  igi6. 


CONTENTS 

LECTURE  PAGE 

I    THE  END  OF  THE  ELDER  GERMANY,  AND  THE 
RISE  OF  BRANDENBURG  AFTER  THE  THIRTY 

YEARS'  WAR 3 

II     FREDERICK  THE  GREAT  AND  THE  ADVENT  OF 

PRUSSIA  AS  A  EUROPEAN  POWER    ....       35 

III  NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE:  PRUSSIA'S  OVERTHROW 

AND  RECONSTRUCTION 67 

IV  PROGRESS  AND  REACTION:  FROM  THE  CONGRESS 

OF  VIENNA  TO  THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1848     .       99 

V     BISMARCK  AND  THE  UNIFICATION  OF  GERMANY     127 

VI    GERMANY  SINCE  HER  UNIFICATION    ....     159 

APPENDIX 

A    THE  HOHENZOLLERN  RULERS  FROM  THE  GREAT 

ELECTOR  TO  THE  PRESENT  DAY    ....     209 
B     THE  LIST  OF  STATES  COMPOSING  THE  GERMAN 

EMPIRE        211 

C    CONCERNING  THE  TITLE  AND  THE  POWERS  OF 

THE  GERMAN  EMPEROR 212 

D    THE  SUFFRAGE  PROVISIONS  FOR  THE  REICHSTAG 

AND   FOR  THE   SECOND   CHAMBER  OF  THE 

PRUSSIAN  PARLIAMENT  (LANDTAG)     .     .     .     216 

E     THE  RACE  FOR  COLONIES. 219 

F    THE  POLISH  QUESTION 222 

G    THE  EMS  DISPATCH 235 

H     THE  ALSACE-LORRAINE  QUESTION      ....     243 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 251 

INDEX        255 

[ix] 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

STATUE  OF  FREDERICK  n  IN  BERLIN  ....     Frontispiece 

FREDERICK  11,  CALLED  THE  GREAT 56 

QUEEN  LOUISE 76 

STEIN 94 

SCHARNHORST 94 

KANT 94 

GOETHE 94 

BISMARCK 168 

MAPS 

THE  TERRITORIAL  GROWTH  OF  PRUSSIA  IN  THE  SEVEN- 
TEENTH AND  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURIES    ....  22 
THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE,  1914 250 


The  End  of  the  Elder  Germany  and 

the  Rise  of  Brandenburg  after 

the  Thirty  Years'  War 


The  Making  of  Modern 
Germany 


JFim  Lecture 

THE  END  OF  THE  ELDER  GERMANY  AND  THE  RISE  OF 
BRANDENBURG  AFTER  THE  THIRTY  YEARS*  WAR 

THE  series  of  six  lectures  which  I  am  beginning  is 
to  treat  of  the  making  of  modern  Germany.  I 
shall  direct  my  attention  in  the  main  to  the  study  of  the 
complicated  political  movement  which  culminated,  after 
many  dramatic  episodes  and  as  the  result  of  the  labors 
of  many  generations,  in  the  unification  of  Germany  in 
1871 ;  in  connection  with  that  political  story  I  shall  try 
also  to  set  forth  the  leading  facts  in  the  social  evolu- 
tion of  the  German  people  itself.  As  the  presentation 
of  this  material  will  require  five  lectures,  I  shall  be  able 
to  devote  my  sixth  and  concluding  lecture  to  a  sketch  of 
united  Germany's  recent  development. 

The  terrible  war  now  raging  in  Europe,  in  virtue  of 
its  being  an  unfinished  event  and  as  yet  quite  beyond 
the  reach  of  a  calm  and  unbiased  exposition,  I  feel  justi- 
fied in  avoiding.  However,  if  I  must  decline  to  speak 
of  what  lies  beyond  my  ken,  I  shall  at  least  not  hesi- 
tate to  proceed  to  the  very  edge  and  threshold  of  the 

[3] 


4          The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

war  in  order  to  explain  how  it  happened  that  Germany 
was  sucked  into  its  seething  and  unfathomable  vortex. 
The  purpose  of  my  first  lecture  is  to  lay  as  broad 
a  foundation  as  possible  for  the  understanding  of  the 
many  complicated  problems  that  confronted  Germany 
in  her  long  struggle  for  unification.  To  this  end  I 
shall  not  scruple  to  penetrate  into  a  relatively  distant 
past,  and  to  show  how  in  the  Middle  Ages  there  existed 
an  elder  Germany  which  after  a  period  of  fame  and 
splendor  ignominiously  crumbled  into  dust.  This  elder 
Germany  came  into  being  in  the  ninth  century  at  the 
same  time  that  England  and  France  first  took  shape 
as  political  entities,  and,  like  England  and  France,  this 
elder  Germany  was,  in  point  of  view  of  government 
and  society,  what  we  familiarly  call  a  feudal  state.  By 
that  term  is  meant  that  Germany  was  indeed  a  mon- 
archy, but  that  the  monarch  enjoyed  only  limited  pow- 
ers and  that  the  essential  controlling  factors  in  the 
political  life  of  the  nation  were  the  two  privileged 
classes,  the  clergy  and  the  nobility.  Privileged  —  why? 
For  the  simple  reason  that  in  a  very  primitive  society, 
living  by  agriculture  and  agriculture  alone,  they  boasted 
a  practically  exclusive  ownership  of  the  land.  But 
though  the  clergy  and  nobility  owned  the  soil  they 
did  not  fertilize  it  with  the  sweat  of  their  brows.  They 
left  that  menial  service  to  the  peasants  who  consti- 
tuted the  mass  of  the  population,  performed  the  total 
productive  labor  of  society,  and  eked  out  as  best  they 
could  a  wretched  existence  from  the  pittance  their 
landlords  left  them  after  generously  providing  for 
themselves. 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  5 

Of  towns  deserving  the  name  there  were  none  in 
that  distant,  barbarous  time,  since  the  scanty  needs 
of  a  young  and  uncouth  society  could  be  amply  satis- 
fied in  the  small  market  centers  that  sprang  up  by  ford 
and  crossway.  A  rapid  sketch  of  this  feudal  Germany 
of  the  Middle  Ages  presents  the  following  fundamental 
elements :  It  was  passionately  Christian  under  a  church 
which  was  an  integral  part  of  the  great  Roman  Cath- 
olic church;  it  was  agricultural  with  the  land  owned 
by  the  great  landlords,  the  prelates  and  barons,  and 
worked  by  the  peasants  whose  economic  and  legal  sta- 
tus was  very  miserable;  and  it  was  monarchical  with 
the  political  power  shared  between  the  sovereign  and 
the  great  lords  of  church  and  state,  but  never  exer- 
cised autocratically  by  the  sovereign,  even  when  he 
was  a  man  of  exceptional  power,  because  his  depend- 
ence on  the  privileged  orders  was,  under  existing  con- 
ditions, fixed  and  irremediable. 

Now  if  you  should  try  to  imagine  yourselves  back  in 
early  medieval  times  looking  about  the  European  world 
and  taking  stock  of  the  young  and  formative  German, 
French,  and  English  nations,  you  would  be  impressed 
with  the  fact  that  Germany  was  better  organized, 
probably  more  populous,  and  certainly  more  powerful 
and  possessed  of  greater  international  authority  than 
her  two  western  rivals;  and  on  the  basis  of  such  obser- 
vations you  would  be  justified  in  prophesying  that  a 
great  and  brilliant  future  was  in  store  for  her.  That 
prophecy,  however,  would  be  found  to  run  counter 
to  the  facts,  for  history  shows  that  this  brilliant 
medieval  Germany,  after  a  relatively  brief  career, 


6          The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

showed  unmistakable  signs  of  decay  and  that  even 
before  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages  it  had  been  fairly 
outstripped  by  England  and  France  which,  consoli- 
dated in  government  and  strengthened  by  new  terri- 
tory, presently  struck  that  proud  stride  which  carried 
them  not  only  without  break  but  with  cumulative  tri- 
umph through  century  after  century  down  to  our  own 
day. 

I  am  therefore  obliged  to  put  the  question,  What 
was  it  that  produced  this  overthrow  of  medieval  Ger- 
many after  so  prosperous  and  vigorous  a  beginning? 
The  complete  answer  would  prove  a  long  story,  but 
in  the  main  it  will  be  found  to  be  contained  in  a  num- 
ber of  ferments  and  ideas  peculiar  to  the  period.  Many 
or  all  of  these  may  seem  to  us  of  a  later  age  no  better 
than  absurd  hallucinations,  but  our  altered  viewpoint 
should  not  keep  us  from  recognizing  that  they  had 
a  perfectly  intelligible  origin  in  the  conditions  of  the 
time,  and  that  they  enjoyed  an  extraordinary  and  uni- 
versal authority. 

One  of  the  most  potent  of  the  concepts  dominating 
the  medieval  period  was  the  coming  again  of  the 
Roman  Empire,  the  famous  world-empire  of  Caesar 
and  Augustus.  It  was  fervently  believed  that  this 
revived  Roman  Empire  would  establish  harmony 
among  the  newly  formed  European  nations,  terminate 
the  fierce  local  strife  maintained  everywhere  by  the 
feudal  barons,  bring  back  an  even-handed  justice  ready 
to  let  its  sword  fall  on  rich  and  poor  alike,  and  cul- 
minate by  realizing  that  noble  prospect,  the  dream 
dreamt  by  lovers  of  their  kind  in  all  periods  of  the 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  7 

world's  history,  universal  peace.  What  wonder  then, 
that  in  the  formative  centuries  to  which  I  am  inviting 
your  attention,  the  sovereign  of  the  German  state,  who 
by  his  sudden  rise  towered  above  the  shoulders  of  the 
other  sovereigns  of  Europe,  should  have  had  the  idea 
suggested  to  him  that  he  was  the  prayerfully  awaited 
Roman  emperor! 

The  clergy,  who  were  the  only  educated  and  intel- 
lectual men  of  the  time,  were  particularly  emphatic 
in  preaching  the  imperial  doctrine,  and  had  much  to 
do  with  bringing  the  German  monarch  to  the  point 
of  action.  Above  all,  the  pope,  head  of  the  Christian 
church,  beckoned  from  across  the  Alps  and  summoned 
him  to  take  the  seat  divinely  prepared  for  him  in  the 
Eternal  City.  Accordingly,  he  gathered  his  followers 
and  entered  Italy.  At  Rome  he  was  festively  received 
by  Christ's  vicar,  who  put  the  crown  upon  the  visitor's 
brow  and  solemnly,  without  the  faintest  sense  of 
absurdity,  proclaimed  him  —  in  simple  truth  no  more 
than  a  semi-barbarous  chieftain  from  the  frozen  north 
—  the  Roman  emperor  come  again ! 

To  such  heights  had  theory  carried  the  German  sov- 
ereign's adventurous  footsteps  when  he  found  himself 
face  to  face  not  with  theory  but  with  reality.  To  grasp 
the  situation  in  its  fullness  we  must  keep  before  our 
mind  that  the  medieval  theory  of  the  emperor,  grant- 
ing to  that  functionary  universal  authority  in  civil 
matters,  had  as  its  counterpart  the  theory  of  the  pope, 
which  conceded  to  the  head  of  the  Christian  church 
sole  and  unquestioned  authority  in  matters  spiritual. 
Finally,  to  harmonize  all  the  elements  of  their  teach- 


8          The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

ing,  the  theorists  affirmed  that  pope  and  emperor  were 
in  no  sense  rivals,  but  that  each  supplemented  the  other 
since  each  enjoyed  authority  in  an  absolutely  distinct 
realm.  But  however  clean  cut  the  doctrine  was,  the 
application  of  it  was  a  different  matter  and  for  a  rea- 
son so  simple  that  we  can  only  wonder  that  the  delusion 
was  not  dispersed  as  soon  as  it  was  born. 

Just  as  in  the  actual  living  of  our  lives  an  exact 
dividing  line  can  not  be  drawn  between  body  and  soul, 
so  in  our  community  existence  it  cannot  be  drawn 
between  church  and  state;  and  no  matter  how  sincere 
we  be  in  our  desire  to  keep  these  domains  separate, 
in  practice  mankind  thus  far  has  steadily  found  them 
variously  and  inextricably  entangled.  The  result  was 
that  pope  and  emperor  fell  to  furious  quarreling  and, 
in  spite  of  all  the  philosophic  assertions  about  inde- 
pendence and  equality,  each  rudely  attempted  to  estab- 
lish his  authority  over  the  other  in  the  profound  private 
conviction  that  if  there  was  to  be  world-mastery  it 
should  be  exercised  by  one  and  not  by  two  individuals. 
Never  did  a  theory,  redolent  of  Arcadian  promise  but 
based  on  a  false  and  arbitrary  view  of  the  nature  of 
man  and  of  society,  produce  a  more  terrible  crop  of 
disasters !  The  details  do  not  concern  us  here.  Suf- 
fice it  that  pope  and  emperor  were  at  daggers  drawn 
for  many  generations  and  ended  one  bloody  war  only 
to  begin  another.  And  naturally  in  the  course  of  this 
bitter  struggle  the  pope  summoned  to  his  help  what- 
ever agencies  he  found  at  hand.  Among  these,  first 
to  consider  and  of  steadiest  service,  was  the  great  spir- 
itual agency  of  excommunication  —  the  power  he  had 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  9 

as  representative  of  Christ  on  earth  to  lay  his  curse 
on  those  whom  he  regarded  as  the  enemies  of  Holy 
Church.  But  help  of  a  more  material  sort  was  not 
lacking  either.  He  called  upon  the  prelates  and  great 
lords  of  Italy  to  aid  him  with  their  arms  and  resources; 
he  called  upon  the  rising  Italian  cities  such  as  Flor- 
ence, Milan,  and  Venice,  which  were  just  coming  to 
the  front  through  the  development  of  commerce  and 
industry;  and  finally  he  did  not  scruple  to  send  his 
appeal  across  the  Alps  and  call  upon  the  princes  of 
Germany,  always  anxious  to  reduce  the  power  of  their 
sovereign  in  order  that  their  own  power  might  grow 
by  his  decline. 

Before  this  combined  pressure  of  the  pope  and  his 
supporters  applied  for  generations,  the  emperor  went 
to  the  ground,  and  to  the  end  of  escaping  complete 
destruction  he  was  at  last  obliged  to  make  peace  on 
such  terms  as  he  could  get.  In  their  final  form  these 
terms  involved  his  bending  a  humble  knee  before  the 
pope,  whom  he  recognized  as  his  superior,  and  his 
withdrawal  fro'm  Italy  and  her  affairs;  but  of  more 
particular  concern  to  us,  as  students  of  Germany,  is 
that  he  was  obliged  to  surrender  most  of  his  sovereign 
rights  in  his  German  homeland  to  the  princes  and 
bishops,  that  is,  to  the  lords  lay  and  spiritual,  and  to 
be  content  henceforth  with  the  merely  nominal  head- 
ship of  the  nation. 

This  movement  of  decline  in  the  power  of  the  sov- 
ereign was  complete  by  the  thirteenth  century,  and 
therewith  the  first  or  medieval  unity  of  Germany  was, 
if  not  destroyed,  at  least  very  substantially  undermined. 


10        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

But  Destiny  is  ever  ready  to  grant  new  chances  to  those 
of  her  children  whose  courage  does  not  fail  them,  and 
the  emperor,  weakened  and  reduced  as  he  was,  had 
tossed  to  him  at  least  one  splendid  opportunity  to  win 
back  his  lost  authority.  It  came  in  the  period  of  the 
Protestant  Reformation. 

You  all  are  familiar  with  certain  far-famed  and 
rather  obvious  aspects  of  the  Reformation.  You  know 
that  early  in  the  sixteenth  century  there  arose  an 
Augustinian  friar,  by  the  name  of  Martin  Luther,  who 
joined  issue  with  the  pope  over  the  question  of  In- 
dulgences, and  that  the  Indulgence  issue,  broadening 
and  deepening  until  it  drew  ever  wider  circles,  ended  in 
the  effort  to  terminate  once  and  for  all  the  pope's  con- 
trol of  the  Christian  church  in  Germany.  Knowing  so 
much,  you  are  aware  that  the  Reformation  was  in  the 
eyes  of  contemporaries  as  well  as  in  our  own  eyes  a 
passionate  movement  in  the  field  of  religion  and  church 
government. 

But  the  Reformation  was  a  great  deal  more  than 
a  religious  crisis,  for  it  could  never  have  been  so  gen- 
eral and  powerful  if  it  had  not  run  parallel  with  a 
great  national  outburst.  The  national  sentiment  had 
become  awakened,  really  for  the  first  time  in  German 
history,  by  what  were  profoundly  felt  to  be  oppress- 
ive acts  of  the  pope  against  the  German  state  and 
people.  It  was,  above  all,  his  policy  of  extortionate 
taxation  that  aroused  the  whole  nation  on  palpable, 
material  grounds  against  the  Roman  pontiff  as  a  for- 
eign tyrant  whose  yoke  was  galling  and  destructive. 
So  deep  was  the  patriotic  indignation  that  any  emperor, 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  11 

possessed  of  sufficient  understanding  to  put  himself  at 
the  head  of  the  movement  and  speak  the  magic  word 
for  which  the  people  waited,  would  have  found  a  force 
behind  him  capable  of  sweeping  him  irresistibly  into 
the  position  of  command  abandoned  in  the  thirteenth 
century.  On  the  ruin  of  his  power  the  princes  and 
prelates  had  built  their  individual  states,  but  they  would 
now  have  been  ruined  in  their  turn  and  the  central 
power  would  have  been  reconstituted  if  the  emperor, 
making  the  most  of  his  unique  chance,  had  boldly 
stepped  before  his  nation  as  its  heaven-sent  leader. 

It  was  the  immeasurable  misfortune  of  Germany 
that  a  nationally  minded  emperor  was  not  at  hand 
at  that  moment  when  the  whole  political  stage  was  set 
for  his  arrival,  and  that  in  consequence  the  splendid 
opportunity  was  permitted  to  go  by  unused.  The 
emperor,  contemporary  with  Luther,  was  Charles  v, 
an  intelligent  man  in  his  way,  who  cut  a  very  con- 
siderable figure  in  the  world  in  a  long  reign  of  thirty- 
six  years  (1520-56).  But  from  the  German  national 
viewpoint  Charles  v  had  one  overwhelming  drawback 
that  more  than  cancelled  his  many  personal  merits: 
he  was  brought  up  far  from  German  influences  in  the 
Netherlands  and  Spain,  countries  that  he  was  destined 
to  inherit  and  to  which  he  belonged  quite  as  much 
as  to  Germany,  and  his  Dutch  and  Spanish  teachers 
had  inculcated  in  him  a  blind  devotion  to  the  Roman 
church. 

When,  on  mounting  the  throne,  he  came  to  Germany 
for  the  first  time  in  his  life,  Martin  Luther  had  just 
precipitated  the  enormous  Reformation  crisis.  Per- 


12         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

haps  we  should  in  justice  remember  that  Charles  was 
only  twenty  years  old  when  he  faced  the  situation, 
but,  whether  it  was  the  fault  of  his  inexperience  or 
of  his  cold  and  narrow  nature,  he  proved  himself 
utterly  incapable  of  understanding  what  stirred  the 
nation  to  the  very  depth  of  its  soul.  Not  only  did 
he  manifest  an  immediate  aversion  for  Luther,  but 
feeling  himself  to  be  a  Spaniard  rather  than  a  German, 
he  eagerly  resolved  to  do  what  lay  in  his  power  to 
crush  the  national  movement,  since  in  his  eyes  it  was 
but  the  cloak  of  a  rebellion  directed  against  the  divinely 
sanctioned  power  of  the  church.  By  virtue  of  his 
position  he  was  enabled  to  gather  together  a  minority 
of  the  people  and  princes  on  his  conservative  plat- 
form, while  the  majority,  the  rebellious  and  progress- 
ive mass  of  the  nation,  fell  in  behind  the  banner  of 
Protestantism.  Thus  the  country  was  torn  from  end 
to  end  and  an  unparalleled  opportunity  to  produce 
unity  served  only  as  the  occasion  of  a  new  and  more 
fatal  division  than  had  existed  before. 

The  two  parties,  Catholics  and  Protestants,  faced 
each  other  with  bitter  religious  animosity  and,  begin- 
ning with  sporadic  conflicts  patched  up  with  ambigu- 
ous treaties,  they  at  last  engaged  in  one  of  the  most 
terrible  and  prolonged  struggles  of  history.  I  am 
referring  to  the  great  civil  conflict  known  as  the  Thirty 
Years'  War.  The  Thirty  Years'  War  was  waged  in 
the  seventeenth  century  from  the  year  1618  to  the  year 
1648,  and  when  it  was  over  it  left  behind  a  devastated 
country  and  an  utterly  exhausted  people.  Considered 
as  a  duel  of  rival  religions  the  most  striking  thing 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  13 

about  the  inhuman  combat  was  that  it  brought  a  vic- 
tory to  neither  side.  It  was  substantially  a  draw,  with 
the  result  that  the  peace  of  Westphalia,  which  con- 
cluded the  long  agony,  declared  that  those  who  were 
Protestants  might  continue  to  remain  Protestants  and 
that  those  who  were  Catholics  might  continue  to  remain 
Catholics.  By  virtue  of  this  compromise  there  was 
established  in  law  and  in  fact  that  mixed  Germany, 
part  Catholic  and  part  Protestant,  that  meets  and 
astonishes  the  religious  inquirer  to  this  day. 

From  a  political  viewpoint  however,  the  Thirty 
Years'  War  was  so  little  in  the  nature  of  a  compro- 
mise and  so  wholly  decisive  that  it  put  a  final  end  to 
the  German  state.  It  accomplished  that  result  by 
virtue  of  the  articles  of  the  treaty  that  deprived  the 
emperor  of  his  last  remaining  sovereign  powers  and 
distributed  them  among  the  princes,  bishops,  and  city 
republics;  that  is,  among  the  several  hundred  small 
states  making  up  the  dominion  of  Germany.  It  is 
true  that  the  imperial  office  was  not  abolished  and 
that  even  an  imperial  legislature  (Reichstag)  and  an 
imperial  court  (Reichsgericht)  were  left  standing. 
But  since  all  the  effective  powers  of  government  had 
been  legally  transferred  to  the  component  states,  the 
federal  institutions  became  more  and  more  negligible. 
It  happens  that  they  were  not  abolished  and  the  coun- 
try cleared  of  their  useless  and  unhandsome  presence 
till  1806,  one  hundred  and  fifty  years  later;  but  that 
fact  need  not  hinder  us  from  declaring  that  as  a 
national  state  Germany  ceased  to  figure  in  the  politics 
of  Europe  from  the  year  1648. 


14        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

Under  these  circumstances  it  may  seem  surprising 
that  not  infrequently  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries  we  encounter  an  emperor  who  was  a  person 
of  power  and  dignity;  but  let  us  make  no  mistake,  he 
owed  such  distinction  as  he  enjoyed  not  to  any  power 
the  federal  constitution  gave  him  —  how  could  he  when 
the  constitution  had  become  a  mockery?  —  but  solely 
to  the  power  springing  from  his  hereditary  possessions, 
to  what  the  Germans  call  his  Hausmacht.  For  it  should 
be  noted  that  the  emperor  was  also  head  of  the  German 
province  of  Austria  which  happened  to  be  larger  than 
any  other  German  state  and  gave  him  an  important 
revenue.  Such  power  as  he  wielded  after  1648  was 
therefore  an  exact  expression  of  the  area,  population, 
resources,  and  organization  of  Austria.  But  as  these 
were  considerable  and  on  the  increase  the  Austrian 
ruler  was  enabled  to  speak  a  weighty  word  in  the  coun- 
cils of  Europe,  due,  however,  as  anyone  with  eyes  can 
see,  to  his  hereditary  lands  and  in  no  sense  to  any 
authority  conceded  to  him  by  the  moribund  German 
constitution. 

Thus  going  to  the  root  of  things  and  refusing  to 
be  deluded  by  appearances,  we  may  confidently  assert 
that  the  year  1648  saw  the  end  of  the  elder  Germany. 
That  end  indeed  had  long  been  threatening.  In  the 
thirteenth  century  the  emperor  had  been  obliged  to 
give  way  before  the  encroaching  princes,  and  when 
the  Reformation  gave  him  a  popular  following  with 
which  to  renew  the  struggle,  he  had,  through  a  fatal 
mischance,  scorned  to  use  it.  The  Protestant-Catholic 
cleavage  had  followed,  ending  in  a  civil  war  of  unpar- 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  15 

alleled  dimensions  and  ferocity,  and  when  it  was  at 
last  over  political  Germany  presented  the  appearance 
of  having  been  broken  as  under  the  blow  of  a  giant's 
hammer  into  scores  of  little  fragments. 

You  will  permit  me  to  pause  at  the  peace  of  West- 
phalia in  order  to  illustrate  with  some  corroborative 
detail  the  misery  of  Germany  at  the  time  she  lost  her 
national  unity  and  found  the  blackness  of  death  closing 
over  her.  It  is  important  that  we  comprehend  her 
general  situation,  for  it  is  the  year  1648  that  I  accept 
as  the  effective  starting-point  of  the  new  Germany, 
whose  story  is  the  real  matter  of  these  lectures. 

The  political  annihilation  already  recounted  was 
only  part  of  the  wretched  story  of  the  Thirty  Years' 
War.  The  economic  exhaustion  was  no  less  complete 
and  furnishes  the  explanation  of  the  grinding  want  that 
henceforth  for  years  to  come  pinched  every  class  and 
household.  The  long  war  had  driven  its  burning 
chariot  over  every  square  mile  of  German  territory, 
and  there  were  extensive  areas  where  the  contending 
battle  lines  had  swayed  to  and  fro  a  score  of  times. 
The  result  was  that  the  cities  were  depopulated,  their 
commerce  and  industry  dead.  In  the  countryside 
whole  counties  were  deserted  by  their  peasants,  who 
no  longer  were  willing  to  till  the  fields  since  before 
the  harvests  could  be  gathered,  the  ripening  grain 
would  be  leveled  with  the  ground  by  the  trample  of 
armed  hosts.  In  some  particularly  stricken  regions 
the  jungle  had  resumed  its  sway  and  an  impenetrable 
underbrush  covered  the  scattered  and  pathetic  vestiges 
of  man's  labor. 


16        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

We  need  not  believe  all  the  tales  told  by  contem- 
porary chroniclers  —  tales,  for  instance,  of  famished 
men  turned  cannibals,  or  of  wolves  that  laid  siege  to 
villages  deserted  except  for  a  few  toothless  men  and 
women  —  but  the  simple  indisputable  facts  are  these : 
The  population  was  reduced  by  more  than  half;  all 
the  material  savings  of  the  nation,  its  working  capital, 
was  wiped  out;  the  cities,  sapped  of  the  trade  which 
was  their  life-blood,  had  become  empty  shells;  and 
the  villages,  when  they  had  not  been  burned  with  fire, 
had  been  plundered  of  their  movables  and  left  as  bare 
as  a  bone.  Considering  all  these  items  we  become 
aware  that,  economically,  we  are  confronted  with  a 
nation  which  is  once  again  at  the  beginning  of  things 
and  which,  having  lost  the  patient  and  painful  accumu- 
lations of  centuries  of  labor,  must  make  an  absolutely 
new  start. 

Nor  are  we  yet  at  the  end  of  our  tale.  Educationally 
and  intellectually  the  situation  was  no  whit  less  dis- 
couraging. In  the  course  of  thirty  years  of  warfare 
that  slowly  ground  the  hearts  out  of  men,  the  schools 
and  universities  had  fallen  into  neglect,  and  even  the 
churches,  both  Protestant  and  Catholic,  had  to  a  large 
extent  been  obliged  to  shut  their  doors  for  lack  of 
pastors.  The  generation  alive  in  the  year  1648  had 
been  brought  up  without  learning  or  religion;  that  is, 
without  those  institutions  by  virtue  of  which  man  has 
chiefly  succeeded  in  differentiating  himself  from  the 
beasts  of  the  field.  The  society  therefore  of  the  West- 
phalian  treaty,  grown  up  amidst  scenes  of  violence 
and  inured  to  habits  of  war,  was  brutalized,  anarchic, 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  17 

unused  to  curb  or  restraint,  and  profoundly  unwilling 
once  more  to  submit  to  discipline  and  acquire  the  train- 
ing necessary  for  fruitful  social  cooperation. 

Such  were  the  elements  of  German  decay  in  1648, 
bad  enough  under  any  circumstances  but  rendered 
acutely  alarming  by  Germany's  position  in  Europe. 
During  the  long  civil  war  the  neighbors  of  Germany, 
some  of  them  strong  and  ambitious  powers,  had  natur- 
ally cast  an  interested  eye  upon  her  confusion.  By 
taking  sides  with  either  Protestants  or  Catholics  they 
were  able  to  insinuate  themselves  into  the  situation  and 
had  ended  by  invading  her  territory.  The  powers 
most  actively  engaged  in  this  policy  were  France  and 
Sweden.  France,  under  the  guidance  of  Cardinal 
Richelieu,  one  of  the  boldest  and  cleverest  statesmen 
she  has  ever  produced,  entered  Germany  from  the  west 
and  established  herself  on  the  upper  Rhine  in  the  prov- 
ince of  Alsace;  at  the  same  time  Sweden,  yielding  to 
the  initiative  of  her  famous  and  heroic  king,  Gusta- 
vus  Adolphus,  crossed  the  Baltic  sea  and  planted  herself 
on  the  German  coast,  holding  firmly  in  her  grasp  the 
province  of  Pomerania. 

When  the  peace  of  Westphalia  concluded  the  war 
France  and  Sweden  resolutely  insisted  that  they  be  re- 
warded with  the  territory  each  had  successfully  seized. 
These  German  losses  at  two  points,  west  and  north, 
were  in  themselves  a  serious  blow,  but  when  you  now 
recall  that  the  political  effect  of  the  war  was  to  destroy 
the  central  government  and  to  leave  Germany  politically 
paralyzed,  it  became  highly  probable  that  the  loss  of 
Alsace  and  of  the  Baltic  coast  would  merely  prove  the 


18        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

preface  of  further  seizures.  And  if  these  seizures 
continued,  was  it  not  more  than  likely  that  other  neigh- 
bors, in  addition  to  France  and  Sweden,  becoming 
interested  would  appropriate  each  one  what  lay  con- 
venient to  his  hand  and  thus  effect  in  the  course  of  time 
a  complete  partition  of  the  German  realm  and  a  final 
annihilation  of  the  German  name? 

But  even  the  gray  tints  thus  far  contributed  do  not 
adequately  present  the  whole  desolate  picture  of  Ger- 
many in  1648.  To  measure  the  depth  of  the  country's 
downfall  you  must  look  about  in  the  European  world 
of  that  day  and  see  Germany  in  relation  to  the  great 
movement  in  which  mankind  was  then  engaged.  The 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  constitute  a  momen- 
tous period.  They  witnessed  a  splendid  new  birth;  in 
fact  it  was  during  their  sway  that  our  race  laid  those 
broad  foundations  upon  which  has  been  erected  the 
lofty  edifice  of  our  recent  civilization. 

Though  it  is  difficult  indeed  to  express  in  a  few 
words  the  weighty  happening,  I  must  make  the  attempt. 
What  was  it  that  took  place?  After  long  centuries 
of  medieval  twilight,  in  which  man  had  been  content 
to  walk  a  narrow  path  with  humble,  downcast  eyes, 
he  began  to  feel  the  need  of  an  untrammeled  outlook. 
He  gazed  about  him  with  quickened  curiosity,  and  as 
day  by  day  the  world  unfolded  a  new  charm,  he  gradu- 
ally became  enamored  of  its  loveliness  and  was  stirred 
to  penetrate  into  its  remotest  corners.  Travel,  com- 
merce, industrial  enterprise,  and  that  methodical  obser- 
vation which  we  call  science  followed  in  due  order 
and  enriched  the  mind  of  man  with  their  varied  benefits. 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  19 

As  a  consequence  the  parochial  medieval  world  slipped 
away  like  a  dissolving  mist  and  our  great,  free  earth 
and  the  celestial  universe  enfolding  it  hove  gradually 
into  view. 

Of  course  I  can  not  tabulate  all  the  fresh  forces 
which  were  released  in  man  and  society  and  cooper- 
ated to  produce  the  Modern  Age.  I  shall  have  to 
content  myself  to  point  out  one  of  these  revolution- 
izing agents,  perhaps  the  most  important  of  all.  In 
the  fifteenth  century  began  the  Voyages  of  Discovery. 
Under  the  leadership  of  intrepid  Portuguese,  Spanish, 
and  Italian  adventurers,  hardy  men  such  as  Prince 
Henry  of  Portugal,  Vasco  da  Gama,  Christopher 
Columbus,  and  Magellan,  sea  voyages  were  under- 
taken, as  a  result  of  which  the  familiar  little  continent 
of  Europe  shrivelled  to  its  true  proportions  and  the 
big  round  world  with  its  land  and  oceans  assumed  the 
physical  aspect  which  it  bears  for  us  today.  The  west- 
ern hemisphere  with  North  and  South  America,  as 
well  as  vast,  uncharted  tracts  of  Asia  and  of  Africa, 
now  first  disclosed  their  wonders  to  the  white  man 
and  invited  him  to  trade,  to  conquer,  and  to  settle. 

This  brilliant  opening  was  offered  only  once  —  and 
since  there  was  only  one  world  to  discover  could 
be  offered  only  once  —  to  the  peoples  of  Europe,  and 
it  was  offered  in  the  time  when  Germany  was  passing 
through  the  Reformation  and  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 
It  is  clear  that  for  a  people  to  make  the  most  of  the 
unique  opportunity  for  power  and  expansion,  it  had  to 
have  a  strong  government  capable  of  giving  ample  pro- 
tection to  the  adventurers  and  merchant-companies  who 


20        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

risked  their  all  to  cross  the  ocean  and  seize  the  inaccess- 
ible and  often  hostile  lands.  These  facts  considered, 
what  European  nations  were  in  a  position  to  compete 
for  the  exceptional  prizes  lifting  their  siren  voices  from 
afar?  Of  course  only  such  as  were  organized  —  Por- 
tugal and  Spain  first,  later  England,  France,  Sweden, 
and  the  Dutch.  A  country  like  Ireland,  conquered  by 
England  and  deprived  of  its  power  of  independent 
action,  and  such  countries  as  Italy  and  Poland  that 
were  the  prey  of  domestic  anarchy,  never  entered  the 
race  at  all.  And  Germany,  the  object  of  our  particular 
concern,  was  definitely  eliminated  because  the  Voyages 
of  Discovery  with  all  they  meant  of  splendor  and 
opportunity  occurred  at  the  very  time  of  those  calami- 
ties that  I  have  been  describing  and  that  brought  down 
upon  her  the  loss  of  her  central  government  and  her 
final  dissolution  into  three  hundred  insignificant  states. 
When  in  1871  Germany  became  again  united  she 
naturally,  in  sign  of  her  recovery,  went  down  to  the  sea 
in  ships  and  sought  out  colonies  beyond  the  bounds  of 
Europe.  But  on  whatever  land  her  eye  fell  there  was 
already  established  an  earlier  claimant  except  in  a  few 
tropical  regions  unsuited  as  habitations  for  Europeans. 
What  at  that  late  date  Germany  could  still  take  pos- 
session of  was  unprofitable  waste  and  in  no  sense  the 
likely  basis  of  a  prosperous  colonial  empire.  Essen- 
tially reunited  Germany  is  therefore  a  purely  European 
power  and  this  narrow  destiny  has  been  meted  out  to 
her  because  of  her  disastrous  eclipse  in  the  heroic  age 
when  the  trans-European  continents  were  partitioned 
among  the  cunning  and  the  strong. 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  21 

And  her  loss  was  not  merely  a  matter  of  wealth  and 
power,  but,  in  point  of  fact,  primarily  a  loss  in  the 
realm  of  mind  and  character.  The  Spaniards,  French, 
and  English  found  themselves,  they  really  only  discov- 
ered the  reaches  of  their  genius  in  wrestling  with  the 
varied  problems  cast  up  by  the  new  world  beyond  the 
Atlantic  ocean.  This  will  appear  to  any  one  who  will 
take  the  trouble  to  imagine  the  history  of  Spain  or 
France  or  England  apart  from  their  colonial  enterprise 
and  the  colonial  communities  which  that  enterprise 
called  into  being.  How  the  glow  would  fade  from  the 
pages  of  their  history  without  the  Spanish  Main,  the 
treasure  of  the  Incas,  the  Indian  wars,  the  search  for 
El  Dorado,  the  northern  fur  trade  and  a  thousand 
equally  thrilling  facts  and  incidents!  Taken  together 
they  signify  an  experience  in  the  fierce  heat  of  which 
the  souls  of  Spain  and  France  and  England,  as  we  have 
come  historically  to  know  them,  received  their  finest 
edge  and  quality.  And  of  this  invaluable  experience 
stricken  and  stay-at-home  Germany  was  by  decree  of 
fate  deprived. 

A  dark  and  somber  picture  this  of  seventeenth  cen- 
tury Germany!  But,  after  all,  the  situation,  however 
desperate,  can  not  have  been  entirely  without  hope. 
There  must  have  been  somewhere  in  that  dead,  dull 
mass  of  German  life  a  tiny  spark  that  could  be  made  to 
blaze  again,  for  how  else  are  we  to  explain  that  some 
two  hundred  years  after  the  loss  of  her  first  unity  Ger- 
many, mewing  her  eagle-youth,  was  re-created?  As 
I  have  already  stated,  it  is  this  process  of  the  second 
unification  that  we  are  going  primarily  to  examine  in 


22        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

these  lectures.  Therefore  by  way  of  introduction  I 
shall  now  invite  your  attention  to  the  first  inconspicu- 
ous signs  of  recovery  in  the  diseased  commonwealth  — 
signs  that  led  to  movements  which,  proceeding  logically 
from  stage  to  stage,  culminated  at  last  in  the  famous 
scene  enacted  on  January  18,  1871,  in  the  Hall  of  Mir- 
rors at  Versailles. 

If  you  will  turn  to  a  map  (page  30)  and  find  the 
broad  North  German  plain  you  will  observe  that  it  is 
crossed  by  parallel  streams,  such  as  the  Rhine,  the 
Weser,  the  Elbe,  the  Oder,  and  the  Vistula,  all  of 
which  flow  from  the  south  and  carry  the  waters  of  the 
central  highlands  of  Europe  to  the  North  and  Baltic 
seas.  In  the  heart  of  that  North  German  plain,  be- 
tween the  Elbe  and  Oder  rivers,  there  existed  in  the 
seventeenth  century  the  little  state  of  Brandenburg,  in 
outer  semblance  very  much  like  Saxony,  Hanover, 
Brunswick,  Mecklenburg,  and  the  other  German  prin- 
cipalities that  lay  about  it.  If  I  propose  to  isolate  it 
for  examination  it  is  because  this  state  of  Brandenburg 
served  as  the  nucleus  of  the  new  Germany.  So  strange 
a  fact  must  straightway  raise  the  question  why  this 
dominion  rather  than  any  of  its  neighbors  should  have 
been  thus  singled  out  by  destiny. 

A  swift  plunge  into  the  history  of  Brandenburg 
before  and  during  the  seventeenth  century  will  supply 
the  answer.  The  little  state  came  into  being  in  the 
early  Middle  Ages  as  a  march  (in  German,  mark),  or 
military  district  to  protect  Germany  fronn-the  incursions 
of  the  numerous  Slav  tribes  to  the  east.  A  national 
outpost  organized  for  war  it  grew  in  measure  as  it 


NORTH 
SEA 


THE  TERRITORIAL  GROWTH  OF  PRUSSIA  IN  • 

This  map  shows  the  territorial  growth  of  Brandenburg-Prussia  in  the  si 

with  its  parallel  streams  of  the  Rhine,  Weser,  Elbe,  Oder,  and  Vistula.     Bi 

sand  and  marsh  levels  between  the  Elbe  and  Oder.     When  the  Great  Elect 

the  duchy  of  Prussia  (later  called  East  Prussia).     In  addition,  he  had  inhei 

of  Cleves.     By  virtue  of  the  treaty  of  Westphalia  (1648),   the  Great  Elector 

Magdeburg  on  the  Elbe.     It  was  the  above  group  of  lands  which  he  merged 

His  grandson,  Frederick  William  I,  acquired  in  1720  the  mouth  of  the 

But  the  acquisitions  which  gave  Prussia  a  standing  among  the  great  pc 

added  to  the  Hohenzollern  lands  Silesia  and  West  Prussia.     Silesia  enabled 

knit  up  the  detached  East  Prussia  to  the  bulk  of  the  monarchy. 


T  RUSSIA  4' 


:  SEVENTEENTH  AND  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURIES 

teenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  We  have  before  us  the  North  German  plain 
snburg,  the  nucleus  of  modern  Germany,  is  seen,  with  its  capital  Berlin,  in  the 
ounted  the  throne  in  1640,  he  was  not  only  lord  of  Brandenburg,  but  also  of 

certain  small  territories  on  the  lower  Rhine,   here  comprized  under  the  name 
uired  the  part  of  Pomerania  east  of  the  Oder  and  the  city  and  territory  of 

an  ordered  state. 

•  with  the  port  of  Stettin,  and  a  section  of  Pomerania  to  the  west  of  the  river, 
i  of  Europe  were  made  by  Frederick  the  Great  (1740-86).     This  sovereign 
issia  to  compete  with  Austria  for  the  control  of  Germany,  and  West  Prussia 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  23 

overcame  its  enemies.  And  undoubted  progress  was 
made  from  the  first,  but  the  rate  of  territorial  advance 
was  for  a  long  time  not  particularly  striking  owing  to 
the  circumstances  that  one  of  the  largest  of  the  Slav 
tribes,  the  Poles,  presently  organized  a  powerful  rival 
state  of  their  own.  In  spite  of  ever  increasing  diffi- 
culties, the  rulers  of  Brandenburg,  keeping  a  vigilant 
lookout,  managed  gradually  to  extend  their  sway,  espe- 
cially in  the  direction  of  the  Baltic  sea,  the  natural  aim 
of  a  north-German  inland  power  seeking  an  economic 
outlet. 

In  the  sixteenth  century  a  very  important  accession 
to  the  original  nucleus  took  place.  A  branch  of  the 
ruling  line  of  Brandenburg  had  acquired  the  throne  of 
the  duchy  of  Prussia,  and  when,  in  1618,  that  branch 
died  out  the  title  to  Prussia  passed  to  the  main  line. 
The  duchy  of  Prussia  of  that  period  was  a  small  state 
on  the  coast  of  the  Baltic,  to  the  east  of  the  Vistula 
river.  Its  capital  and  chief  port  of  trade  was  Koenigs- 
berg.  Though  settled  by  Germans  since  the  thirteenth 
century,  when  it  was  conquered  from  the  heathen  and 
now  long  since  extinct  tribe  of  Prussians,  it  was  never 
officially  incorporated  in  the  German  Empire.  A  hun- 
dred years  after  its  acquisition  by  the  ruler  of  Branden- 
burg, this  remote  and  inconspicuous  Prussia  gave  its 
name  to  all  the  lands  accumulated  by  the  reigning  house, 
and  completely  drove  the  older  name  of  Brandenburg 
from  common  usage.  In  order  not  to  anticipate,  that 
change  will  be  explained  later  in  its  proper  chronolog- 
ical place.  All  that  we  must  be  sure  of  seizing  at  this 
point  is  that  seventeenth  century  Brandenburg  and 


24        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

Prussia  were  two  distinct  and  geographically  separated 
provinces  of  German  speech  which  an  accident  of  in- 
heritance had  given  to  the  same  sovereign. 

A  similar  succession  accident,  befalling  shortly  after- 
wards, opened  the  prospect  of  acquiring  the  duchy  of 
Pomerania.  When,  in  the  year  1631,  this  duchy, 
lying  on  the  Baltic  sea,  between  the  Vistula  and  the 
Oder,  lost  its  last  native  ruler,  Brandenburg,  on  the 
basis  of  kinship  and  treaties,  laid  claim  to  the  territory. 
Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  Thirty  Years'  War  was 
raging  just  then  and  that  Sweden  presented  a  counter 
claim  to  Pomerania  based  on  the  unanswerable  argu- 
ment of  possession  through  conquest,  Brandenburg 
could  realize  only  a  part  of  her  expectations,  and  after 
long  haggling  was  paid  off  (1648)  with  eastern  Pom- 
erania, leaving  the  more  valuable  western  Pomerania, 
including  the  mouth  of  the  river  Oder,  in  the  hands 
of  Sweden.  None  the  less  she  secured  by  this  com- 
promise a  valuable  additional  coastline  on  the  Baltic. 

Thus  matters  stood  at  the  close  of  the  Thirty  Years' 
War.  The  ruler  of  Brandenburg,  by  virtue  of  his  posi- 
tion at  the  eastern  periphery  of  Germany,  where  polit- 
ical conditions  were  very  much  more  in  flux  than  in  the 
more  settled  Rhine  regions,  had  been  able  to  take 
advantage  of  certain  territorial  opportunities  and  had 
acquired  the  duchy  of  Prussia,  eastern  Pomerania, 
and  a  not  inconsiderable  number  of  lesser  German  dis- 
tricts, of  which  Cleves  on  the  lower  Rhine  calls  for 
particular  mention  as  marking  the  western  limit  of  the 
scattered  Brandenburg  possessions.  A  look  at  the  map 
will  show  that  the  sovereign's  lands  now  straggled  in 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  25 

loose  array  across  the  whole  north-German  plain  from 
the  Rhine  to  the  Niemen !  Therefore  my  former  state- 
ment that  Brandenburg  was  in  1648  a  state  very  much 
like  all  its  neighbors  calls  for  qualification.  Through 
lucky  territorial  additions  it  had  become  the  largest  in 
area  of  all  the  north-German  states  and  by  reason  of 
this  circumstance  was  endowed  with  a  notable  material 
force;  in  fact  the  material  force  was  so  considerable 
that  under  proper  organization  there  was  reason  to 
believe  that  the  state  would  reach  a  development  en- 
abling its  ruler  to  enforce  a  respect  to  which  the 
impotent  little  princes  all  around  could  never  hope  to 
aspire. 

With  quickened  interest  we  now  direct  our  glance  to 
the  all-important  question  of  the  organization  of  the 
little  north-German  territory.  That  first  organization, 
its  various  evolutionary  phases,  its  successes  and  fail- 
ures, and  finally  the  many  remarkable  men  who  pre- 
sided over  the  work,  will  henceforth  engage  our 
attention.  And  at  the  very  head  of  the  list  of  states- 
men-builders we  encounter  the  brilliant  name  of  the 
Elector  Frederick  William.  His  family,  which  bore 
the  name  of  Hohenzollern,  had  exercised  rule  in  Bran- 
denburg since  the  beginning  of  the  fifteenth  century, 
that  is,  for  over  two  hundred  years  prior  to  Frederick 
William's  accession.  The  Hohenzollerns  had  pro- 
duced some  sturdy,  capable  men,  as  the  steady  advance 
of  Brandenburg  would  go  to  prove,  but  they  had  not 
yet  given  birth  to  an  energetic  and  compelling  person- 
ality. If  the  Elector  Frederick  William  was  the  first 
Hohenzollern  who  acquired  a  European  reputation, 


26        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

that  was  due,  in  fairness  be  it  said,  to  his  undoubted 
talents  but,  in  hardly  less  degree,  to  his  exceptional 
opportunity.  For,  mounting  the  throne  in  the  year 
1640,  toward  the  end  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  he  was 
able  to  take  advantage  of  the  Peace  of  Westphalia, 
which  ended  the  long  agony  of  Germany  and  gave  the 
signal  for  the  resumption  of  civilizing  labor  throughout 
the  land. 

Frederick  William  found  himself  in  the  momentous 
year  of  the  Peace  at  the  head  of  the  territories 
already  enumerated  —  Brandenburg,  Prussia,  Pomer- 
ania,  Cleves,  etc.  —  not  inconsiderable  in  total  area 
but  widely  scattered  in  space.  Each  of  these  had  its  own 
administration  and  was  provincially  hostile  to  any  close 
association  with  its  neighbor.  Monstrous  disunion  and 
confusion,  hardly  conceivable  by  the  modern  man,  were 
the  leading  features  of  the  situation  and  were  start- 
lingly  reflected  by  Frederick  William's  wealth  of  titles. 
While  he  was  elector  and  margrave  in  Brandenburg, 
locally  endowed  by  custom  with  certain  definite  rights, 
he  was  duke  in  Prussia  on  the  basis  of  a  local  Prussian 
constitution,  duke  in  Pomerania,  with  powers  deter- 
mined by  Pomeranian  law,  in  fact  he  was  a  score  or  so 
of  different  political  personalities,  some  of  them  infi- 
nitesimal and  ludicrous,  and  might  have  gone  distraught 
over  his  multiple  role  if  he  had  not  from  the  first 
decided  on  a  policy  of  simplification.  As  a  symbol  of 
that  policy  he  encouraged  the  general  use  of  his  chief 
title  of  elector  (Kurfiirst).  That  title  had  in  the  Mid- 
dle Ages  become  attached  to  the  ruler  of  Brandenburg, 
and  signified  that  its  holder,  besides  governing  Bran- 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  27 

denburg,  had  the  right,  together  with  six  other  leading 
territorial  magnates,  to  elect  the  German  emperor. 
The  right  had  once  upon  a  time  meant  much,  but  by 
the  seventeenth  century,  in  consequence  of  the  decline 
of  the  German  constitution,  was  largely  an  empty 
honor.  None  the  less,  because  of  the  national  signifi- 
cance of  the  title,  Frederick  William  preferred  it  to  all 
others.  He  became  known  in  his  life-time  to  all  his 
subjects  alike  as  the  Elector  Frederick  William,  and 
because  his  work  proved  permanent  and  beneficent,  he 
has  since  been  called  simply  and  admiringly  the  Great 
Elector. 

Mounting  the  throne  at  the  youthful  age  of  twenty, 
the  Great  Elector  ruled  for  nearly  half  a  century,  from 
1640  to  1688.  He  showed  from  the  first,  in  addition 
to  a  tireless  energy,  a  remarkable  comprehension  of 
finance,  economics,  and  administration  as  contributory 
factors  in  the  upbuilding  and  strengthening  of  a  state. 
At  the  same  time  his  every  step  in  the  foreign  field  gave 
evidence  of  a  broad  and  clear  vision  of  the  entangled 
politics  of  Europe.  Making  allowance  for  the  smaller 
scale  on  which  he  worked,  we  may  unhesitatingly 
declare  that  he  takes  rank  with  the  greatest  constructive 
statesmen  of  the  seventeenth  century;  with  men  like 
Cardinal  Richelieu  in  France  and  Gustavus  Adolphus, 
king  of  Sweden.  Cardinal  Richelieu,  above  all,  we 
are  obliged  to  think  on  studying  that  minister's  famous 
reorganization  of  the  French  government,  must  have 
supplied  Frederick  William  with  some  elements  of  his 
policy. 

The  central  thought  that  inspired  the  Great  Elector 


28        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

and  irradiated  all  his  plans  was  the  perception  of  the 
woeful  impotence  of  Germany  at  the  end  of  the  Thirty 
Years'  War.  He  observed  that  there  were  many  pow- 
erful neighbors  peering  covetously  over  the  German 
boundary  and,  as  he  read  the  signs  in  the  sky,  he  con- 
cluded that  the  time  would  come,  and  in  all  probability 
come  soon,  when,  resuming  the  policy  followed  in  the 
late  conflict,  these  neighbors  would  combine  to  effect  a 
complete  partition  of  the  helpless  German  lands.  Fred- 
erick William  was  filled  with  patriotic  regret  and  even 
anguish  of  spirit  at  this  prospect,  but  as  matters  stood 
—  the  central  government  destroyed,  himself  the  insig- 
nificant prince  of  a  ruined  province,  the  whole  German 
community  exhausted  and  reduced  to  barbarism  — 
there  was  little  he  could  do  effectively  to  help  the  situa- 
tion. But  though  he  might  not  prove  the  savior  of  the 
fatherland,  he  need  at  least  not  sit  idly  by,  awaiting 
with  hands  folded  in  his  lap  the  clap  of  doom.  As  an 
active,  practical  man  he  could  find  a  task,  limited  per- 
haps in  scope,  but  worthy  of  engaging  his  whole  energy 
and  intelligence.  That  task,  he  came  to  see  with  grad- 
ually enlarging  vision,  was  to  take  the  territory  of 
Brandenburg- Prussia  in  hand  and  to  organize  it  as 
thoroughly  and  effectively  as  he  knew  how.  Then, 
should  Germany's  troubles  continue,  as  was  only  too 
likely,  there  at  least  would  be  his  own  state,  a  solid 
nucleus  in  the  midst  of  a  fluid  and  chaotic  swirl. 

During  his  long  reign  the  Great  Elector  worked 
steadily  at  this  constructive  program,  the  main  features 
of  which  are  easily  recognizable.  Most  important  to 
his  mind  was  a  new  central  administration,  all  the  offi- 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  29 

cials  of  which  were  to  depend  upon  himself.  He  felt 
that  without  a  compact  government,  the  social  order 
and  cooperation  which  were  necessary  after  the  long 
anarchy  of  war  could  not  be  attained,  nor  the  assurance 
be  given  to  peasant  and  citizen  that  they  would  enjoy 
the  product  of  their  labor.  Under  the  system  he  had 
in  mind,  the  taxes  assessed  according  to  law  would  flow 
into  a  central  treasury  and  be  applied  by  state  officials 
to  genuine  community  ends,  such  as  justice,  roads  and 
canals,  forests  and  mines,  and,  finally,  an  army. 

An  army!  That  in  Frederick  William's  manly  view 
was  the  necessary  keystone  of  the  whole  plan.  With 
the  German  situation  characterized  by  political  imper- 
manence  and  threatened  with  ruin  he  very  reasonably 
made  up  his  mind  that  it  was  indispensable  for  Bran- 
derburg  to  be  able  to  defend  itself,  and,  when  the  occa- 
sion rose,  to  meet  force  with  force.  Though  imposed 
by  his  common  sense,  the  policy  was  supplemented  by 
every  patriotic  instinct  that  stirred  in  his  breast  and 
led  him  to  dedicate  with  an  almost  niggard  zeal  every 
thaler  that  he  could  spare  from  his  private  allowance 
as  well  as  from  his  public  resources  to  the  assembling 
and  equipping  of  a  standing  army.  Of  course  with  his 
small  territory  and  reduced  funds  he  could  not  create 
an  army  at  will,  because  soldiers  cost  money,  but  he 
could  strive  to  make  his  force  effective  in  proportion  to 
its  size,  and  that  this  was  successfully  done  was  proved 
by  its  creditable  participation  in  several  wars. 

In  the  course  of  these  wars  which,  since  the  age  was 
turbulent,  were  numerous,  the  Elector's  troops  appeared 
in  the  field  against  Poland,  Sweden,  France,  and  even 


30        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

Turkey.  The  details  need  not  occupy  us  here.  Suffice 
it  to  say  that  all  the  wars  conducted  by  Frederick  Wil- 
liam with  his  small,  though  well-disciplined  force,  served 
in  the  first  place  to  banish  disaster  from  the  threshold 
of  Brandenburg,  and  that  second,  being  courageously 
if  not  always  triumphantly  waged,  they  secured  the 
little  state  a  leading  place  in  northern  Germany  and 
even  carried  its  reputation  modestly  afield  beyond  the 
Rhine  and  Alps. 

At  this  point  we  may  pause,  reiterating  that  Fred- 
erick William's  central  administration  and  strong  army 
became  the  fundamental  institutions  of  Brandenburg- 
Prussia,  and  that,  created  in  the  second  half  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  they  were  steadily  improved  in  the  fol- 
lowing generations.  Only  in  their  light  can  the  political 
movement  of  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries, 
which  came  to  a  head  in  the  rebirth  of  Germany,  be 
understood.  Of  course,  by  themselves  they  were  of 
small  account,  being  just  machinery;  but  properly  sup- 
ported by  statesmen  and  rulers  capable  of  contributing 
intelligence  and  purpose,  supported  finally  by  the  reborn 
German  society  itself,  encouraged  to  take  up  once 
more  its  interrupted  labors  in  the  field,  shop,  school, 
and  laboratory,  army  and  administration  proved  them- 
selves more  than  mechanical  arrangements,  and  un- 
doubtedly served  as  the  historical  agents  of  a  mighty 
national  revolution.  Let  our  final  word  today  be  this: 
in  the  ill-starred  seventeenth  century  German  national 
life  in  all  its  aspects  was  in  complete  decomposition. 
In  the  disorder  and  wild  flux  a  hard,  resistant  nucleus 
was  necessary  which  in  the  nick  of  time,  when  the 


The  Rise  of  Brandenburg  31 

country's  need  was  greatest,  was  supplied  by  Branden- 
burg under  the  Great  Elector.  My  next  lecture  will 
show  how  the  fortunate  and  forceful  emergence  of 
Brandenburg  proved  the  beginning  of  a  new  Germany. 


n 

Frederick  the  Great  and  the  Advent 

of  Prussia  as  a  European 

Power 


§>econd  Lecture 

FREDERICK  THE  GREAT  AND  THE  ADVENT  OF  PRUSSIA 
AS  A  EUROPEAN  POWER 

¥  N  my  first  lecture  I  discussed  the  gradual  overthrow 
•*•  of  the  elder  Germany  founded  in  medieval  times, 
and  showed  that  by  the  year  1648,  at  the  end  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  that  overthrow  was  as  good  as 
complete.  I  also  pointed  out  that  the  older  German 
state  was  no  sooner  dead  than  there  began  a  quiet, 
inconspicuous  work  of  reconstruction  which  centered 
in  the  little  north-German  state  of  Brandenburg.  En- 
couraging signs  of  vigor  became  apparent  in  Branden- 
burg immediately  after  the  treaty  of  Westphalia, 
largely  owing  to  the  presence  at  the  head  of  affairs  of 
a  born  ruler  of  men,  Frederick  William,  the  Great 
Elector,  and  to  his  calling  into  existence  a  central  admin- 
istration and  a  professional  army.  In  Frederick  Wil- 
liam, a  man  of  solid  attainments,  intelligent  without 
brilliance,  cautious  and  yet  enterprising,  we  hail  the 
first  of  the  makers  of  Modern  Germany. 

In  my  lecture  today  I  purpose  to  speak  of  Frederick 
H,  called  the  Great.  He  was  the  great-grandson  of 
the  Great  Elector  and  looms  as  large  in  the  eighteenth 
century  history  of  the  state  as  did  Frederick  William 
in  that  of  the  seventeenth  century.  Frederick  n  came 
to  the  throne  in  1740,  exactly  one  hundred  years  after 

[35] 


36        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

the  Great  Elector,  and  held  the  scepter  until  his  death 
in  1786.  By  constant  vigilance  and  extraordinary  au- 
dacity he  was  enabled  to  strengthen  and  enlarge  his 
inheritance,  thereby  lifting  himself  and  his  dominion 
to  the  dignity  of  a  great  European  power. 

But  before  I  pursue  Frederick's  remarkable  story, 
I  wish  to  discuss  a  few  general  issues  and  developments, 
the  removal  of  which  from  our  path  will  greatly  facili- 
tate our  progress.  First  of  all,  let  me  dispose  finally 
of  the  change  of  name  from  Brandenburg  to  Prussia. 
I  have  already  pointed  out  that  by  the  accident  of  in- 
heritance the  ruler  of  Brandenburg  gradually  accumu- 
lated a  number  of  other  dominions,  among  which  was 
a  province,  Prussia  by  name,  on  the  southern  shore  of 
the  Baltic  sea.  Now  in  the  year  1700  the  then  ruler  of 
Brandenburg,  son  and  heir  of  the  Great  Elector  and  an 
insignificant  man  taken  up  with  pomp  and  ceremony,  got 
the  idea  into  his  head  of  calling  himself  king,  a  title 
thus  far  unknown  in  Brandenburg  where,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  current  designation  for  the  sovereign  was 
elector.  If  his  vanity  had  taken  counsel  of  historical 
logic,  he  would  have  blossomed  forth  to  the  world  as 
king  of  Brandenburg.  But  he  preferred,  on  grounds 
which  need  not  be  examined  here,  to  adopt  the  style  of 
king  of  Prussia,  taking  his  royal  title  from  his  relatively 
recent  Baltic  acquisition.  From  that  moment  the  cus- 
tom struck  root  of  including  all  the  scattered  dominions 
of  the  Hohenzollerns  under  the  name  of  Prussia. 

The  need  of  some  common  name  for  the  increasing 
territories  of  the  house  was  imperative,  and  what,  after 
all,  was  more  natural  than  to  take  it  from  the  title  of 


Frederick  the  Great  37 

the  sovereign?  If  he  was  king  of  Prussia,  then  Prussia 
was  a  satisfactory  name  to  designate  the  totality  of  his 
dominions.  None  the  less  Brandenburg  and  not  the 
Baltic  shoreland  of  Prussia  is  the  true  kernel  of  the 
Hohenzollern  state.  Let  us  dismiss  the  relatively  unim- 
portant question  by  repeating  that,  beginning  with  the 
year  1700,  we  are  justified  in  calling  the  state  with  which 
we  are  concerned  Prussia,  and  in  distinguishing  its  ruler 
with  the  title  king.* 

Another  matter  that  it  seems  to  me  important  to  dis- 
cuss before  going  on  with  the  achievements  of  Fred- 
erick II  is  the  eighteenth-century  theory  of  the  Prussian 
state.  Permit  me  to  remind  you  that  the  idea  is  often 
put  forth  that  states  originate  in  theories  and  that  the 
laws  and  institutions  of  a  given  state  are  no  more  than 
the  practical  application  of  a  theory  mysteriously  inher- 
ent in  that  state.  In  spite  of  the  prevalence  of  the  idea, 
I  find  myself  unable  to  accept  it.  Like  most  pragmatic 
students  I  hold  that  the  institutions  of  every  state  under 
the  sun  have  their  origin  in  the  necessities  and  habits 
of  the  community,  and  that  only  long  after  the  institu- 
tions have  taken  shape,  certain  reflective  students,  given 
to  generalization  in  the  field  of  politics,  come  forward 
and  deduce  from  the  institutions  a  set  of  fundamental 
principles  which  they  announce  as  constituting  the 
spiritual  essence  or  theory  of  the  state. 

Assuming  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  I  am  right, 
and  that  the  laws  and  institutions  of  Prussia  were  born 
out  of  the  country's  political  necessities,  it  is  none  the 

*  For  further  details  concerning  Prussia — the  original  Baltic  Prussia 
—  see  Appendix  F. 


38         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

less  true  that  they  are  reducible  to  theoretic  statement, 
and  that  a  consideration  of  this  statement  may  serve 
to  throw  a  welcome  light  on  the  fundamental  character 
of  the  government.  The  usual  declaration  with  regard 
to  eighteenth-century  Prussia  is  that  its  basic  principle 
was  patriarchal  control,  that  is,  that  the  state  was 
omnipotent  and  that  it  totally  overshadowed  the  indi- 
vidual citizen  by  subordinating  his  activity  and  happi- 
ness to  its  own  ends  and  interests.  Accepting  this  defi- 
nition, we  become  aware  that  the  spirit  of  eighteenth- 
century  Prussia  was  in  sharp  contrast  with  the  con- 
temporary spirit  of  such  countries  as  England  and  our 
own  United  States.  In  the  eighteenth  century  we  insti- 
tuted and,  for  that  matter  still  possess,  the  individualist 
state.  » 

The  theory  of  the  individualist  state  may  be  phrased 
in  some  such  form  as  this:  that  the  government  be 
obliged  to  keep  as  aloof  as  possible  from  the  affairs 
and  activities  of  the  citizens,  and  that  it  permit  the 
development  of  the  social  and  economic  life  of  the  com- 
munity under  the  free  play  of  competition.  Thus  Prus- 
sia and  the  United  States  in  the  eighteenth  century  were 
dedicated  to  opposed  theories  of  control.  However, 
the  point  to  which  I  desire  to  return  and  on  which,  as  a 
student  of  history,  I  must  lay  stress,  is  that  our  indi- 
vidualist state  is  just  as  much  the  result  of  special 
American  conditions  as  the  patriarchal  state  of  Prussia 
is  the  result  of  special  conditions  in  Germany.  It  is 
not  as  if  the  American  and  Prussian  peoples  in  the 
eighteenth  century  exercised  a  free  choice  in  the  mat- 
ter of  their  state  and,  like  Hercules  in  the  ancient  Greek 


Frederick  the  Great  39 

fable,  stood  for  a  while  in  deep  reflection  at  the  parting 
of  the  ways.  Nothing  in  their  history  would  remotely 
justify  us  in  representing  them  as  ever  making  a  con- 
scious choice  among  two  or  more  state-theories ;  rather 
each  solved  certain  difficult  besetting  problems  as  best  it 
could  and  the  result  in  one  case  was  the  Prussian  mon- 
archy, in  the  other  the  government  of  the  United  States. 
Excellent  testimony  in  support  of  this  view  of  the 
connection  between  social  conditions  and  political  insti- 
tutions is  supplied  by  what  has  happened  in  the  United 
States  within  the  last  twenty  years.  In  that  period  the 
terms  of  many  of  our  American  problems  suffered  a 
considerable  change.  Certain  economic  phenomena, 
notably  the  great  trusts,  aroused  an  alarmed  attention 
and  caused  a  sharp  criticism  to  be  leveled  at  our  too 
rampant  individualism,  hitherto  our  chief  source  of 
pride.  Social  and  political  conditions,  too,  bringing 
bosses,  graft,  and  labor  struggles  to  the  fore,  seemed  to 
betoken  a  growing  measure  of  national  ill  health.  More 
and  more  we  inclined  to  ascribe  the  fundamental  cause 
to  our  captains  of  industry  and  to  their  secret  control  of 
the  elections  and  the  government.  Mr.  Roosevelt 
coined  the  phrase  about  malefactors  of  great  wealth, 
and  earnestly  invited  us  to  beware  of  them  as  a  menace 
to  the  republic.  Though  certainly  not  unanimously  con- 
verted to  this  view,  we  have  generally  come  around  to 
the  decision  to  bind  the  rich  and  powerful  with  restric- 
tions hitherto  unknown  in  our  history,  in  order  that  they 
may  not  use  their  individualist  freedom,  coupled  as  it  is 
with  disportionate  political  power,  against  the  interests 
of  the  community.  Accordingly,  we  have  put  the  rail- 


40         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

roads  under  the  supervision  of  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission,  we  have  prosecuted  and  dissolved  the 
trusts,  and  we  have  passed  scores  of  laws  intended  to 
protect  the  factory  workers  against  excessive  exploita- 
tion. 

In  consequence  of  this  development  our  loosely  ar- 
ranged individualist  state  has  assumed  community  func- 
tions which  it  formerly  eschewed,  and  has  measurably 
adopted  the  practice  and  theory  with  which  Prussia 
became  identified  as  early  as  the  days  of  the  Great 
Elector.  There  we  may  let  the  matter  of  the  informing 
spirit  behind  the  institutions  of  Prussia  and  the  United 
States  rest  for  the  present,  merely  reasserting,  as  we 
pass  on,  that  our  eighteenth-century  individualist  liberty 
was  no  more  our  merit  than  the  subjection  to  an  all- 
powerful  state  was  a  Prussian  fault,  and  that  the  Prus- 
sian patriarchal  system  represented  the  historical,  and 
therefore  the  only  conceivable,  solution  of  the  special 
problems  that  confronted  Frederick  William  and  his 
successors. 

From  the  theory  of  the  Prussian  state  we  pass  by 
a  natural  transition  to  the  dynasty  of  the  Hohenzollerns 
who  wielded  the  patriarchal  power.  Now  this  dynasty 
has  undoubtedly  produced  a  number  of  remarkable 
men.  But  the  idea  occasionally  propounded  by  certain 
Prussian  super-patriots  that  the  members  of  the  Hohen- 
zollern  dynasty  represent  a  higher  level  of  capacity 
than  the  dynasties  of  other  European  states  is  diffi- 
cult to  uphold.  Let  us  look  at  the  facts.  Of  note- 
worthy men  there  is,  first,  the  Great  Elector  who 
founded  the  state  and  who  stands  like  a  Gulliver  amidst 


Frederick  the  Great  41 

the  Lilliputian  shapes  of  seventeenth  century  Germany; 
then  there  is  Frederick  n,  called  the  Great,  with  whom 
we  are  about  to  deal;  finally,  two  nineteenth-century 
sovereigns,  William  I  and  William  II,  whom  we  shall 
treat  later,  appear  to  be  above  the  average  in  natural 
endowment  for  their  appointed  task.  But  against  this 
list  of  distinguished  rulers  there  must  be  set  an  equally 
large  group  which  does  not  rise  above  mediocrity,  and 
brings  down  the  efficiency  index  to  about  the  figure 
maintained  by  the  other  reigning  houses  of  Europe. 

There  remains,  however,  an  observation  to  submit 
on  this  head  which  opens  a  path  to  an  understanding 
of  the  success  which  the  Hohenzollerns  have  undeniably 
achieved.  The  organization  of  the  Prussian  state,  as 
I  have  disclosed  it,  called  for  a  very  active  kind  of  sov- 
ereign since  his  authoritative  position  put  upon  him  an 
enormous  number  of  duties.  Now  such  duties,  regu- 
larly exercised,  made  for  a  tradition  of  work  and  serv- 
ice which,  once  established,  would  prove  a  support  for 
the  weaker  spirits  and  hold  them  to  a  standard  far 
beyond  their  personal  worth. 

This  is  well  illustrated  if  we  compare  the  sovereigns 
of  Prussia  in  the  eighteenth  century,  when  kings  counted 
for  more  than  ever  before  or  since  in  the  history  of 
Europe,  with  the  sovereigns  of  a  country  like  France. 
The  prominent  eighteenth  century  figure  of  France  was 
Louis  XV.  This  king  found  himself  at  the  head  of  a 
brilliant  state,  with  countless  resources  at  his  disposal 
but  with  no  very  solidly  established  tradition  of  royal 
service,  and  in  consequence  he  fell  victim  to  the  many 
insidious  temptations  of  power.  He  ended  by  becoming 


42         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

a  self-indulgent  oriental  despot  passing  his  days  in  a 
ceaseless  round  of  pleasures.  Now  Prussia  never  had 
a  Louis  XV  either  in  the  eighteenth  or  in  any  other  cen- 
tury, and  it  is  not  because  there  is  anything  in  the  moral 
stamina  of  the  house  of  Hohenzollern  that  is  superior 
to  the  moral  stamina  of  the  house  of  Bourbon.  It  is 
simply  because  an  honorable  tradition  of  state  service 
imposed  itself  on  the  rulers  of  Prussia  from  generation 
to  generation.  Though  this  Hohenzollern  conception 
of  office  is  a  difficult  factor  to  evaluate  precisely  in  the 
upgrowth  of  the  country,  it  is,  without  any  doubt,  of 
signal  importance. 

I  am  now  ready  to  turn  to  Frederick  II,  commonly 
called  the  Great,  who  occupied  the  throne  of  Prussia 
for  well  nigh  half  a  century  ( 1740-86) .  When  he  suc- 
ceeded to  the  crown  he  was  a  young  man,  twenty-eight 
years  old.  He  had  shown  from  his  birth  a  merry,  pleas- 
urable disposition  which  made  him  love  the  society  of 
his  kind,  and  he  had  exhibited  a  receptive  intelligence 
eager  to  assimilate  the  products  of  literature,  music, 
science,  and  philosophy.  In  the  years  when  he  was 
growing  up,  the  most  impressive  literature  and  art  of 
Europe  hailed  from  France,  and  it  was  therefore  quite 
natural  that,  lured  by  its  novelty  and  charm,  he  should 
have  directed  his  study  to  the  stirring  movement  among 
his  western  neighbors. 

Like  many  young  men  of  similar  tastes  and  enthusi- 
asm he  nursed  the  hope  of  a  literary  career  and  planned 
to  link  his  name  with  the  immortals  of  the  French 
Parnassus  —  Racine,  Montesquieu,  Voltaire,  and  their 
peers.  Of  course  nothing  came  of  it  in  the  end,  if  we 


Frederick  the  Great  43 

except  a  solemn  row  of  unimportant  volumes  entitled 
Oeuvres  de  Frederic  II,  and  a  passionate  but  hectic 
friendship  with  Voltaire.  This  was  so  characteristic 
of  Frederick  and  summarized  so  many  of  the  hopes  and 
disappointments  of  his  life,  that  I  must  be  permitted 
to  say  a  few  words  about  it,  however  insignificant,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  our  story  of  the  Prussian  state,  a 
purely  personal  relationship  may  seem  to  be. 

Voltaire,  half  a  generation  older  than  Frederick,  was 
singled  out  by  the  impressionable  youth  as  the  man  of 
men,  the  authentic  prophet  with  an  intimate  and  sav- 
ing message.  On  his  own  initiative,  and  with  the  usual 
palpitations  of  a  young  enthusiast,  he  entered  into  cor- 
respondence with  his  idol,  desiring  nothing  so  much 
as  to  become  Voltaire's  friend.  This  early  courtship 
was  the  happiest  period  of  their  association;  but  later, 
when  Frederick  became  king  and  master  of  his  own 
destiny,  he  resolved  to  go  farther,  and  invited  Voltaire 
to  visit  him  in  his  dominions.  The  French  author 
made  several  stays,  more  or  less  prolonged,  under  the 
roof  of  his  royal  friend,  but  alas !  friction  developed, 
due  to  temperamental  differences,  and  finally  led  to  a 
grievous  clash.  The  violent  breach  between  king  and 
philosopher  gave  birth  to  much  malicious  comment 
which  has  not  entirely  subsided  to  the  present  day.  It 
is  not  worth  while  repeating,  since  it  does  not  contribute 
to  our  true  knowledge  of  Frederick;  but  what  is  worth 
while  saying  is  that  the  early  courtship  of  Voltaire 
drew  the  young  Prussian  prince  into  the  fresh  intel- 
lectual currents  of  the  eighteenth  century,  supplied  him 
with  a  Voltairean  or  rationalist  mentality,  and  at  least 


44        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

materially  helped  in  fitting  him  for  that  role  of  enlight- 
ened despot  with  which  he  is  identified. 

Though  the  strong  natural  bent  disclosed  by  Fred- 
erick in  his  youth  toward  the  literature  and  philosophy 
of  his  day  seemed  to  his  tutors  and  friends  the  earnest 
of  a  great  future,  it  flatly  failed  to  win  the  approval 
of  his  father.  That  was  King  Frederick  William  I, 
who  ruled  the  state  from  1713  to  1740,  and  who  in  a 
fuller  account  of  Prussia  than  is  possible  here  would 
have  to  be  conceded  a  prominent  place.  As  an  admin- 
istrator Frederick  William  I  displayed  a  remarkable 
initiative  and  zeal,  and  in  view  of  the  care  he  gave  to 
the  problems  of  agriculture  and  colonization  well  de- 
serves the  title  of  the  Great  Economist  (der  grosse 
Wirth)  which  he  has  won  from  Prussian  scholars.  But 
though  honest  and  capable,  he  had  a  boorish  disposition 
and  was  filled  with  a  frank  scorn  for  the  refinements  of 
the  mind  and  of  society.  The  constant  playing  on  the 
flute  by  the  young  prince  and  his  writing  of  French 
verses  were  in  the  father's  eyes  the  symptoms  of  an 
intolerable  effeminacy.  Der  Fritz  ist  ein  efemimrter 
Kerl,  was  his  oft  repeated  slur  upon  his  son  and  he 
gradually  made  up  his  mind  that  unless  matters  changed 
radically,  Fritz  should  never  succeed  him  on  the  Prus- 
sian throne. 

At  first  he  only  nagged  and  criticised;  then,  his 
patience  outdone,  he  gave  commands.  The  result  was 
a  clash  between  father  and  son  culminating  in  one  of 
the  most  notorious  court-scandals  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury. I  can  not  stop  to  sketch  the  whole  drama  here 
with  its  plots  and  passions,  its  tragic  and  comic  episodes. 


Frederick  the  Great  45 

I  can  only  state  briefly  that  the  son  refusing  to  yield 
to  parental  tyranny  at  last  formed  the  resolution  to 
seek  safety  in  flight.  But  before  he  could  carry  out  his 
plan  he  was  apprehended  and  summarily  cast  into 
prison.  The  father,  excited  almost  to  the  pitch  of 
insanity,  talked  wildly  of  having  the  prince  shot  as  a 
deserter  from  the  army  and  a  traitor  to  the  country. 
The  bosom  friend  and  accomplice  of  Frederick,  young 
lieutenant  Katte,  the  grim  parent  actually  had  tried  by 
a  military  court  and  executed  under  the  eyes  of  his 
recalcitrant  and  wayward  heir.  Then  gentler  counsels 
won  the  upper  hand  and  the  young  man  was  reprieved, 
but  not  until  he  had  eaten  prison  fare  for  one  whole 
year  and  taken  a  solemn  vow  to  the  effect  that  he  would 
henceforth  curb  his  self-willed  course  and  subject  him- 
self in  all  things  to  his  father's  authority. 

There  now  dawned  a  new  and  Spartan  period  for 
the  prince  who  at  the  age  of  nineteen  entered  upon  an 
austere  curriculum,  the  purpose  of  which  was  to  pre- 
pare him  as  thoroughly  as  possible  for  his  kingly  duties. 
He  was  first  apprenticed  to  a  minor  bureau  in  the  civil 
service  and,  starting  as  a  common  clerk  reporting  for 
work  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  he  had  to  make  his 
way  through  the  various  stages  of  the  Prussian  admin- 
istration. Then  he  was  readmitted  to  the  army,  and  by 
similar  close  application  worked  his  way  up  as  an  officer 
until  he  became  familiar  with  every  minute  requirement 
of  the  military  system. 

Probably  no  royal  heir-apparent  has  ever  received  so 
thorough  a  schooling  in  the  practical  duties  of  his 
office  as  was  imposed  upon  the  chastened  Fritz  by  his 


46        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

stern  parent  and  taskmaster.  Of  course  his  fresh  spirit 
suffered  from  this  discipline  and  something  bright  and 
confident  went  out  of  Frederick's  life  never  to  return; 
but  may  we  not  affirm  that  the  hard  father  contributed 
that  quality  of  iron  which,  originally  lacking,  was  neces- 
sary to  give  a  foundation  of  solid  strength  to  the  gifts 
and  graces  of  the  young  prince? 

When,  after  ten  years  of  strict  apprenticeship,  Fred- 
erick came  to  the  throne,  the  expectation  in  Prussia  and 
Europe,  founded  on  the  young  man's  well-known 
literary  inclinations,  was  that  there  would  now  be  a 
radical  change  of  system  in  the  Prussian  state,  and  that 
presently,  in  the  place  of  the  shrill  cry  of  the  drill  ser- 
geant, there  would  be  heard  in  the  sandy  wastes  of 
rough  and  backward  Brandenburg  the  song  of  the  muses 
to  the  accompaniment  of  lyre  and  harp.  Needless  to 
say  that  all  such  expectations  were  cruelly  deceived. 
Without  denying  his  love  of  letters,  Frederick  II  lived 
and  moved  from  the  first  day  of  power  in  the  traditions 
of  the  Prussian  crown,  and  recognized  as  his  main  task 
the  support  and  enlargement  of  his  inherited  state. 
Hardly  on  the  throne,  he  plunged  into  the  political 
whirlpool  of  Europe  and  thus  created  that  issue  which 
dominated  Germany  for  the  next  one  hundred  years, 
the  rivalry  between  Prussia  and  Austria.  At  this  junc- 
ture it  becomes  necessary  to  refer  briefly  to  the  situa- 
tion of  Austria  in  the  eighteenth  century. 

Austria  was  a  south-German  state  which,  beginning 
in  a  small  feudal  way,  gradually  rose  to  eminence  in  the 
valley  of  the  Danube.  Its  dynasty  was  the  family  of 
the  Hapsburgs,  and  its  capital  the  city  of  Vienna,  favor- 


Frederick  the  Great  47 

ably  located  on  the  blue  waters  of  the  great  central 
artery.  By  a  successful  policy  of  wars  and  marriage- 
alliances  the  Hapsburgs,  in  the  course  of  many  genera- 
tions, accumulated  the  various  provinces  and  dominions, 
such  as  Hungary,  Bohemia,  and  the  Tyrol,  which  still 
in  this  twentieth  century  make  up  the  bulk  of  their  pos- 
sessions. Even  before  the  Reformation,  Austria  was 
the  most  considerable  German  state,  and  had  acquired 
a  kind  of  ascendancy  over  the  rest  of  Germany  which 
expressed  itself  in  the  recurrent  election  of  a  Hapsburg 
prince  to  the  imperial  office.  When  in  the  Thirty  Years' 
War,  Germany,  as  we  have  seen,  went  to  pieces,  Aus- 
tria continued  to  enjoy  a  position  of  preeminence,  for 
her  ruler  continued  to  be  elected  German  emperor, 
though  under  a  constitution  so  emasculated  as  to  make 
his  position  merely  ornamental. 

Under  these  narrowing  circumstances,  political  life  in 
Austria  might  have  been  smitten  with  paralysis  if  an 
opening  had  not  been  afforded  elsewhere.  From  an 
Austrian  viewpoint  the  greatest  event  of  the  eighteenth 
century  was  the  decay  of  Turkey.  In  measure  as  the 
weakness  of  the  Sultan  became  apparent,  Austria  was 
encouraged  to  engage  in  a  policy  of  expansion  down  the 
Danube  and  immediately  met  with  considerable  success. 
In  consequence,  she  could  afford  to  neglect  Germany  and 
desist  from  any  effort  to  change  the  desolate  situation 
there.  In  fact,  Austria  substantially  resigned  herself 
to  the  view  that  it  was  best  to  accept  the  settled  German 
stagnation  on  the  understanding  that  she  be  left  in  the 
undisturbed  enjoyment  of  the  few  decorative  German 
rights  which  were  still  hers. 


48        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

Matters  standing  thus,  the  continued  exercise  by 
Austria  of  the  nominal  headship  of  Germany  meant 
nothing  more  or  less  than  the  perpetuation  of  the  coun- 
try's impotence.  Right  here  belongs  the  significance 
of  Frederick  the  Great  in  the  eyes  of  history.  He  took 
it  on  himself  to  challenge  the  traditional  ascendancy  of 
Austria,  thereby  inaugurating  a  fierce  competition  be- 
tween that  state  and  upstart  Prussia.  By  Frederick's 
bold  act  the  dead  German  life,  which  lay  like  a  wide, 
ice-covered  marsh,  was  stirred  for  the  first  time  in  a 
hundred  years  and  showed  a  faint  movement  as  though 
spring  were  in  the  wind.  In  the  eyes  of  the  historian 
at  least,  if  not  in  Frederick's  own  eyes  or  in  those  of 
his  contemporaries,  he  was  the  innovator  at  whose  chal- 
lenge sounded  the  knell  of  the  old  order  in  Germany. 

The  rivalry  between  Austria  and  Prussia,  which 
Frederick  called  into  being,  lasted  for  more  than  a 
hundred  years,  from  1740  to  1866,  and  led  in  its  final 
consequences  to  the  rebirth  of  Germany.  Of  this  far 
conclusion  the  Prussian  king  had  hardly  a  remote  ink- 
ling. He  was  no  German  patriot,  and  no  wonder,  since 
there  were  no  German  patriots  in  existence  anywhere 
and  could  not  well  be  because  there  was  no  Germany 
that  called  for  patriotism.  He  was  the  king  of  Prussia 
and  a  political  realist,  with  a  roving  eye  searching  the 
horizon  for  opportunities  to  better  the  position  of  his 
state.  It  was  in  this  spirit,  as  a  practical  Prussian 
statesman,  I  say  again,  not  as  an  idle  German  dreamer, 
that  he  took  up,  on  his  accession,  the  nearby  question 
of  Silesia  and  therewith  precipitated  an  Austro-Prussian 
war;  and  like  many  a  man  building  better  than  he  knew, 


Frederick  the  Great  49 

when,  a  century  later,  the  harvest  of  his  deeds  had 
ripened,  he  was  seen  as  the  forerunner  who  had  uncon- 
sciously prepared  the  ground  for  a  new  Germany. 

The  province  of  Silesia,  which  caught  the  eye  of  the 
young  king,  was  an  Austrian  territory  along  the  Oder 
river.  By  virtue  of  it,  the  Hapsburg  possessions  ex- 
tended into  northern  Germany  and  bordered  upon 
Brandenburg.  To  certain  limited  sections  of  Silesia 
the  house  of  Hohenzollern  held  a  claim  which  the  Great 
Elector  had  vigorously  pressed,  but  Austria  had  resisted 
persuasion  and  threats  alike  and  the  controversy  had 
made  as  good  as  no  headway  in  half  a  hundred  years. 

In  October,  1740,  some  five  months  after  Frederick 
had  mounted  the  Prussian  throne,  the  Emperor  Charles 
VI,  the  last  male  of  the  Hapsburg  line,  died,  and  im- 
mediately the  question  as  to  who  would  succeed  him  at 
Vienna  leaped  to  the  front  and  engaged  the  attention 
of  the  European  cabinets.  Charles  had  made  the  testa- 
mentary provision  that,  in  default  of  male  heirs,  he 
should  be  succeeded  by  his  daughter,  Maria  Theresa, 
and  his  arrangements,  embodied  in  a  so-called  Prag- 
matic Sanction,  had  been  very  generally  accepted  by 
the  courts  of  Europe.  But,  as  usual,  a  paper  treaty 
was  found  to  be  a  very  inadequate  barrier  against  the 
assaults  of  cupidity,  and  Charles  vi  was  no  sooner  laid 
in  the  vault  of  his  fathers  than  ominous  movements  on 
the  part  of  Bavaria,  France,  and  Spain  made  it  clear 
that  these  powers  would  vamp  up  old  claims  of  one 
sort  or  another  wherewith  to  assert  a  prerogative  to  a 
portion  of  Maria  Theresa's  rich  dominions. 

Young  and  clear-eyed  Frederick  of  Prussia  saw  from 


50        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

what  quarter  the  wind  was  blowing,  and  quickly  resolved 
not  to  be  behind  his  neighbors.  He,  too,  had  a  claim 
—  the  aforesaid  claim  to  parts  of  Silesia  —  and  to  his 
calculating  mind  the  young  Austrian  heiress  was  in  so 
perilous  a  position  that  Prussia  would  probably  only 
have  to  present  its  ancient  bill  energetically  to  cause 
her  to  pay  it  in  full.  In  consequence  he  marched  an 
army  into  Silesia.  The  act  meant  war  —  a  war  which, 
regardless  of  the  validity  or  non-validity  of  his  Silesian 
claims,  can  not  reasonably  be  called  other  than  a  war  of 
aggression.  Frederick  himself  in  his  Histoire  de  mor. 
temps,  has  taken  substantially  the  same  view.  As  I 
read  his  simple  and  unpretentious  account,  he  saw  un- 
folded before  him  an  opportunity  to  carry  his  state  to 
a  new  level  of  importance,  and  considered  it  pusillani- 
mous to  let  the  chance  slip  by  unused.  Of  course  Maria 
Theresa  resisted  an  attack,  for  which,  to  her  mind, 
there  was  no  possible  warrant,  but  as  her  other  ene- 
mies, Bavaria,  France,  and  Spain,  descended  upon  her 
at  the  same  time,  she  became  engulfed  in  a  vast  struggle 
known  as  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  and  last- 
ing from  1740  to  1748.  In  the  course  of  it,  in  order 
to  ease  the  pressure  exercised  upon  her  from  so  many 
sides  she  resolved  to  come  to  terms  with  Frederick. 
The  result  was  that  in  a  treaty  signed  in  1742  and  con- 
firmed, after  a  second  struggle,  in  1745,  she  made  over 
the  province  of  Silesia  to  Prussia.  Courageously  con- 
tinuing the  war  with  her  other  opponents,  she  was 
enabled  not  only  to  hold  her  own  but  finally  to  force  a 
settlement  which  greatly  enhanced  the  Austrian  prestige 
in  the  eyes  of  Europe. 


Frederick  the  Great  51 

The  young  woman  who  sustained  the  terrible  trial 
of  this  war  proved,  in  the  course  of  a  long  reign,  to  be 
the  most  capable  sovereign  that  Austria  ever  had. 
Holding  the  rudder  firm  as  any  man,  the  Empress 
Maria  Theresa  was  none  the  less  a  very  feminine  spirit, 
closely  attached  to  her  family,  and  profoundly  swayed 
by  her  feelings  whether  of  love  or  resentment.  In  the 
late  war  she  had  avenged  herself  on  all  her  enemies 
who  had  come  down  upon  her  unawares  —  on  all  but 
Frederick,  who,  firmly  possessed  of  the  Silesian  prize, 
was  in  her  sight  a  sorry  instance  of  how  the  wicked 
flourish  in  this  evil  world.  She  had  surrendered  to  him 
a  precious  territory,  but  since  it  had  been  wrested  from 
her  by  armed  force,  she  not  unnaturally  considered  her- 
self free  to  take  it  back  in  the  same  way  at  the  first 
opportunity. 

With  deliberate  and  extraordinary  persistence  Maria 
Theresa  undertook  to  create  a  political  system  which 
would  give  her  an  assured  preponderance  over  Prussia, 
and  so,  reversing  the  tables,  bring  Silesia  back  into  the 
Austrian  fold.  Having  first  attached  Russia  to  herself 
by  formal  treaty,  she  next  turned  to  France.  The 
French  negotiations  proved  extremely  difficult,  owing 
to  the  long-standing  feud  between  the  houses  of  Haps- 
burg  and  Bourbon,  and  the  reluctance  of  France  to  see 
the  desirability  of  a  changed  course.  However,  by 
1756  an  Austro-French  treaty  was  perfected,  and  now 
Prussia  was  surrounded  on  three  sides  and  could  be 
crushed,  it  might  reasonably  be  hoped,  in  a  single  vigor- 
ous campaign. 

Still  the  matter  was,  after  all,  not  so  simple  as  Maria 


52         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

Theresa's  confident  resentment  pictured  it.  With  un- 
equalled political  daring  Frederick  II  coupled  a  mili- 
tary skill  which  made  him  the  greatest  captain  of  his 
time,  and  although  he  did  not  for  a  moment  underesti- 
mate the  force  of  the  gathering  tempest,  he  did  not 
quail  before  it.  He  looked  around  for  aid  and  found  a 
helper  in  Great  Britain.  Great  Britain  in  the  eighteenth 
century  was  involved  with  France  in  a  tremendous 
struggle  for  the  rule  of  the  seas  and  the  trans-oceanic 
continents,  and  this  quarrel,  dating  back  in  its  origin 
over  a  hundred  years,  happened  to  be  ripe  for  settle- 
ment at  the  exact  moment  which  the  Empress  Maria 
Theresa  had  chosen  to  even  scores  with  Frederick.  In 
the  year  1756  an  Anglo-French  conflict  was  a  certainty, 
and  if  France  was  to  have  the  aid  of  Austria  in  that 
struggle,  Great  Britain  was  sure  to  make  an  eager  bid 
for  Prussian  help.  Through  the  respective  necessities 
of  London  and  Berlin  the  two  cabinets  were  forced  into 
an  alliance,  and  thus  it  was,  with  Great  Britain  at  his 
side,  that  Frederick  met  the  descent  upon  him  of  his 
three  continental  neighbors,  Austria,  France,  and 
Russia. 

The  struggle  that  followed,  one  of  the  most  gigantic 
and  far-reaching  in  history,  is  familiar  to  us  all  as  the 
Seven  Years'  War  (1756-63).  How  it  was  fought 
out  by  England  and  France  on  all  the  seas  and  not  only 
confirmed  Britannia  as  the  ruler  of  the  waves  but  gave 
her  India  and  Canada  as  well,  is  sufficiently  known.  To 
Americans  this  chapter  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  is  so 
preeminently  important  that  the  Austro-Prussian  com- 
bat sinks  by  comparison  into  insignificance.  And  yet 


Frederick  the  Great  53 

it  is  the  Austro-Prussian  phase  with  which  we  are  here 
alone  concerned.  Therefore  having  reminded  you  of 
the  world-wide  ramifications  of  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
I  shall  confine  my  attention  to  the  struggle  in  Central 
Europe. 

It  was  eminently  like  Frederick,  perhaps  the  most 
nimble  and  collected  spirit  of  his  time,  that,  as  soon  as 
he  was  certain  in  his  mind  the  blow  was  about  to  fall, 
he  sprang  to  anticipate  it.  A  quick  offensive  would  at 
least  enable  him  to  strike  his  enemies  before  they  had 
combined  their  movements,  and  naturally  he  pounced 
upon  Austria,  his  main  enemy,  first.  But  the  campaign 
of  1756  was  only  partially  successful,  for  Austria  was 
not  surprised  and  parried  the  blow.  The  next  year  the 
concerted  advance  of  Austria  from  the  south,  of  France 
from  the  west,  and  of  Russia  from  the  east  was  only 
stopped  by  two  sweeping  victories,  one  over  the  French 
at  Rossbach,  the  other  over  the  Austrians  at  Leuthen; 
as  for  the  Russians,  when  the  news  of  these  swift  strokes 
reached  them  they  retired  from  the  scene  without  await- 
ing an  attack. 

Beginning  with  the  third  campaign,  that  of  1758,  a 
British  army  operating  in  western  Germany  stood  off 
the  French  and  considerably  relieved  the  terrible  pres- 
sure upon  the  harassed  Frederick.  But  Austria  and 
Russia  by  themselves  continued  to  constitute  a  terrible 
menace,  as  will  appear  at  a  glance  as  soon  as  the  vast 
area  of  united  Austria  and  Russia  is  compared  with 
that  of  little  Prussia  and  their  enormous  preponderance 
in  money  and  men  is  taken  into  account.  Against  such 
odds  Frederick  maintained  a  bold  front,  though  it  was 


54        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

plain  that  he  could  not  keep  up  the  fight  forever.  In 
1759  he  was  badly  defeated  by  the  Russians  at  Kuners- 
dorf,  in  eastern  Brandenburg,  and  from  that  time 
showed  unmistakable  signs  of  exhaustion.  It  was  only 
by  one  of  the  most  remarkable  examples  of  moral 
courage  ever  given  that  he  did  not  regard  his  cause  as 
lost  and  cry  for  quarter. 

Step  by  step,  like  hunters  stalking  a  quarry,  the  Aus- 
trians  and  Russians  closed  in  upon  him  until  he  had 
hardly  more  in  hand  than  the  original  nucleus  of  Bran- 
denburg. Probably  no  man  in  his  dominion  beside  him- 
self believed  there  was  any  further  use  in  fighting.  Thus 
he  stood  his  ground,  defiant  to  the  last,  when  a  stroke 
of  fortune  saved  the  day.  At  the  end  of  the  sixth  cam- 
paign (January,  1762)  the  Czarina  Elizabetji  of  Rus- 
sia died,  and  her  successor,  as  capriciously  moved  by 
friendship  for  Frederick  as  Elizabeth  had  been  by  hate, 
insisted  on  making  peace  and  restoring  to  Prussia  all 
the  land  he  held.  Maria  Theresa  was  profoundly 
chagrined  at  this  desertion  and  stuck  to  the  war  with 
Prussia  for  another  year.  But  when  she  now  began  to 
be  pushed  back  in  her  turn,  she  sadly  made  up  her  mind 
that  her  efforts  were  vain  and,  in  February,  1763,  con- 
cluded peace,  at  Hubertsburg  in  Saxony,  on  the  basis 
of  a  return  to  the  conditions  before  the  war. 

The  great  seven  years'  struggle  was  over,  and  tech- 
nically it  was  a  draw,  for  neither  Austria  nor  Prussia 
gained  a  foot  of  territory.  But  the  fact  stands  out  that 
Maria  Theresa  was  obliged  to  relinquish  her  plan  of 
getting  back  Silesia  and  to  accept  its  incorporation  in 
Prussia  as  final.  That  made  the  struggle  in  effect  a 


Frederick  the  Great  55 

Pmssian  victory,  especially  as  Prussia  had  shown  such 
strength  that  she  had  now  to  be  accepted  as  a  great 
power  in  Europe,  capable  of  negotiating  on  a  basis  of 
equality  with  all  the  rest.  Specifically  for  Germany,  the 
war  meant  that  Austria,  preeminent  so  long  within  the 
German  fold,  was  obliged  to  share  her  control  with 
another  state  and  to  admit  the  northern  upstart  into  a 
reluctant  partnership.  From  the  end  of  the  Seven 
Years'  War  a  silent  agreement  made  Prussia  ascendant 
in  the  north,  with  Austria  retaining  the  leadership  in 
the  regions  of  the  south.  Henceforth,  as  concerns  the 
political  life  of  the  country,  there  were  two  Germanics, 
each  eyeing  the  other  with  jealousy,  animosity,  and  even 
aversion.  The  deep  estrangement  augured  ill  for  the 
future  of  the  nation. 

In  some  respects  it  was  not  so  much  Prussia  that 
came  out  of  the  war  with  honor,  as  the  Prussian  king. 
With  remarkable  unanimity  admiring  Europe  turned 
him  into  a  hero  and  hailed  him  as  Frederick  the  Great. 
Everybody  felt  and  expressed  that  against  the  enor- 
mous odds  which  Austria  had  brought  into  the  field, 
the  Prussian  state  had  been  able  to  maintain  itself, 
primarily,  by  virtue  of  the  military  skill,  the  moral 
courage,  and  the  steady  endurance  of  one  man. 

But  though  the  world  saw  in  Frederick  chiefly  the 
soldier,  the  truth  is  that  he  never  set  overmuch  store  by 
his  military  reputation.  "  My  successes,"  he  said,  tem- 
pering the  exaggerations  of  an  encomiast  with  the 
amused  irony  which  never  deserted  him,  "  my  successes 
are  largely  due  to  luck  and  the  stupidity  of  my  ene- 
mies " !  He  regarded  himself  as  a  state-builder,  a  man 


56        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

of  peace,  and  wished  primarily  to  leave  behind  him  a 
strengthened  structure  diversified  and  enriched  with 
varied  economic  activity. 

While  he  did  not  occupy  himself  much  with  the  theo- 
retic study  of  economics,  he  plunged  with  an  eagerness 
that  balked  at  no  physical  exertion  into  all  the  practical 
problems  of  agriculture,  trade,  and' industry.  Holding 
the  patriarchal  view  derived  from  his  ancestors  that  an 
intelligent  control  was  necessary,  and  that,  if  honestly 
exercised,  it  could  only  be  productive  of  good  to  the 
state,  he  did  not  scruple  to  summon,  as  it  were,  the  whole 
labor  of  his  people  before  his  throne.  Of  course,  to 
present-day  Americans,  accustomed  to  free,  competitive 
activity  and  abominating  the  action  of  the  government, 
his  interference  often  looks  like  foolish  meddling  with 
the  laws  of  nature,  and  even  the  unbiased  observer  will 
discover  that  much  of  it  was  ill-advised  and  hurtful. 
Trade,  for  instance,  which  always  flourishes  most  lux- 
uriously when  it  is  unhampered,  Frederick  burdened 
with  all  kinds  of  regulations  and  embargoes  in  the  sup- 
posed interest  of  this  or  that  infant  industry. 

All  things  considered,  it  is  plain  that  the  great  king 
was  ruled  by  the  central  idea  that  the  chief  desideratum 
for  Prussia  was  the  development  of  her  manufactures, 
and  that  it  was  not  too  much  to  pay  for  this  benefit 
with  a  very  high  duty  against  foreign  goods.  Let  his 
own  words  tell  his  purpose.  "  I  prohibit  as  much  as 
I  dare,  in  order  to  force  my  subjects  to  manufacture," 
he  wrote  to  one  of  his  ministers.  Whether  or  no  the 
game  was  worth  the  candle  let  others  say,  but  the 
undeniable  truth  is  that  Frederick  inaugurated,  how- 


FREDERICK  n,  CALLED  THE  GREAT 


Frederick  the  Great  57 

ever  modestly,  the  Prussian  industrial  development. 
Before  he  died  the  native  woolen  mills  more  than 
supplied  the  home  market,  while  the  Silesian  linens 
traveled  as  far  as  England  and  America.  Even 
silk  goods  were  turned  out  in  considerable  quantity. 
His  taking  up  this  last-named  industry  shows  him  in  a 
most  characteristic  light.  Since  imported  silks  sold  at 
a  good  price  on  the  local  market,  why  not  let  the  manu- 
facturing profit  be  earned  at  home?  For  years  he  dedi- 
cated considerable  sums  from  the  treasury  to  help  the 
new  business  obtain  a  firm  footing.  When  the  capital- 
ists complained  of  the  difficulty  of  getting  raw  silk  and 
of  its  high  cost,  he  distributed  cocoons  among  the  peas- 
ants and  ordered  the  government  agents  in  the  country 
to  line  the  highways  with  mulberry  trees,  on  the  leaves 
of  which  the  cocoons  lived.  In  the  long  run  the  enter- 
prise proved  impracticable,  for  the  cocoons  called  for 
more  sun  than  bleak  and  chilly  Brandenburg  could 
furnish,  but  Frederick  with  his  indomitable  will  kept 
up  hope  to  the  end  that  the  various  difficulties  would 
be  overcome.  If,  on  the  whole,  the  funds  used  to 
stimulate  the  silk  industry  must  be  declared  to  have 
been  wasted,  numerous  successes  in  other  enterprises 
more  than  made  up  for  this  failure  and  justified  Fred- 
erick in  the  feeling  that  his  economic  policy,  with  its 
feature  of  state  interference,  was  a  move  in  the  right 
direction. 

However,  in  spite  of  varied  industrial  beginnings, 
Frederician  Prussia  was,  and  remained  essentially,  an 
agricultural  state.  Let  us  not  be  in  the  least  doubt  on 
this  head,  and  let  us  understand  the  social  structure 


58         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

which  the  agricultural  economy  involved.  Generally 
speaking,  the  land  of  Prussia  was  divided  into  great 
estates  owned  by  feudal  landlords,  familiarly  called 
Junkers.  A  considerable  area  was  owned  by  the  sov- 
ereign himself,  in  fact  his  estates  ran  into  the  hundreds 
and  made  him  the  landlord  of  the  country.  They  were 
thrown  together  for  administrative  purposes  into  a 
royal  domain  and  managed  from  a  central  office  at 
Berlin,  returning  a  revenue  which  was  one  of  the  most 
important  items  of  the  annual  budget  of  the  state. 
Frederick,  fully  aware  of  the  value  of  this  resource  for 
his  purse,  was  tireless  in  urging  improvements  in  the 
royal  domain  by  introducing  fertilizers,  bettering  the 
stock,  and  varying  the  crops. 

Naturally  the  progress  made  on  the  royal  farms, 
many  of  which  served  as  experiment  stations,  imposed 
itself  by  force  of  imitation  on  the  neighboring  Junkers. 
But  improved  methods  and  increased  returns  did  not 
mean  social  changes  in  the  countryside.  For  centuries 
the  estates  had  been  worked  in  accordance  with  feudal 
usage;  that  is,  the  workers  were  peasants  legally  sub- 
ject to  the  landlords  and  obliged  to  pay  for  the  little 
holdings  on  which  they  lived  by  three,  four,  or  even 
five  days'  labor  per  week  on  the  master's  land.  These 
conditions  made  the  Prussian  peasants  serfs,  and 
depressed  them  to  a  position  only  better  than  slavery 
in  that  they  could  not  be  bought  and  sold  and  usually 
had  some  vested  rights  in  their  bits  of  land. 

In  the  general  absence  of  a  large,  progressive,  and 
enlightened  Prussian  middle  class  stirring  up  criticism 
of  these  conditions,  Frederick  never  ventured  to  come 


Frederick  the  Great  59 

forward  with  a  program  of  peasant  reform.  Since 
the  Junkers  were  in  possession  and  constituted  the  most 
powerful  class  in  the  state,  it  was  best  to  let  well  enough 
alone.  Wise  monarchs  do  not  revolutionize  the  socie- 
ties they  govern  merely  for  the  sake  of  experiment.  By 
fostering  an  industry  and  calling  the  nucleus  of  a  middle 
class  into  being,  he  created  the  only  counterweight 
which,  in  the  course  of  time,  would  prove  effective  in 
diminishing  the  influence  of  the  landlord  group.  How- 
ever far  we  may  go  in  giving  Frederick  credit  for 
certain  constructive  features  of  his  economic  program, 
he  is  certainly  not  to  be  classed  as  a  social  reformer. 

My  limited  time  permits  me  to  give  only  a  hurried 
consideration  to  the  many  other  instructive  features 
of  Frederick's  reign.  The  king  created  a  bureau  which 
put  the  management  of  the  national  forests  on  a  scien- 
tific and  systematic  basis;  he  maintained  a  good  net- 
work of  highways,  and  added  a  number  of  canals  to 
those  already  in  use;  he  drained  bogs  and  colonized 
peasants  from  other  parts  of  Germany  on  the  reclaimed 
land. 

His  method  of  work  was  highly  individual.  Week 
in  and  week  out,  for  many  hours  each  day,  he  sat  in  his 
cabinet  dispatching  the  affairs  which  his  secretaries 
submitted.  With  the  advent  of  summer  he  regularly 
traveled  from  one  end  of  his  kingdom  to  the  other  in 
order  to  keep  his  eye  responsive  to  the  realities  of  life 
and  to  hinder  his  spirit  from  drying  up  in  the  tedium  of 
a  deadly  routine.  Let  us  see  Frederick  as  he  was  —  an 
absolutist  administrator  of  the  eighteenth  century,  a 
typical  enlightened  despot  who  labored  with  energy, 


60         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

intelligence,  and  devotion  to  increase  the  population 
and  well-being  of  the  state.  Everything  for  the  people, 
nothing  by  the  people,  was  essentially  his  motto.  And 
a  careful  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances  will 
impose  the  view  that  this  Frederician  system  would 
continue  until  the  urban  classes,  still  very  negligible, 
in  spite  of  an  industrial  beginning,  had  lifted  them- 
selves to  a  higher  economic  and  intellectual  level  and 
insisted  on  being  heard  in  all  matters  of  public  policy. 

A  final  word  about  the  great  king's  army.  If,  after 
his  first  plunge  into  the  war  of  the  Austrian  succession, 
he  was  far  from  wishing  to  use  it  wantonly  for  the 
sake  of  "  glory,"  he  had  no  two  opinions  as  to  the 
need  of  keeping  it  ready  for  defense.  In  this  respect 
he  shared  the  view  of  all  his  predecessors  beginning 
with  the  Great  Elector,  founder  of  the  state.  If  by 
any  chance  his  interest  in  the  army  should  ever  have 
flagged,  a  single  glance  at  the  map,  showing  his 
exposed  position  in  the  heart  of  Europe,  would  have 
sufficed  to  spur  him  to  renewed  military  activity.  In 
consequence  of  an  unrelaxed  attention,  his  permanent 
forces  swelled  to  a  figure  which  was  out  of  all  pro- 
portion to  the  wealth  and  population  of  the  state. 
Toward  the  end  of  his  life  he  boasted  an  army  which 
was  little  short  of  200,000  men,  approximately  the 
figure  of  the  standing  armies  of  such  large  powers  as 
Austria  and  France! 

To  keep  the  ranks  full  a  recruiting  system  was 
required  which  awakens  interest  as  it  was  not  far  re- 
moved from  universal,  compulsory  service.  But  the 
compulsion  was  a  class  compulsion  and  applied  only 


Frederick  the  Great  61 

to  the  peasants,  not  to  the  burghers.  As  the  officers 
were  exclusively  drawn  from  the  landed  gentry,  and 
mere  burghers  were  jealously  excluded  from  officer 
positions,  the  Frederician  army  was  a  perfect  mirror 
of  the  traditional  feudal  organization  of  Prussian 
society.  A  body  of  hardy  peasants  officered  by  gentle- 
men to  whom  they  looked  up  as  to  superior  beings  — 
such  was  the  Frederician  army,  and  as  such  it  had 
an  undeniable  solidarity  fully  proved  in  the  furnace- 
test  of  war.  But  it  was  the  product  of  a  medieval 
class  system  which  was  already  becoming  antiquated, 
and  the  future  alone  would  show  whether  it  would 
be  able  to  hold  its  own  in  the  democratic  age  which 
was  just  beginning  to  dawn. 

Such  for  better  and  worse  were  the  society  and 
institutions  of  Prussia  in  the  days  of  Frederick  the 
Great.  The  other  sovereigns  of  Germany,  dazzled 
by  the  brilliant  successes  of  the  king  in  peace  and  war, 
looked  upon  him  with  envy  and  paid  him  the  flattery 
of  imitation.  And  now  for  the  first  time  since  the 
disasters  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  new  life  began 
to  stir  through  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  German 
land.  It  showed  first  of  all  in  the  ideal  world,  in  the 
realm  of  the  mind.  There  was  a  manifest  awakening, 
a  casting  off  of  old  fetters  at  some  of  the  universities, 
notably  at  Gottingen  and  Leipzig,  while  in  the  class- 
rooms at  Konigsberg  Kant  expounded  his  famous 
philosophy  which  opened  a  new  era  of  speculation  and 
differed  from  the  contemporary  mechanistic  systems 
by  affirming  the  ethical  freedom  and  therewith  the 
dignity  of  man  as  the  noblest  creature  under  the 


62         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

sun.  In  the  field  of  criticism  Lessing  and  Herder,  in 
lyric  and  dramatic  poetry  Goethe  and  Schiller,  made 
contributions  that  put  German  literature  on  a  broad 
and  modern  foundation,  while  music,  that  art  with 
which  the  name  of  Germany  is  most  intimately  linked, 
unfolded  its  wonders  in  the  moving  strains  of  Bach 
and  Handel. 

Thus,  toward  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  in- 
numerable signs  pointed  to  the  rebirth  of  the  German 
people,  a  rebirth  which,  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  auto- 
cratic Frederician  state,  was  volksthumlich  in  the 
best  sense  of  the  word  because  proceeding  out  of 
the  depths  of  the  national  soul.  Curious  to  reflect, 
Frederick,  the  most  eminent  German  of  his  day,  had 
little  understanding  for  the  intellectual  revival  of  his 
people.  Brought  up  in  the  elegant  French  tradition, 
writing  and  speaking  the  Gallic  tongue  far  more  flu- 
ently than  his  own  German,  he  found  the  door  of  his 
mind  locked  to  an  art  and  literature  which  had  their 
roots  in  the  soil  and  which  withered  in  the  close  atmos- 
phere of  the  drawing-room.  Not  long  before  his 
death  he  wrote  a  review  —  naturally  in  French  —  of 
the  German  writers  of  his  time,  the  young  titans  of 
the  Sturm  und  Drang,  and  reprimanded  them  for  their 
rough  words  and  careless  forms;  they  reminded  him, 
he  declared,  of  that  uncouth  and  detestable  English 
barbarian,  Guillaume  Shakspeare!  None  the  less,  a 
lingering  faith  in  the  destiny  of  his  people  persuaded 
him  that  better  things  would  come  and  caused  him  to 
declare  that,  like  Moses  in  the  desert,  he  hailed  from 
afar  the  Promised  Land  which  he  would  not  live  to  see. 


Frederick  the  Great  63 

In  August,  1786,  in  his  villa  of  Sans  Souci  near  Pots- 
dam, Frederick  the  Great,  familiarly  known  to  his 
people  then  and  now  as  der  alte  Fritz,  closed  his  eyes 
upon  this  world.  It  was  a  Germany  still  hopelessly 
divided  in  political  matters  which  at  the  news  of  his 
death  turned  its  mental  vision  to  the  place  where  the 
dead  king  and  warrior  lay  in  state,  but  it  was  certainly 
not  the  Germany  of  Frederick's  youth,  afflicted  with 
chronic  dry  rot  in  every  department  of  human  activity. 
The  breath  of  an  authentic  spring  was  abroad  and 
fresh  forces  were  shaping  a  national  life  which  Fred- 
erick in  his  blindness  did  not  appreciate,  but  which 
none  the  less  owed  much  of  its  inspiration  to  the  magic 
of  his  name.  No  less  an  authority  than  Goethe  has  left 
incontrovertible  evidence  on  this  head.  In  his  famous 
autobiography,  Dichtung  und  Wahrheit,  the  poet  says 
that  he  and  the  youth  of  his  day  were  first  touched 
with  national  pride  by  the  thought  that  they  were 
Frederick's  countrymen,  and  that  after  many  gener- 
ations a  German  had  again  proved  himself  a  construc- 
tive political  force  and  writ  his  name  across  the  sky. 
Thus  Frederick,  more  French  than  German  in  all  the 
superficial  aspects  of  his  mind,  was  yet  a  quickener 
of  German  national  life;  purely  Prussian  in  his  politics 
and  creator  of  a  greater  Prussia,  he  yet  prepared  the 
way  for  a  new  Germany. 


Ill 

Napoleon  Bonaparte:  Prussia's  Overthrow 
and  Reconstruction 


Lecture 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE  :  PRUSSIAS  OVERTHROW  AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 

TN  my  previous  lecture  I  tried  to  make  clear  that 
•^  Frederick  the  Great  was  the  dominating  figure  in 
the  eighteenth  century  history  of  Prussia.  His  sig- 
nificance lay  in  his  enlarging  his  territory  and  revenue, 
in  his  administering  his  kingdom  with  alert  intelli- 
gence thereby  increasing  its  prosperity  and  preparing 
it  for  an  industrial  future,  and  in  his  successfully  chal- 
lenging the  ascendancy  of  Austria  in  Germany.  From 
Frederick's  time,  the  great  issue  in  Germany  was  the 
rivalry  between  Austria  and  Prussia,  between  Hapsburg 
and  Hohenzollern,  an  issue  in  which  the  two  opponents 
were  so  evenly  matched  that  it  was  not  settled  for 
one  hundred  years. 

My  task  today  is  to  follow  the  history  of  Prussia 
during  the  period  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  in 
order  to  understand  what  befell  it  is  necessary,  first, 
to  turn  our  attention  to  France.  The  famous  rising 
of  1789  is  often  regarded  as  a  volcanic  and  ruinous 
upheaval.  We  arrive  much  nearer  the  truth  by  look- 
ing upon  it  as  the  logical  consequence  of  the  sound  and 
steady  development  of  the  French  people.  The  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries  had  brought  about  a 
vast  economic  and  social  change  in  France  which 

[67] 


68        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

reduces  itself,  on  analysis,  to  the  rise  of  the  middle 
class,  or  bourgeoisie,  through  commerce  and  industry. 
The  bourgeoisie,  like  every  advancing  group  since  the 
beginning  of  time,  desired  to  get  control  of  its  own 
destiny,  and  became  more  keenly  set  on  its  program 
in  measure  as  it  realized  the  waxing  senility  of  the 
French  state. 

Many  generations  before,  at  the  close  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  this  state  had  taken  the  form  of  an  autocracy, 
reaching  the  height  of  its  organization  as  well  as  of 
its  power  under  Louis  XIV  (1643-1715).  The  eigh- 
teenth century,  dominated  by  the  name  of  Louis  XV 
inaugurated  a  sharp  decline.  The  monarchy  forgot 
its  national  mission,  occupied  itself  with  sumptuous  dis- 
play and  inane  pleasures,  and  lost  the  moral  energy 
necessary  to  deal  with  the  abuses  that  multiplied  to  an 
alarming  degree  in  every  department  of  the  state.  The 
administration  became  hopelessly  corrupt,  the  finances 
developed  a  chronic  deficit  which  no  increase  of  tax- 
oppression  was  able  to  cure,  and  in  the  long  wars 
with  England  the  government  was  ousted  from  one 
vantage-point  after  another  until  the  nation  felt  itself 
deprived  of  its  outlook  into  the  future  and  intolerably 
humiliated. 

Meanwhile  the  two  feudal  classes,  the  clergy  and 
nobility,  though  obliged  to  yield  their  political  power 
to  the  monarch,  had  retained  so  many  privileges,  both 
real  and  honorific,  as  to  enable  them  to  occupy  a  wholly 
exceptional  position  in  the  state.  They  enjoyed  a 
complete  exemption  from  some  and  a  partial  exemption 
from  other  taxes,  and  all  the  exalted  posts  in  the  diplo- 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  69 

matic  service  as  well  as  the  officer  positions  in  the  army 
and  navy  were  exclusively  reserved  for  the  born  aristo- 
crats. In  the  eyes  of  the  middle  class,  occupied  with 
business  enterprises  at  home  and  abroad  and  becoming 
daily  richer  and  more  self-confident,  the  situation  was 
fast  assuming  an  intolerable  aspect.  The  leading 
intellectual  representatives  of  the  bourgeoisie,  men  like 
Voltaire,  Rousseau,  Diderot,  and  D'Alembert,  clam- 
ored for  a  change  of  system,  and  when  the  monarchy, 
openly  controlled  by  the  two  privileged  groups,  proved 
unable  to  effect  a  reform,  an  outbreak  became  inevitable. 

Such  is  the  meaning  of  the  year  1789.  An  effete 
social  and  political  system  was  overthrown  by  the  rising 
middle  class,  which  felt  strong  enough  to  take  the  direc- 
tion of  affairs  into  its  own  hands.  But  it  had  just 
begun  to  labor  at  the  reorganization  of  the  government 
when  it  found  itself  displaced  in  its  turn  by  the  demo- 
cratic masses,  shaken  out  of  their  age-long  sleep  by 
the  fierce  agitation  of  the  period.  Into  the  struggle 
that  followed  between  bourgeoisie  and  masses  it  is 
not  my  business  to  go  further  than  to  recall  to  your 
minds  that  the  masses,  or  at  least  their  most  energetic 
group,  gaining  a  victory,  guillotined  the  king  and  estab- 
lished a  republic. 

Being  solely  concerned  with  the  effect  of  the  Revo- 
lution beyond  the  limits  of  France,  I  now  beg  you  to 
switch  your  attention  and  note  that  from  the  first  day 
all  the  neighboring  monarchies  looked  upon  the  French 
convulsion  with  alarm.  Sporadic  friction  over  diplo- 
matic issues,  both  real  and  unreal,  produced  sparks 
which,  refusing  to  be  extinguished,  started  an  inevitable 


70        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

conflagration.  In  the  year  1792  war  began  between 
France  and  Austria  and,  spreading,  gradually  involved 
all  Europe.  The  French  republic,  stirred  to  heroic 
efforts  by  the  risks  it  ran,  equipped  armies  on  an  un- 
heard-of scale  and  was  able  not  only  to  defend  its  soil 
against  invasion  but  presently  to  invade  the  territory 
of  its  enemies.  The  republican  victories  were  sweeping 
and  unparalleled  but  had  an  ominous  aftermath :  they 
brought  the  military  leaders  to  the  front,  chief  among 
them  Napoleon  Bonaparte. 

Endowed  with  a  remarkable  intelligence  directed 
solely  by  personal  ambition,  Bonaparte  saw  his  oppor- 
tunity and,  supported  by  a  devoted  army,  in  the  year 
1799  overthrew  the  republic  and  seized  the  power. 
How,  completely  abandoning  the  original  aims  of  the 
Revolution,  he  gradually  took  up  the  grandiose  but 
futile  dream  of  conquering  Europe  is  a  palpitating 
story  but  does  not  concern  us  here.  Our  concern  is  to 
learn  how  he,  and  the  French  Revolution  before  him, 
affected  the  kingdom  of  Prussia. 

The  Prussia  of  Frederick  the  Great  bore  a  certain 
outward  resemblance  to  the  France  of  Louis  xv.  Both 
were  autocratic  monarchies,  and  both  the  French  and 
Prussian  societies  showed  certain  familiar  feudal  ear- 
marks, above  all,  a  powerful  landed  gentry  endowed 
with  special  privileges.  There  the  resemblance  ended; 
for,  whereas  in  France  the  monarchy  was  old  and  dis- 
credited, and  the  society,  though  feudal  in  law  and 
outward  form,  had  been  undermined  through  the  rise 
of  the  bourgeoisie,  in  Prussia,  on  the  contrary,  the 
monarchy  was  young  and  authoritative,  and  the  society 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  71 

was  feudal  in  fact  as  well  as  law,  because  a  middle 
class  was  as  yet  more  of  a  hope  than  a  reality. 

Thus  while  advancing  France  was  in  utter  contradic- 
tion with  its  inherited  laws  and  institutions,  backward 
Prussia  was  still  in  more  or  less  complete  harmony  with 
itself.  The  consequence  was  that  the  Revolution,  an 
event  of  the  utmost  logic,  in  fact  a  necessity,  in  France, 
could  not  even  be  understood  in  Prussia,  and  gave  rise 
to  the  gravest  fears.  And  when,  with  astonishing 
rapidity,  the  Revolution  became  aggressive,  pouring 
like  molten  lava  over  the  French  boundaries,  Prussia, 
identified  with  the  old  regime,  naturally  and  spontan- 
eously ranged  herself  on  the  side  of  France's  enemies. 

The  sovereign  who  followed  Frederick  the  Great, 
his  nephew,  Frederick  William  II,  was  a  dissipated 
man  of  a  soft  and  unstable  character.  Quick  to  con- 
duct his  country  into  the  war,  he  was  no  sooner  in  than 
he  regretted  his  decision.  He  lamented  the  loss  of 
blood  and  treasure  on  the  Rhine  for  no  tangible  terri- 
torial profit,  and,  though  all  the  monarchs  of  Europe 
had  come  together  to  defend  as  from  ravening  wolves 
what  they  proclaimed  to  be  their  holy  cause,  he  pres- 
ently deserted  their  union  and  signed  a  separate  peace 
at  Basel  (1795).  By  its  terms  Prussia  became  a  spec- 
tator in  the  great  struggle  between  the  old  and  the 
new  order  of  things,  and  from  now  on  for  eleven 
years,  in  spite  of  luring  offers  from  both  sides,  per- 
sisted in  her  neutral  attitude.  The  French  armies 
marched  from  victory  to  victory,  the  French  state 
passed  through  a  long  succession  of  domestic  crises, 
Napoleon's  star  began  to  rise  and  shed  its  luster  over 


72        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

Europe,  but  still  the  Prussian  monarch  declared  that 
the  struggle,  which  raged  all  around  his  borders  and 
caused  the  Prussian  state  to  rock  on  its  foundations, 
was  none  of  his. 

Such  a  neutrality,  in  plain  contradiction  with  the 
facts,  could  be  accounted  for  only  on  the  ground  of 
political  stupidity  and  moral  cowardice.  Sooner  or 
later  the  hour  would  strike  when  it  could  not  be  main- 
tained and  then  Prussia  would  be  sucked  into  the  vortex 
against  her  will  and  without  that  resolute  conviction 
which  is  the  only  certain  earnest  of  victory.  There 
is  no  more  despicable  chapter  of  Prussian  history  than 
the  official  neutrality  observed  for  eleven  years  in  the 
face  of  an  unexampled  catastrophe  of  the  European 
world.  It  was  the  conclusive  evidence  that,  in  spite  of 
its  many  successes  under  Frederick,  the  Prussian  mon- 
archy was  hollow  at  the  core  and  ripe  for  overthrow. 

Meanwhile,  Napoleon  Bonaparte  had  begun  his  spec- 
tacular career  of  victory.  Having  assumed  the  imperial 
crown  in  1804  amidst  splendid  medieval  ceremonies, 
and  having  won  a  dominating  position  beyond  the 
boundaries  of  France  in  the  Netherlands,  Italy,  and 
South  Germany,  he  administered,  in  the  Austerlitz 
campaign  of  the  autumn  of  1805,  a  third  and  superla- 
tive beating  to  his  most  consistent  continental  enemy, 
Austria.  There  was  now  no  reason  why  he  should  any 
longer  hesitate  to  complete  his  control  of  central  Europe 
by  forcing  neutral  Prussia,  lulled  by  a  false  and  irra- 
tional security,  into  his  political  system.  Of  course 
the  timid  Prussian  king  was  profoundly  hurt  by  the 
aggressive  attitude  of  his  hitherto  friendly  western 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  73 

neighbor.  Big,  sodden,  apoplectic  Frederick  William  II, 
who  had  inaugurated  the  neutrality  policy,  was  now  no 
longer  on  the  throne.  He  had  been  succeeded  in  1797 
by  his  son,  Frederick  William  ill,  who,  though  hon- 
orable and  virtuous  by  all  the  standards  of  private 
life,  was  in  the  conduct  of  public  affairs  as  slack  and 
irresolute  as  his  unlamented  father.  When,  summoning 
the  last  remnant  of  his  self-respect,  he  resisted  the  will 
of  his  tormentor,  the  lightning  flashed  and  the  storm 
broke. 

The  war  of  1806  between  Napoleon  and  Prussia  is 
one  of  the  great  Corsican's  most  brilliant  achievements. 
He  gathered  his  forces  with  even  more  than  his  usual 
swiftness  and  practically  with  one  master  blow  deliv- 
ered at  Jena,  in  the  forests  of  Thuringia,  shattered  the 
Prussian  army.  Thereupon  the  whole  Prussian  state 
fell  like  a  house  of  cards.  The  wretched  king  made 
his  escape  into  East  Prussia  and  there,  supported  by 
Czar  Alexander  of  Russia,  with  whom  he  had  entered 
into  a  belated  alliance,  continued  the  struggle  a  little 
longer.  In  July,  1807,  in  the  extreme  eastern  corner 
of  the  state,  at  Tilsit,  Napoleon  and  Alexander  made 
peace,  the  beaten  Frederick  William  humbly  accepting 
the  terms  that  were  arranged  for  him  by  the  two 
emperors. 

By  the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  Prussia  lost  half  of  her  terri- 
tory; besides,  she  had  to  agree  to  support  a  French 
army  of  occupation  and  pay  an  indemnity,  the 
amount  of  which  was  purposely  left  undetermined  in 
order  to  keep  a  sword  suspended  over  the  anxious 
government.  In  the  eyes  of  contemporaries  Prussia 


74        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

was  stricken  from  the  list  of  the  great  powers  without 
any  likelihood  of  ever  recovering  from  her  terrible 
abasement. 

The  chapter  that  follows  is  the  proudest  in  Prussian 
history,  for  it  tells  the  story  of  a  deliberate  and  pain- 
ful reconstruction  upon  a  sounder  foundation  than  the 
one  that  had  crumbled  so  miserably.  In  the  hour  of 
need  the  best  manhood  of  Prussia  gathered  around 
the  throne  and  set  an  example  of  devoted  self-sacrifice 
for  the  state  that  has  few  parallels.  And  yet  without 
meanly  stinting  our  praise  let  us  avoid  misconceptions. 
We  may  read  in  many  books  that  Prussia,  following 
her  collapse,  went  through  a  radical  transformation, 
achieving  by  a  succession  of  royal  decrees  all  the  ben- 
efits of  the  French  Revolution.  That  is  a  manifest 
exaggeration  as  a  moment's  reflection  will  show.  The 
French  Revolution  was  the  proclamation  orb'i  et  urbi 
of  the  coming  of  age  of  the  French  bourgeoisie,  and 
since  Prussia  had  only  an  embryo  bourgeoisie,  created 
by  the  economic  policy  of  Frederick  the  Great,  it  stands 
to  reason  that  the  country  could  not  possibly  have  been 
reorganized  after  the  French  pattern. 

Prussia  after  Jena  was,  like  Prussia  before  Jena, 
an  essentially  agricultural  state  of  the  feudal  type,  and 
any  reconstruction  plans  which  left  that  fact  out  of 
account  would  have  been  foredoomed  to  failure. 
Therefore  the  actual  reconstruction  proceeded,  as  we 
may  say,  historically,  and  with  wise  moderation  left 
the  absolute  monarchy  unimpaired  with  its  two  tradi- 
tional pillars  of  a  trained  civil  service  and  a  standing 
army.  But  something,  both  new  and  vital,  was  joined 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  75 

to  the  old  by  means  of  reforms,  the  main  purpose  of 
which  was  to  arouse  the  latent  manhood  of  those  classes 
of  the  population  hitherto  neglected  and  submerged. 
These  were  the  peasant-serfs  who  worked  the  estates 
of  the  nobles,  and  the  town-dwellers  engaged  in  trade 
and  industry.  To  raise  their  personal,  legal  status, 
thereby  increasing  their  self-esteem,  to  give  them 
political  power  in  order  that  they  might  learn  to  look 
upon  the  affairs  of  the  state  as  their  own  —  such  was 
the  end  of  the  new  legislation  which,  while  it  aimed 
at  a  social  renewal,  certainly  did  not  in  the  spirit  of 
doctrinaire  fanaticism  attempt  the  impossible  task  of 
making  Prussia  over  into  a  kind  of  German  France. 

Those  were  terrible  and  solemn  days  when,  after 
the  peace  of  Tilsit,  King  Frederick  William  called  his 
optimati  about  him  to  take  counsel  concerning  the  sav- 
ing of  the  remnants  of  the  state  from  final  ruin.  He 
himself,  stiff,  upright,  without  vision  or  originality, 
counted  for  nothing  in  the  crisis.  Fortunately  his 
wife,  the  spirited  Queen  Louise,  covered  his  insignifi- 
cance with  her  feminine  grace  and  sounded  the  note 
of  heroism  for  which  the  people,  seated  in  the  darkness 
of  despair,  were  listening. 

During  the  negotiations  at  Tilsit  the  queen's  simple 
courage  had  prompted  her  to  seek  out  Napoleon  in 
order  to  bend  her  knee  before  him  and  ask  for  better 
terms.  True,  the  victor  remained  adamant,  but  her 
petitioner's  role,  sustained  with  royal  dignity,  carried 
her  at  a  bound  into  the  hearts  of  her  people.  Ponder- 
ing the  Prussian  catastrophe,  her  unflinching  honesty 
brought  her  face  to  face  with  the  truth  touching  her  hus- 


76        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

band's  reign :  "  We  have  fallen  asleep  on  the  laurels 
of  Frederick  the  Great,  the  creator  of  a  new  era,"  she 
wrote  to  a  friend.  "  Not  progressing  with  that  era  we 
have  been  left  behind." 

There  exists  a  well-known  portrait  of  Queen  Louise 
coming  down  a  staircase  with  youthful  and  erect  grace, 
a  jeweled  star  shining  at  her  brow.  That  is  the  guise 
in  which  she  appeared  to  her  people  in  their  hour  of 
need,  spreading  just  that  glamour  of  leadership  with- 
out which  monarchy  is  but  an  intolerable  incumbrance. 
Her  moral  courage  thrown  at  the  decisive  moment 
into  the  political  balance  inclined  the  scales  in  favor 
of  a  brave,  forward-looking  policy,  but  the  actual  meas- 
ures now  adopted  came,  not  from  her,  but  from  a  group 
of  trained  administrators  and  ardent  reformers,  Stein, 
Hardenberg,  Scharnhorst,  Gneisenau,  Humboldt,  and 
others,  men  who  were  one  and  all  exceptionally  endowed 
by  nature,  but  the  greatest  of  whom  was  unquestionably 
Stein. 

Baron  Stein,  or,  as  his  correct  title  is,  Freiherr  vom 
Stein,  was  not  a  native  Prussian.  He  was  born  in 
Nassau,  the  homeland  of  that  famous  line  of  princes 
who  fill  so  shining  a  page  in  Dutch  history.  The  baron 
belonged  to  an  ancient  house  of  imperial  knights 
(Reichsritter)  and  had,  as  a  young  man,  come  to  Prus- 
sia in  search  of  a  career.  Possessed  of  great  ability, 
he  had  risen  fast  in  the  administrative  service  but  was 
of  too  austere  and  independent  a  temper  to  become 
popular  at  court,  None  the  less,  on  the  morrow  of  Til- 
sit, the  advisers  of  the  king  were  unanimous  that  the 
only  man  to  bring  order  out  of  chaos  was  the  head- 


QUEEN  LOUISE 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  77 

strong  administrator.  He  accepted  the  grave  responsi- 
bility, and  by  the  simple  weight  of  his  personality  soon 
exercised  an  effective  dictatorship. 

Long  before  the  disaster  of  Jena,  Stein  had  arrived 
at  the  conclusion  that  the  Prussian  absolutism  was 
out  of  date  and  would  have  to  be  remodeled.  But  — 
and  this  was  all  important  —  the  new  vigor  to  be 
injected  into  its  lifeless  bones  was  to  be  drawn  not  so 
much  from  the  example  of  revolutionary  France  as 
from  that  of  commercial  and  individualist  England. 
Stein's  central  concept,  focus  of  all  his  political  thought, 
was  that  the  best  asset  of  a  state  is  the  energy  of  its 
citizens,  and  that  to  liberate  and  increase  that  energy 
is  the  chief  end  of  government.  Stein  turned  first  to 
the  peasants.  In  a  decree  issued  October,  1807,  he 
put  an  end  for  all  time  to  serfdom  in  Prussia  and 
declared  the  workers  of  the  soil  free  men.  But  what 
was  to  be  their  future  relation  to  the  land?  Stein's 
idea  undoubtedly  was  to  establish  them  as  independent 
owners.  However,  the  property  rights  in  dispute 
between  them  and  their  masters  could  not  be  adjusted 
over  night,  and  before  a  settlement  was  reached  Stein 
had  left  office. 

The  result  was  that  the  peasants,  receiving  an  insuf- 
ficient endowment  of  land,  neither  then  nor  afterwards 
succeeded  to  the  possession  of  the  bulk  of  the  Prussian 
soil.  Thus,  though  the  liberation  of  the  serfs  rang 
the  knell  of  feudalism  in  its  legal  aspect,  it  did  not 
occasion  a  far-reaching  social  revolution.  To  this  day 
the  Prussian  countryside  is,  in  the  main,  an  affair  of 
large  estates ;  the  landlords,  or  Junkers,  continue  to  be 


78        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

a  very  important  social  and  economic  element,  while  the 
agricultural  laborers  are  a  free  and  wage-earning  class 
but  not,  in  overwhelming  numbers  at  least,  independent 
proprietors. 

From  the  peasants  Stein  turned  his  attention  to  the 
burghers.  To  arouse  them  from  the  political  apathy 
with  which  they  were  afflicted  seemed  even  more  import- 
ant than  to  liberate  the  serfs,  because  the  state  would 
be  more  immediately  benefited  by  the  restored  faith 
and  vigorous  cooperation  of  the  middle  class.  Accord- 
ingly, after  careful  study,  he  issued  the  Stddteordnung 
(November,  1808),  devised  to  put  the  towns  on  a 
self-governing  basis.  Frederick  the  Great  in  his  day 
had  busily  tried  to  animate  the  cities  with  industrial 
life,  but  neither  he  nor  his  ancestors  before  him  had 
had  the  wisdom  to  observe  that  a  competent  industry 
could  spring  only  from  strong,  individual  initiative. 
Thus  he  had  defeated  his  own  ends,  for  though  spur- 
ring his  burghers  to  greater  economic  production,  he 
had  continued  to  rule  their  cities  bureaucratically  by 
royal  commissioners. 

Stein,  drawing  breath  in  the  era  of  English  industrial 
expansion,  saw  that  an  enterprising,  self-respecting 
business  class  implied  political  training  and  responsi- 
bility, and  for  this  reason  he  resolved  to  start  the  urban 
communities  on  a  career  of  self-government.  In  the 
back  of  his  head  he  had  the  further  idea  of  preparing 
the  people  in  the  elective  municipal  councils  for  the 
still  larger  work  of  ruling  the  state.  In  short,  a  con- 
stitutional monarchy  was  his  ultimate  hope,  but  before 
he  could  effect  such  a  thorough-going  change,  the  scene 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  79 

shifted  and  the  curtain  descended  upon  his  ministry 
with  tragic  abruptness.  The  story,  since  it  made  him  a 
martyr  to  the  German  cause,  deserves  to  be  recounted. 

While  laboring  to  revive  the  state  and  the  people, 
Stein  never  lost  from  view  the  immediate,  practical 
end  of  liberating  Prussia  from  the  Napoleonic  yoke. 
He  planned  a  popular  revolt  to  embrace  all  Germany, 
but,  owing  to  his  outspoken  character,  proved  an 
impossible  conspirator.  One  of  Napoleon's  secret 
agents  in  Germany  succeeded  in  getting  possession  of 
a  private  letter  of  Stein's.  It  exhibited  the  writer  in 
so  anti-French  a  light  that  further  continuance  in  office 
was  out  of  the  question,  unless  Prussia  was  ready  to 
go  to  war  with  Napoleon  at  once.  That  was  by  no 
means  the  case,  and  therefore  in  November,  1 808,  after 
not  much  more  than  a  year's  service,  Stein  left  office, 
a  victim  of  his  headlong  patriotism.  Napoleon,  made 
aware,  as  by  a  flash  in  the  dark,  of  the  mettle  of  his 
enemy,  resolved  to  be  rid  of  him  forever.  In  a  decree 
issued  from  Paris  he  confiscated  Stein's  ancestral  estates 
in  Nassau  and  declared  the  rebuilder  of  Prussia  an 
outlaw.  Only  by  a  hurried  flight  from  Germany  did 
the  hunted  statesman  save  his  life. 

However,  the  work  inaugurated  by  Stein  did  not 
cease  with  his  fall.  His  successor,  Hardenberg,  in  spite 
of  his  ideas  having  a  far  more  bureaucratic  tinge  than 
those  of  Stein,  upheld  the  policy  of  reform;  and  min- 
isters like  Scharnhorst,  head  of  the  military  commis- 
sion, and  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt,  charged  with  public 
education,  made  their  names  illustrious  with  memorable 
achievements.  Scharnhorst's  work  more  particularly 


80        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

supplemented  Stein's,  for  he  popularized  and  national- 
ized the  Prussian  army.  He  did  this  by  throwing  open 
the  officer  positions  to  all  citizens;  by  abolishing  foreign 
enlistments;  by  drafting  the  burghers  into  the  ranks; 
and  by  proclaiming,  in  theory  at  least,  the  right  of 
the  Prussian  state  to  the  military  service  of  every 
citizen. 

Some  years  later,  in  1814,  the  principle  of  universal, 
obligatory  service  was  definitely  incorporated  in  a  royal 
statute,  and  in  the  course  of  the  last  one  hundred  years 
has  impressed  the  world  with  being  the  most  charac- 
teristic single  feature  of  the  Prussian  state.  However, 
Scharnhorst  himself,  in  the  era  of  reconstruction,  had 
to  be  content  with  less  than  the  ideal  he  set  up,  for, 
making  against  the  full  realization  of  his  military  plans 
was  first,  the  exhausted  state  of  the  national  finances, 
and  second,  an  express  provision  in  the  treaty  with 
Napoleon  by  which  the  Prussian  army  was  limited  to 
42,000  men.  The  latter  restriction,  it  is  true,  a  clever 
device  in  a  measure  overcame.  By  replacing  one  group 
of  young  men  after  a  short  term  of  service  with  another 
group,  Scharnhorst  managed,  without  particularly 
arousing  Napoleon's  suspicions,  to  give  military  train- 
ing to  a  not  inconsiderable  section  of  the  nation  and 
thus  to  be  ready,  when  the  hour  struck,  with  a  large  and 
effective  fighting  force. 

To  renovated  state  and  army  the  renovated  educa- 
tional life  of  Prussia  presents  a  worthy  parallel,  though 
at  first  it  made  its  effects  felt  only  at  the  summit  of  the 
system,  in  the  university  realm.  In  the  year  1810 
Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  —  brother  of  the  great  natur- 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  81 

alist,  Alexander  —  acting  as  minister  of  public  instruc- 
tion founded  the  university  of  Berlin.  The  new  time 
called  for  new  intellectual  agents,  and  the  universities 
older  than  Berlin,  dedicated  to  theological  creeds  and 
moving  in  the  settled  ruts  of  scholasticism,  proved 
unsuitable  media  of  the  fresh  thought  abroad  in  the 
land.  The  university  of  Berlin,  it  was  expressly  declared 
in  the  articles  of  incorporation,  was  to  serve  no  creed 
and  to  be  intent  only  on  truth  and  science.  Lehrfrei- 
heit  und  Lernfreiheit  —  the  right  of  teachers  to  teach 
and  students  to  learn  whatever  love  of  truth  urged  — 
now  for  the  first  time  established  themselves  within 
academic  walls  in  Germany  and,  for  that  matter,  in 
the  European  world. 

What  that  meant  it  is  difficult  for  us  to  appreciate 
who  live  in  a  day  when  Lehrfreiheit  und  Lernfreiheit 
have  won  universal  recognition;  but  if  it  is  recalled 
that  a  hundred  years  ago  a  narrow  and  rancorous  the- 
ology predominated  everywhere,  and  that  the  natural 
sciences  as  well  as  the  other  studies  of  the  modern 
curriculum  enjoyed  a  very  uncertain  academic  standing, 
we  will  begin  to  realize  that  the  founding  of  a  uni- 
versity under  the  solemn  invocation  of  mental  freedom 
meant  the  advent  of  a  new  educational  era. 

The  Prussia  which  reshaped  itself  along  the  lines 
here  sketched,  inevitably  rose  again  from  the  dust  to 
which  it  had  been  leveled  at  Jena.  Life  seems  to  accord 
this  reward  of  renewal  to  individuals  and  nations  who 
refuse  to  accept  the  verdict  of  defeat.  But  the  renewal, 
I  must  repeat,  did  not  involve  a  wholesale  rejection 
of  the  Prussian  tradition.  On  the  contrary,  the  essen- 


82         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

tial  elements  of  that  tradition  —  the  strong  monarchy, 
the  trained  civil  service,  the  standing  army  —  were 
retained;  only  they  were  nationalized  and  brought  into 
touch  with  the  people,  besides  being  supplemented  by 
a  comprehensive  legislation  which  had  the  tendency 
to  awaken  the  citizen  body  to  a  consciousness  of  its 
responsibilities.  This  Prussia,  smarting  with  the  humil- 
iations imposed  at  Tilsit,  was  not  likely  to  remain  an 
indifferent  spectator,  if  ever  by  a  turn  of  fortune  the 
throne  of  Napoleon  began  to  rock.  The  more  difficult 
the  self-restraint  imposed  by  political  wisdom,  the  more 
determined  would  be  the  leap  at  the  foe  when  the 
favorable  moment  came. 

That  moment  came  when  in  1812  Napoleon  made 
the  fatal  mistake  of  trying  to  conquer  Russia.  In  spite 
of  apparent  successes  culminating  in  a  triumphant 
entrance  into  Moscow,  the  French  campaign  ended  in 
as  complete  a  disaster  as  that  of  Xerxes  when  he 
mustered  his  Asiatic  host  for  the  invasion  and  conquest 
of  Greece.  By  battles,  disease,  and  the  bitter  Russian 
cold  Napoleon's  whole  fighting  force,  the  effective  prop 
of  his  throne,  was  as  good  as  wiped  out.  When  the 
whispered  news  spread  through  Prussia  that  the  French 
Caesar  had  been  obliged  to  hurry  across  Germany  in 
the  dead  of  winter,  more  like  a  fugitive  than  a  sover- 
eign, a  movement  went  through  the  people  that  was 
like  the  rustle  in  the  forest  leaves  before  the  coming 
of  the  storm.  The  king,  true  to  the  last  to  the  unheroic 
mold  in  which  nature  had  cast  him,  was  for  discreetly 
waiting  on  Napoleon's  next  move.  There  was  now  no 
fine-tempered  Queen  Louise  to  fix  his  resolution,  for 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  83 

death  had  called  away  the  helpmate  while  the  political 
darkness  was  still  unbroken.  But  the  awakened  nation, 
remembering  its  proud  lady,  was  alert  and  inexorable. 
Responding  to  the  throbbing  heart  of  the  people,  a 
Prussian  corps  under  General  Yorck  took  matters 
into  its  own  hands  and,  on  its  own  initiative,  practically 
declared  war  on  France. 

Therewith  the  crisis  was  precipitated,  but  though 
the  indignant  king  threatened  to  try  Yorck  for  treason, 
the  people  unanimously  applauded  the  general's  act. 
Under  a  mild  form  of  duress  Frederick  William  was 
hurried  by  a  patriot  group  from  Berlin  to  Breslau  in 
Silesia,  which  had  become  the  center  of  the  movement 
of  revolt.  There,  barely  given  time  to  strengthen  his 
cause  by  the  conclusion  of  an  alliance  with  Russia,  he 
was  swept  into  a  declaration  of  war  against  Napoleon 
(March,  1813),  which  to  refuse  would  have  been  to 
abdicate  the  throne. 

The  struggle  that  followed  is  known  in  Prussian  his- 
tory as  the  War  of  Liberation,  for  it  was  fought  to 
free  the  nation  from  the  yoke  of  Napoleon.  It  was 
no  sooner  under  way  than  the  effects  of  the  new  spirit 
and  organization  became  everywhere  visible  and 
nowhere  more  conspicuously  than  in  the  army.  The 
army  could  indeed  be  only  very  slowly  equipped,  owing 
to  the  absence  of  funds,  but,  thanks  to  Scharnhorst,  it 
boasted  a  solid  stock  of  men  possessed  of  the  rudiments 
of  military  training.  The  chief  command  was  given  to 
Bliicher,  a  man  old  in  years  but  young  in  spirit  and 
admirably  suited  to  keep  the  enthusiasm  of  troops  and 
nation  at  the  boiling-point.  In  addition  to  the  regu- 


84         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

lars,  there  were  such  crowds  of  volunteers  that  finally 
the  whole  arm-bearing  population  was  gathered  into 
camp.  But  not  alone  from  Prussia,  from  all  parts  of 
Germany  men  rushed  to  help  the  cause.  To  mention 
only  one  such  volunteer  because  of  the  fame  he  reaped 
—  the  Saxon,  Koerner,  joined  a  troop  of  roughriders, 
called  Jaeger,  and  in  a  number  of  splendid  war  songs 
crystallized  the  exaltation  of  the  age.  The  young  poet 
fell  in  battle  at  the  age  of  twenty-two,  dying  a  death 
which  the  ancient  Greeks  would  have  acclaimed  as 
beautiful.  As  final  evidence  of  the  spirit  of  sacrifice 
abroad  let  a  single  statistical  statement  suffice.  Prus- 
sia, a  conquered  country  of  contracted  area  and  less 
than  five  million  inhabitants,  mobilized  almost  three 
hundred  thousand  soldiers,  a  larger  number  than  was 
furnished  for  the  campaign  of  1813  by  either  Russia 
or  Austria. 

In  spite  of  the  disaster  of  1812,  the  Emperor  Napo- 
leon had  an  abundance  of  fight  left  in  him.  With  the 
skill  for  organization  that  was  an  essential  feature  of 
his  military  genius,  he  equipped  a  new  army  and  with 
the  advent  of  spring  hurried  into  Germany  to  seek  out 
the  enemy.  Prussians  and  Russians  together  made  a 
determined  effort  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Elbe.  Twice' 
defeated  in  the  month  of  May,  they  had  slowly  to 
fall  back.  But  to  Napoleon's  own  surprise  the  enemy 
yielded  few  prisoners  and  retired  from  the  field  in 
perfect  order.  "  The  rascals  have  learnt  something!  " 
he  was  heard  to  mutter  angrily  in  the  course  of  his 
futile  pursuit,  and  troubled  by  the  many  perplexities 
of  the  situation,  he  fell  in  with  the  offer  of  an  armistice, 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  85 

the  purpose  of  which  was  to  discuss  possible  terms  of 
peace.  That  act  was  his  undoing,  at  least  such 
was  his  own  view  repeatedly  expressed  in  after 
years.  For  the  armistice  lasted  over  two  months,  from 
June  to  August,  with  the  result  that  Russia  and  Prussia 
gained  a  much  needed  respite  to  complete  their  equip- 
ment, while  Austria,  hitherto  neutral,  slowly  reached 
the  conviction  that  her  hour  of  revenge  had  come  and 
joined  the  allies.  At  the  same  time  Great  Britain, 
already  at  war  with  Napoleon  —  she  had  been  unin- 
terruptedly at  war  with  him  since  1803  —  signed  an 
agreement  with  his  other  enemies.  There  was  thus 
constituted  in  the  summer  of  1813  a  formidable  Quad- 
ruple Alliance  pledged  to  dedicate  its  total  strength  to 
the  overthrow  of  Europe's  conqueror. 

When  the  truce  ended  without  the  conclusion  of  a 
peace,  the  campaign  of  1813  reopened.  And  now  be- 
hold, the  scene  had  shifted  everywhere  to  Napo- 
leon's disadvantage.  He  was  outnumbered  and  — 
unheard-of  event !  —  put  on  the  defensive.  He  held 
the  plain  of  Saxony,  a  central  position,  with  his  usual 
skill  and  obstinacy,  but  slowly  his  many  and  ubiquitous 
enemies  drove  in  his  outposts  until  the  hero  of  a  hun- 
dred battles,  the  modern  god  of  war,  was  brought  to 
bay  near  the  great  city  of  Leipzig.  There  followed  a 
supreme  struggle,  a  battle  lasting  three  days  and  cul- 
minating on  October  18  in  one  of  the  famous  routs  of 
history.  Napoleon  himself  with  a  small  body  of  troops 
managed  to  slip  through  the  iron  ring  which  the  allies 
were  drawing  about  him  and  gained  the  Rhine  in  safety, 
but  central  Europe  was  definitely  lost  to  him  and  it  was 


86        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

very  doubtful  whether  the  resources  still  in  hand  would 
suffice  to  maintain  his  hold  on  France.  Prussia  was  in- 
toxicated with  joy.  Not  only  had  the  nation  gloriously 
redeemed  itself,  but  the  Prussian  army  under  the  ener- 
getic Bliicher,  the  Marschall  Vorwaerts  of  his  idolizing 
troopers,  had  been  unquestionably  the  decisive  factor 
in  the  lion  hunt  that  closed  at  Leipzig. 

Irresistibly  the  victors  poured  after  Napoleon  until 
they  reached  the  banks  of  the  Rhine.  There  they 
paused  until,  slowly  becoming  aware  that  nothing  was 
done  as  long  as  Napoleon  himself  was  still  at  large, 
they  crossed  the  river  prepared  to  track  him  to  his 
lair.  His  resistance  in  the  famous  winter  campaign  of 
1813-14  was  magnificent.  But  he  was  now  a  beaten 
man,  fighting  against  hope  and  fatally  outnumbered. 
When  on  the  last  day  of  March  the  allies  captured 
the  city  of  Paris,  he  accepted  the  verdict  of  arms,  and 
on  April  7,  at  his  castle  of  Fontainebleau,  drew  up  his 
abdication.  Proclaimed  the  prisoner  of  Europe,  he 
was  sent  into  honorable  exile  to  the  island  of  Elba,  off 
the  coast  of  Tuscany. 

In  the  light  of  Napoleon's  subsequent  conduct  the 
distinguished  treatment  meted  out  to  him  by  the  victors 
was  more  than  he  deserved.  Still  it  may  be  urged  in 
his  defense  that  it  was  pure  folly  to  expect  so  venture- 
some a  spirit  to  be  content  with  a  play-kingdom  such 
as  Elba,  while  France,  his  willing  prize,  lay  a 
few  hours'  journey  across  the  blue  Mediterranean. 
Abiding  in  Elba  through  the  winter  months,  as  soon 
as  the  spring  of  1815  stirred  the  smouldering  fires  in 
his  blood,  he  struck  suddenly  and  secretly  for  the  shore 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  87 

of  Provence.  His  former  soldiers,  to  whom  his  word 
was  law,  once  more  rallied  about  him,  and,  although 
the  level-headed  shopkeepers  and  merchants  grumbled 
and  shook  their  heads,  he  was  swept  on  to  Paris  by  a 
flood  of  popular  sentiment  and  triumphantly  established 
on  the  restored  imperial  throne. 

The  restored  Napoleonic  empire  was  not  destined 
to  last  long.  Les  Cent  Jours  —  the  Hundred  Days  — 
the  French  call  the  brief  period  of  Bonaparte's  second 
dream  of  power.  As  soon  as  the  news  of  his  flight 
from  Elba  reached  the  diplomats  of  the  Quadruple 
Alliance,  they  renewed  their  mutual  pledges  and,  refus- 
ing to  treat  with  their  escaped  prisoner  in  any  form  or 
manner,  peremptorily  declared  him  an  outlaw.  Then 
they  let  slip  the  dogs  of  war.  Since  with  relatively 
unimpaired  forces  he  had  failed  to  resist  the  four 
powers  in  1813,  it  was  as  good  as  certain  that  he 
would  not  prevail  now.  In  point  of  fact  a  three  days' 
campaign,  conducted  by  only  a  fraction  of  the  allies' 
forces,  sufficed  to  crush  him. 

Of  course,  being  Napoleon,  he  did  not  go  down 
without  a  struggle.  Characteristically  he  himself  forced 
the  fighting  by  suddenly  swooping  down  on  Bliicher's 
Prussians.  These,  with  a  part  of  the  British  army, 
had  wintered  not  far  from  the  French  frontier,  in 
Belgium.  At  Ligny,  on  June  16,  by  quick  maneuvering 
Napoleon  gave  Bliicher  a  sound  beating.  Then 
he  turned  against  the  British  under  Wellington,  and 
two  days  later,  on  June  18,  fought  the  battle  of  Water- 
loo. Everybody  knows  how  the  emperor,  after  the 
skies  cleared  at  noon,  recklessly  sent  his  legions  to  dis- 


88         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

lodge  the  enemy,  how  the  British  for  hours  stubbornly 
held  their  ground,  and  how  they  were  rewarded  for 
their  gallantry  when,  late  in  the  afternoon,  the  Prus- 
sians came  upon  the  scene.  Bliicher,  beaten  two  days 
before,  had  been  eliminated,  so  Napoleon  calculated 
from  the  situation.  But  to  his  misfortune  the  emperor 
underestimated  the  spirit  of  the  marshal  and  his  stead- 
fast troops.  The  fiery  old  man  had  pledged  his  word  to 
Wellington  to  join  him  upon  need,  and  on  June  18,  in 
spite  of  the  heavy,  rain-sodden  roads,  intrepidly  worked 
his  way  toward  Napoleon's  right  flank. 

The  emperor  caught,  to  his  complete  surprise,  be- 
tween two  fires  was  forced  to  witness  the  shattering 
of  his  army,  and  at  nightfall  made  his  escape  from  a 
carnage  and  rout  that  were  worse  than  Leipzig.  With 
his  soldiers  dead  or  captured  he  was  deprived  of  his 
one  sure  following,  and  in  the  face  of  the  cold  aver- 
sion of  the  rest  of  France,  abdicated  a  second  time. 
Needless  to  say  the  allies  did  not  repeat  their  Elban 
experiment.  They  sent  him  as  far  away  from 
Europe  as  possible  to  the  rocky  mid-Atlantic  island  of 
St.  Helena,  where  after  a  confinement,  unhappily 
attended  by  both  humiliation  and  physical  suffering, 
he  died  six  years  after  Waterloo. 

My  hurried  narrative  can  not  have  failed  to  show 
that  the  Prussian  army  figured  prominently  in  both 
the  first  and  second  overthrow  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte. 
With  such  achievements  to  its  credit  the  new  Prussia 
had  conclusively  proved  that  it  was  not  the  mean  affair 
which  had  gone  down  to  defeat  at  Jena  some  years 
before,  and  that  it  would  have  to  be  readmitted  to 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  89 

the  councils  of  Europe.  With  the  downfall  of  Napoleon 
effected,  the  great  concern  was  the  re-drawing  of  the 
European  boundaries,  and  naturally  the  victors  of  the 
Quadruple  Alliance  took  it  in  hand  as  their  particular 
prerogative.  They  discussed  the  question  while  the 
fighting  was  still  going  on,  but  finally  agreed  to  adjourn 
the  debate  to  a  meeting  called  in  the  Austrian  capital  in 
the  winter  of  1814-15.  The  famous  Congress  of 
Vienna  created  the  public  law  with  which  Europe 
entered  upon  the  nineteenth  century,  and  of  course  the 
four  allies,  who  controlled  the  situation,  saw  to  it  that 
their  reward  was  duly  entered  on  the  books. 

At  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  Prussia,  the  only  country 
with  which  we  are  concerned,  was  restored  to  the  terri- 
torial condition  she  boasted  before  the  war  of  1806. 
That  does  not  mean  that  she  received  back  the  exact 
provinces  held  before  Jena,  but  merely  that  in  area  and 
population  she  was  restored  to  her  ante-bellum  power. 
To  illustrate  the  procedure  adopted:  By  giving 
up  the  territory  acquired  in  the  three  partitions  of 
Poland  the  government  got  in  exchange  certain  Ger- 
man territory  in  Saxony  and  on  the  Rhine.  The  sur- 
rendered Polish  provinces  were  snapped  up  by  Russia 
which  therewith  was  enabled  to  boast  that  most  of  the 
old  kingdom  of  Poland  was  now  in  its  power.*  If, 
map  in  hand,  you  will  compare  the  boundaries  of  the 
restored  Prussia  of  1815  with  the  boundaries  of  1806, 
it  will  immediately  appear  that  the  new  Prussia  was 
territorially  more  compact  and,  from  the  point  of  view 

*  On  the  partitions  of  Poland  and  Prussia's  share  therein  see  Appen- 
dix F. 


90         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

of  race,  more  solidly  German.  In  fact,  except  for  a 
remaining  belt  of  Poles  along  the  eastern  frontier, 
the  state  boasted  only  German  citizens. 

Since  Austria,  after  its  restoration  at  Vienna,  re- 
mained the  same  state  of  many  peoples  —  Germans, 
Slavs,  Magyars,  Italians  —  which  it  had  become 
through  its  age-long  growth  down  the  valley  of  the 
Danube,  Prussia  from  now  on  enjoyed  an  indubitable 
advantage  over  Austria  in  the  struggle  for  German 
leadership.  Being  German,  she  was,  without  effort 
and  through  no  special  merit,  essentially  harmonious 
with  the  whole  German  stock;  whereas  Austria,  largely 
identified  with  non-German  interests,  was  obliged  by 
circumstances  to  pursue  ends  which  were  often  not  in 
accord  with  those  of  German  nationalism  and  some- 
times diametrically  opposed  to  them. 

The  best  illustration  of  the  change  in  the  relative 
importance  of  the  two  rivals  with  regard  to  the  rest 
of  Germany  is  afforded  by  the  new  Rhenish  territories 
which,  as  I  have  just  said,  came  to  Prussia  in  exchange 
for  Polish  lands.  Let  us  for  a  moment  consider  some 
of  the  implications  of  the  solid  establishment  of  Prussia 
on  the  Rhine.  At  first  glance  the  advantage  of  the 
Rhenish  acquisition  was  open  to  question,  because  the 
new  territory  was  not  contiguous  with  the  bulk  of  the 
monarchy  east  of  the  Elbe;  besides,  it  presented  a  diffi- 
cult problem  of  defense  in  the  event  of  a  renewal  of 
French  aggression. 

Now  in  building  up  a  special  Prussian  territorial  in- 
terest in  western  Germany  the  Congress  of  Vienna  con- 
sciously and  deliberately  brought  Prussia  and  France 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  91 

into  opposition.  We  must  remember  that  the  perhaps 
dominant  idea  of  the  Viennese  diplomats  was  so  to  draw 
the  boundaries  of  Europe  that  defeated  France  would 
pause  and  reflect  before  resuming  her  ambitious  assaults 
on  central  Europe.  Their  thought  ran  much  as  fol- 
lows: Eighteenth-century  Prussia,  provided  with  neg- 
ligible interests  on  the  Rhine,  had  proved  a  weak  dam, 
in  fact  no  dam  at  all,  against  the  French  floods;  en- 
dowed at  Vienna  with  a  solid  block  of  territory  on  both 
banks  of  the  river,  would  she  not  prove  a  better  bulwark 
in  the  future  ?  Acting  on  this  hope,  the  Congress,  not 
without  a  certain  malice,  loaded  a  dangerous  responsi- 
bility on  Prussian  shoulders.  The  Berlin  government, 
it  is  interesting  to  note,  took  over  the  Rhine  lands  with 
reluctance,  but  having  once  accepted  them,  Prussia  be- 
came automatically  the  protector  of  Germany  against 
its  Gallic  neighbor,  and,  for  better  and  for  worse,  as- 
sumed the  honorable  task  of  watch  and  ward  on  the 
most  national  of  German  streams,  the  Rhine. 

But  that  same  protecting  role  Austria  had  exercised 
in  the  past  centuries  by  reason  of  her  ownership  of  the 
Breisgau,  on  the  upper  Rhine  opposite  Alsace,  and  of 
the  Austrian  Netherlands,  familiar  to  us  under  the  name 
of  Belgium.  And  now  what  happened?  In  1815  the 
House  of  Hapsburg,  prompted  by  the  desire  to  with- 
draw from  contact  with  France  and  to  concentrate  its 
attention  nearer  home,  surrendered  all  these  western 
outposts  in  return  for  a  foothold  in  Italy.  It  was  not 
an  unreasonable  move  in  itself,  but  it  snapped  most  of 
the  remaining  bonds  between  Austria  and  Germany. 
Thus  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  with  Austria's  own 


92         The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

consent,  Prussia  was  put  in  the  way  of  proving  by  serv- 
ice to  the  nation  that  the  leadership  of  Germany  be- 
longed henceforth  of  right  to  her. 

The  Prussian  monarchy  of  1815,  we  may  note  again 
in  a  final  attempt  to  measure  the  transformation  of 
the  Napoleonic  period,  was  equal  to  the  new  oppor- 
tunities that  came  with  the  new  time.  I  have 
repeatedly  warned  against  the  extravagant  view  that 
reconstructed  Prussia  deserted  her  traditional  founda- 
tions. The  strong  monarchy  kept  control,  and  with 
it  much  of  the  patriarchal  theory  which  I  attempted  to 
define  in  a  previous  lecture  continued  to  obtain.  None 
the  less,  a  transformation  of  weight  and  moment  was 
effected,  inasmuch  as  Stein  and  Scharnhorst  released 
the  slumbering  forces  of  the  nation  and  wed  the  people 
to  the  state.  Henceforth  the  view,  dangerously  prev- 
alent before  Jena,  that  the  state  was  an  end  in  itself 
and  therefore  justified  in  setting  tasks  to  its  subjects 
with  lordly  unconcern  for  their  counsels  and  wishes, 
lost  all  but  a  few  hidebound  supporters. 

In  the  new  century  individual  Prussians,  practicing 
local  self-government,  serving  shoulder  to  shoulder  in 
the  army,  made  confident  by  a  body  of  fundamental 
civil  rights,  were  sure  to  assert  themselves  as  they  never 
had  before.  "  Every  citizen  is  in  duty  bound  to  defend 
his  fatherland,"  ran  the  opening  sentence  of  the  famous 
conscription  law  of  1814,  crowning  Scharnhorst's  re- 
construction of  the  army.  That  sentence  and  the  com- 
pulsory military  service  which  it  imposed  put  a  solemn 
responsibility  on  every  citizen,  high  and  low,  that  showed 
itself  in  an  increased  dignity  of  bearing.  It  showed 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  93 

itself  no  less  in  an  ethical  enthusiasm  voiced  by  scores 
of  contemporaries  —  administrators,  poets,  and  teach- 
ers —  but  most  impressively  sounded  by  such  philos- 
ophers as  Kant,  the  Prussian  by  birth,  and  Fichte,  the 
Prussian  by  adoption. 

Most  probably  Kant  and  Fichte,  in  urging  their 
views  of  the  duty  of  the  citizen,  imagined  they  were 
stating  a  general  position  valid  for  any  place  and  for 
all  time;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  limited,  like  the  rest 
of  us,  by  their  personal  experience,  they  merely  postu- 
lated the  moral  conditions  which,  by  saving  Prussia, 
the  country  of  their  attachment,  from  its  besetting 
perils,  appeared  to  them  to  guarantee  its  permanence. 
Kant  and  Fichte  taught  the  stirring  doctrine  of  the 
individual  will  which,  free  in  itself,  discovers  its  true 
end  in  voluntary  subjection  to  the  state.  Voluntary 
subjection  was  the  gist  of  the  matter,  since  it  was  only 
by  the  free  offer  of  his  hand  and  brain  that  the  indi- 
vidual affirmed  his  moral  integrity.  In  Kant  the  doc- 
trine took  the  form  of  the  socalled  categorical  impera- 
tive, the  "  thou  must  "  of  the  still,  small  voice;  in  Fichte 
it  assumed  the  character  of  a  romantic  patriotism.  In 
any  case,  with  an  appeal  mixed  of  reason  and  emo- 
tion, the  great  ethical  masters  of  the  age  incukated 
the  solemn  assumption  by  the  citizen  of  a  duty  to  the 
state  and  thus  stamped  or  helped  stamp  an  austerity 
on  the  Prussian  spirit  which  has  brought  to  the  mind 
of  many  an  observer  the  "  dourness  "  of  the  Scots 
under  the  regime  of  Presbyterianism.  Indeed  it  is  far 
from  fantastic  to  suggest  that,  on  its  ethical  side,  Kan- 
tianism was  a  sort  of  revived  Calvinism. 


94        The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

Summarizing  this  attempt  to  characterize  the  revived 
Prussian  state,  I  would  linger  on  the  moral  unity  and 
force  which  the  Kantian  ideal  gave.  True,  the  spread 
of  that  ideal  was  not  so  much  due  to  Kant,  an  abstruse 
and  relatively  unknown  pedagogue  of  Konigsberg,  as 
to  the  long  working  of  historical  causes  which  Kant 
formulated  in  terms  of  a  personal  and  social  ethics. 
For  me  at  least,  when  I  try  to  account  for  the 
Spartan  rigor  of  the  Prussian  state  coupled  with  the 
voluntary  and  passionate  devotion  to  it  of  its  subjects, 
I  find»myself  going  over  in  my  mind  the  peculiar  experi- 
ence of  the  Prussian  people,  more  particularly  the  dan- 
gers attending  the  birth  of  Prussia  during  the  agony 
of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  and  the  crushing  catastrophe 
precipitated  by  the  genius  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte. 

If  it  did  not  lead  me  too  far  afield,  it  would  be  inter- 
esting, in  conclusion,  to  compare  this  Prussian  state  of 
1815,  in  development  and  essence,  with  that  contem- 
porary European  state  to  which  it  presented  the  sharp- 
est contrast  —  England.  As  even  a  hurried  comparison 
sheds  a  measure  of  light,  I  beg  leave  to  call  attention 
to  a  few  outstanding  facts  of  the  English  situation. 

The  England  of  the  early  nineteenth  century  pos- 
sessed a  parliamentary  form  of  government,  which 
means  that  the  political  control  had  passed  into  the 
hands  of  certain  social  groups  represented  in  parlia- 
ment. These  were  the  land-holding  aristocracy  and 
the  well-to-do  middle  class  made  up  of  the  merchants 
and  bankers. 

These  groups,  after  a  long  struggle,  had  won  a 
victory  over  the  king  and  had  reduced  him  to  impotence. 


STEIN 


SCHARNHORST 


KANT* 


GOETHE 


1  Courteiy  of  Ottn  Court  Pub.   Lv. 


Prussia's  Overthrow  and  Reconstruction  95 

The  act  that  registered  their  final  triumph  was  passed 
in  1689  and  is  known  as  the  Bill  of  Rights.  Enamored 
of  free  action  in  a  world  that  was  just  being  opened 
by  colonial  enterprise,  the  victors  (whom,  for  short,  I 
shall  call  the  upper  classes),  proclaimed  their  own 
political  and  economic  liberty,  and  eagerly  accumulated 
guarantees  against  the  possibility  of  being  interfered 
with  by  the  central  executive.  A  weak,  relatively  inac- 
tive state  controlled  by  the  upper  classes;  freedom, 
glorious  freedom,  for  the  individual  members  of  the 
ruling  orders  to  shape  their  destiny  as  they  pleased; 
and  more  or  less  passive  masses  excluded  from  every 
voice  in  the  government,  but  thrown  sufficient  abun- 
dance of  crumbs  from  the  crowded  table  of  their 
"betters"  to  preserve  their  attachment  to  the  system  — 
such  were  the  essential  features  of  the  English  social 
and  political  regime  of  1815. 

Being  what  it  was,  the  regime  impressed  on  Great 
Britain  an  overwhelming  individualist  tendency,  just 
as  the  concentrated  system  of  Prussia,  with  its  all- 
powerful  state,  created  a  political  unity,  which,  in  spite 
of  inherited  feudal  distinctions  of  caste,  is  suggestive 
of  collectivism.  In  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
in  spite  of  new  conditions  and  certain  important  modi- 
fications imposed  thereby  on  both  systems,  the  histor- 
ically established  tendencies  of  individualism  and 
collectivism  continued  to  prevail  in  Great  Britain  and 
Prussia  respectively,  causing  them  to  develop  as  con- 
sistent examples  of  two  diametrically  opposed  social 
ideals. 


IV 

Progress  and  Reaction:  from  the 

Congress  of  Vienna  to  the 

Revolution  of  1848 


jfourti)  Lecture 

PROGRESS  AND  REACTION:  FROM  THE  CONGRESS  OF 
VIENNA  TO  THE  REVOLUTION  OF  1848 

AT  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  period,  the  position 
of  Prussia  in  the  European  world  was  determined 
by  two  events  which  I  beg  to  be  permitted  to  bring 
once  more  to  your  attention.  The  first  was  the  social 
transformation  wrought  by  Stein  and  the  other  patriot 
statesmen,  and  the  second  was  the  improved  position 
of  the  country  as  a  German  power  effected  by  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna.  Prussia's  immediate  future  was  there- 
fore definitely  staked  out  for  her:  it  would  involve  an 
inner  problem  of  continued  reorganization,  and  an 
outer  problem  of  her  relationship  to  Germany.  These 
two  matters,  which,  owing  to  their  constant  interaction, 
it  will  not  be  possible  or  even  desirable  to  keep  steadily 
apart,  will  form  the  substance  of  our  inquiry  in  this 
our  fourth  meeting. 

By  way  of  introduction  we  must  supply  an  omission 
in  our  development  hitherto  and  bring  the  general 
German  situation  up  to  the  point  to  which  it  had  been 
carried  by  virtue  of  the  great  upheaval  called  the 
French  Revolution.  That  the  Revolution  and  Napoleon 
gravely  affected  the  fortunes  of  Prussia  we  are  now 
amply  aware,  but  we  have  not  paused  to  note  what 
stir  they  made  in  the  rest  of  Germany,  and  specifically, 

[99] 


100       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

what  changes  they  produced  in  the  form  of  union  still 
legally  maintained  under  the  name  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire.  We  saw  that  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  was 
indeed  left  in  existence  at  the  end  of  the  Thirty  Years' 
War,  but  that  its  functions  were  so  reduced  that  the 
effective  sovereignty  passed  from  it  to  the  component 
states.  These  were  some  three  hundred  in  number, 
of  which  Austria  and  Prussia,  as  the  largest,  presently 
stepped  to  the  front.  The  nameless  but  overwhelming 
majority  were  of  course  microscopic  affairs,  which  tried 
to  conceal  their  impotence  behind  a  noisy  insistence  on 
their  rights. 

Since  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  was  a  political 
mummy  conserved  by  peculiar  circumstances,  it  was  sure 
to  crumble  to  dust  at  the  first  rude  breath  from  the  real 
world.  This  fact  was  so  generally  understood  that 
eighteenth  century  humor  poured  a  steady  stream  of  by 
no  means  gentle  ridicule  over  the  sorry  remains  of  a 
former  splendor.  Voltaire  mockingly  defined  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire  as  a  state  that,  in  derision  of  its  name, 
was  neither  an  empire  nor  holy  nor  Roman;  and  Goethe 
has  one  of  the  students  in  the  drinking-scene  in  Faust 
brawl  out  a  song  of  scorn  beginning : 

Das  liebe  Heilige  Romische  Reich, 
Wie  halt's  nur  noch  zusammen? 


No  national  sanitary  commission  insisting  on  re- 
moval, the  Empire  did  somehow  halt  zusammen  till 
a  Day  of  Judgment  dawned  with  the  French  Revolu- 
tion. Then,  in  the  presence  of  this  touchstone  of  reality, 
the  dissolution  proceeded  so  rapidly  and  spontaneously 


Progress  and  Reaction  101 

that  by  the  time  Napoleon  Bonaparte  arrived  on  the 
scene  an  imperial  nod  sufficed  to  hurry  it  into  an 
unnoticed  grave.  The  event  occurred  in  1806.  By 
that  year  Napoleon  in  his  conquering  course  had 
reached  the  point  at  which  he  was  resolved  to  lay  hand 
on  central  Europe.  Examining  with  the  direct,  un- 
clouded gaze  of  the  born  soldier  the  confused  situation 
in  Germany,  he  became  filled  with  an  impatient  desire 
to  end  the  hundreds  of  infinitesimal  sovereignties  of 
medieval  origin  which  had  managed  to  perpetuate  their 
useless  existence.  In  execution  of  his  design  he  threw 
scores  of  them  together,  handed  other  scores  to  larger 
neighbors  and,  before  he  was  done,  had  by  his  ruthless 
proceeding,  intolerant  of  legal  artifice,  simplified  and 
modernized  the  map  of  Germany.  What  was  left  of 
the  reshaped  country  he  reorganized  under  the  name 
of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  and  ruled  with  the 
title  of  Protector. 

When  on  Napoleon's  disappearance  the  Congress 
of  Vienna,  in  pursuit  of  its  policy  of  reconstruction, 
drew  up  a  list  of  the  German  states  which  it  was  pre- 
pared to  acknowledge,  the  number  was  found  to  run 
to  thirty-eight.  Compare  this  figure  with  the  three  hun- 
dred and  more  of  a  decade  earlier  and  you  arrive  at  a 
picture  of  Napoleon  in  the  role  of  Hercules  intent  on 
cleaning  up  the  political  stables  of  Germany.  Many 
a  Frenchman,  unable  to  work  up  any  ^enthusiasm  for 
Napoleon's  diminution  of  the  German  chaos,  has  iron- 
ically suggested  that  the  grateful  fatherland  raise  statues 
to  the  Corsican  alongside  of  Luther  and  Bismarck.  And 
the  Germans,  not  unmindful  of  Napoleon's  work,  might 


102      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

have  heeded  the  advice,  if  the  reflection  had  not  inter- 
posed that,  invaluable  as  the  emperor's  destructive 
policy  was,  he  had  carried  it  through  for  his  own  am- 
bitious ends  and  not  with  the  least  idea  of  doing  any- 
thing for  the  German  nation. 

Putting  discussion  aside,  it  is  indisputable  that  Napo- 
leon interred  the  ancient  German  empire,  bade  with  a 
haughty  gesture  some  hundreds  of  socalled  potentates 
no  longer  to  burden  the  earth  with  their  pretensions, 
and  brought  the  diplomats  at  Vienna  face  to  face  with 
a  Germany  immensely  simplified,  it  is  true,  but  still 
boasting  the  by  no  means  inconsiderable  number  of 
thirty-eight  sovereign  states. 

One  of  the  most  engrossing  issues  which  came  up  for 
consideration  in  the  Congress  of  Vienna  was  the  ques- 
tion what  form  of  union,  if  any,  was  to  be  given  the 
thirty-eight  states  which  had  survived  the  floods  and 
tempests.  Nobody  in  even  that  conservative  assembly 
suggested  a  return  to  the  Holy  Roman  Empire.  If  it 
could  by  any  conceivable  hocus-pocus  have  been  raised 
from  the  dead,  we  may  rest  assured  that  reactionaries 
like  Prince  Metternich,  the  Austrian  chancellor,  would 
have  made  the  attempt. 

But  what  was  to  be  put  in  its  place?  A  new  patri- 
otism had  come  to  life  in  Germany  during  the  Napo- 
leonic conquest,  and  in  the  era  of  the  Wars  of  Liberation 
it  had  blazed  up  grandly  for  a  moment.  Its  upholders 
loudly  declared  that  the  victory  won  must  be  utilized 
in  such  a  way  as  to  secure  Germany  against  a  repetition 
of  the  recent  French  conquest  and  that  the  only  method 
to  effect  that  end  was  by  a  close,  authoritative  federa- 


Progress  and  Reaction  103 

tion.  But,  after  all,  these  patriots  were  a  scattered 
group  and  if  a  census  had  been  taken  would  have  been 
found  to  include  hardly  more  than  the  membership  of 
the  intellectual  classes.  Since  these  individuals  pub- 
lished books,  held  university  chairs,  and  wrote  for  the 
newspapers,  they  could  make  themselves  heard  through 
the  land,  but  it  remained  to  be  proved  whether  or  no 
they  had  a  following  among  the  people  and  could  effect 
political  results.  Opposed  to  them  were,  on  the  one 
hand,  backward,  inexperienced  masses  attached  to  their 
local  governments  and  as  yet  unfamiliar  with  the  idea 
of  a  united  Germany;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  sover- 
eign princes  who,  jealous  of  their  inherited  rights,  had 
no  desire  to  see  their  power  curtailed  in  the  interest  of 
a  federal  executive. 

Finally,  of  momentous  importance  in  every  debate 
over  the  reorganization  of  Germany,  was  the  ancient 
rivalry  between  Austria  and  Prussia,  which,  as  soon  as 
the  common  enemy  was  overthrown,  blazed  up  afresh. 
If  Germany  was  to  become  one,  it  would  have  to  be 
united,  as  matters  stood,  under  a  monarchical  form  of 
government,  and  that  meant  that  the  German  imperial 
crown  would  have  to  be  tendered  to  either  the  Austrian 
or  the  Prussian  sovereign,  to  either  a  Hapsburg  or  a 
Hohenzollern.  But  neither  was  willing  that  the  other 
should  be  so  distinguished,  and  until  a  solution  of  this 
difficulty  was  found  the  German  situation  was  abso- 
lutely deadlocked.  Thus  the  sincere  efforts  made  by 
the  patriots  at  Vienna,  even  though  Stein  with  his 
immense  national  prestige  stood  behind  them,  led  to 
nothing,  and  it  was  clear  to  all  men  endowed  with 


104       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

political  insight  that  the  Austro-Prussian  rivalry  would 
have  to  be  disposed  of  before  German  unification  could 
advance  an  inch. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
need  not  be  criticised  and  excoriated,  as  has  been  often 
the  case,  for  contenting  itself  with  a  subterfuge.  After 
all,  it  was  not  within  the  power  of  the  diplomats  to 
terminate  the  jealousy  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  nor  was 
it  their  function  to  fan  the  low  fire  of  German  patriotism 
to  a  vaulting  blaze.  As  diplomats  have  always  done, 
the  excellencies  gathered  at  Vienna  took  matters  as  they 
found  them,  and  brought  the  German  states  into  a 
union,  the  main  characteristic  of  which  was  that  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  component  members  was  left  untouched. 
The  German  Federation  —  der  dentsche  Bund  —  as 
the  union  was  called,  created  neither  an  executive  head 
nor  a  central  administration;  it  did  not  levy  taxes  or 
provide  an  army  and  navy;  in  a  word,  it  was  a  union 
existing  only  on  paper  and  not  a  whit  less  impotent 
than  the  defunct  and  unlamented  Holy  Roman  Empire. 
Its  role  in  the  subsequent  years  was  so  shadowy  and  neg- 
ligible, that  in  a  brief  account  like  this  we  may  leave  the 
Bund  entirely  out  of  account  after  registering  the  fact 
that  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  it  was  considered  the 
only  form  of  union  of  which  Germany  was  capable. 

As  soon  as  the  German  patriots,  aglow  with  expec- 
tation, examined  what  the  diplomats  had  hatched,  they 
were  overcome  with  disappointment.  They  scoffed  at 
the  mock-union  foisted  on  their  land,  and  declared  in 
unequivocal  terms  that  they  would  not  rest  until  the 
flimsy  fabrication  had  been  blown  away  and  a  solid  and 


Progress  and  Reaction  105 

permanent  edifice  set  in  its  place.  But  how  that  result 
was  to  be  achieved  in  view  of  the  Austro-Prussian  and 
a  heap  of  other  difficulties,  no  patriot  was  able  to  say. 
With  German  unification  in  a  state  of  suspended 
animation,  our  interest  swings  to  the  second  problem 
with  which  Prussia  embarked  on  her  post-Napoleonic 
career,  the  problem  of  her  continued  inner  upbuilding. 
I  need  not  here  rehearse  the  story  of  the  Stein  reforms 
further  than  to  note  that  they  had  stood  the  test  of 
fire  in  the  great  uprising  of  1813.  But  one  point  remains 
to  be  added  to.  the  tale.  Stein  himself,  profound 
believer  in  the  awakened  energies  of  the  people,  desired 
to  crown  his  labors  by  introducing  a  constitutional  sys- 
tem of  government.  He  was  dismissed  too  soon  to 
realize  his  idea,  but  in  the  year  1815,  when  he  had  been 
for  some  time  out  of  office,  it  looked  as  if  his  plan 
were  to  be  given  a  belated  trial. 

In  May  of  that  year,  only  a  few  weeks  before  Water- 
loo, King  Frederick  William  allowed  himself  to  be  per- 
suaded to  spur  the  martial  ardor  of  his  subjects  to  the 
utmost  by  promising  them  a  departure  from  the  tradi- 
tional absolutism.  "  A  representation  of  the  people 
shall  be  established  in  Prussia,"  the  joyful  message  ran, 
which,  in  view  of  the  monarch's  rooted  distrust  of 
change,  must  have  been  reluctantly  wrung  from  him  by 
the  pressure  of  events.  Loud  and  extravagant  was  the 
rejoicing  of  the  Liberals,  whose  unbridled  imagination 
saw  Prussia  endowed  by  royal  command  with  a  consti- 
tution and  a  parliamentary  form  of  government. 

But  the  Liberals,  who  had  fed  freely  on  the  political 
literature  of  England  and  France  and  looked  upon  a 


106       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

Prussian  evolution  along  English  and  French  lines  as 
the  great  desideratum,  had  a  disappointment  in  store 
for  them.  To  begin  with,  what  the  king  had  in  mind 
with  his  vaguely  phrased  promise  was  something  im- 
measurably less  than  their  fond  imaginings.  Though 
a  man  without  the  faintest  aura  of  geniality,  Frederick 
William  in  had  the  not  unimportant  gift  of  common 
sense,  and  did  not  for  a  single  moment  plan  to  supply 
Prussia  with  a  constitutional  suit  made  according  to 
the  measure  of  his  western  neighbors.  But  even  that 
modest  degree  of  popular  cooperation  which  he  may 
have  planned  when  he  issued  his  statement  was  denied 
in  the  end.  For  this  he  laid  himself  open  to  just  and 
bitter  censure  but  the  fault  was  not  exclusively  his. 

We  must  remember  that  every  man  is  more  or  less 
the  plaything  of  circumstance,  and  that  Frederick  Wil- 
liam, a  very  mediocre  person,  was  not  likely  to  resist 
the  compelling  forces  of  his  age  and  immediate  environ- 
ment. Now  the  overwhelming  fact  is  that,  after  Water- 
loo had  been  fought  and  Napoleon  had  been  chained, 
like  another  Prometheus,  to  his  Atlantic  rock,  an  irre- 
sistible reaction  came  over  tired  Europe.  People  had 
had  enough  of  experiment  and  change  and  wanted 
chiefly  to  be  let  alone.  The  past,  lying  beyond  the 
French  Revolution,  became  to  their  warped  vision  "  the 
good  old  days,"  and  the  enlightened  autocracy  of  the 
eighteenth  century  the  best  form  of  government  attain- 
able by  erring  man. 

The  pleased  monarchs  were  not  slow  to  support  the 
movement  in  their  favor,  and,  together  with  them,  the 
old  ruling  classes,  the  nobility  and  the  clergy,  were 


Progress  and  Reaction  107 

floated  back  into  leadership  on  the  favoring  tide  of 
opinion.  The  result  was  a  general  reign  of  conserv- 
atism, the  fine  fleur  of  which  showed  its  ungracious  head 
in  the  famous  Holy  Alliance.  This  was  a  combination 
of  the  victors  over  Napoleon  sworn  to  maintain  the 
governments  and  boundaries  imposed  by  the  Congress 
of  Vienna.  It  was  originally  made  up  of  all  the  victors 
—  even  the  France  of  the  restored  Bourbons  being  ad- 
mitted into  the  partnership  —  but  finally,  on  becoming 
uncompromising  and  quixotic  in  its  devotion  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  political  immobility,  the  Holy  Alliance  retained 
the  reliable  support  of  only  the  three  eastern  powers, 
Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia. 

These  brief  references  to  the  dominant  currents  of 
European  opinion  after  1815  will  help  explain  the  fate 
of  Frederick  William's  promise  of  a  popular  represen- 
tation. In  his  court,  among  the  nobility,  even  among 
many  enlightened  representatives  of  the  middle  class 
he  met  a  blank  disapproval  of  every  form  of  experi- 
mentation suggesting  kinship  with  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, and  in  the  face  of  an  opinion  which  chimed  most 
happily  with  his  own  intimate  thoughts,  he  adjourned 
action  from  day  to  day  and  year  to  year.  Only  when  it 
was  impossible  to  delay  longer,  he  honored,  as  it  were, 
his  own  draft,  and  in  1823  established  provincial 
assemblies  throughout  the  monarchy  organized  along 
feudal  lines  and  endowed  with  only  consultative  powers. 

Mountains  had  been  in  labor,  the  ridiculous  mouse 
was  born,  was  the  comment  of  the  disheartened  Lib- 
erals; and  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  provincial  assemblies 
could  not  even  by  the  dialectical  skill  of  the  hirelings 


108       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

of  the  court  be  palmed  off  as  a  redemption  of  the  royal 
promise  and  a  genuine  modern  representation  of  the 
people.  The  decree  of  1823  indicated  that  a  political 
reaction  was  triumphant  in  Prussia,  that  a  modification 
of  the  absolute  regime  was  for  the  moment  out  of  the 
question,  and  that  the  disappointed  Liberals  would 
have  to  content  themselves  with  waiting  for  a  better 
day. 

But,  in  spite  of  reaction,  Prussia  did  not  drop  into 
a  general  standstill  in  the  period  which  we  are  consider- 
ing. The  very  opposite  is  more  nearly  the  truth.  After 
all,  the  monarchy,  if  autocratic,  was  the  heir  of  an 
enlightened  tradition,  and  the  democratic  impulse  com- 
municated by  the  era  of  Stein  was  far  from  spent. 
Therefore  the  labors  of  reform  continued  and  in  more 
than  one  respect  the  achievements  of  the  reactionary 
period  after  1815  do  not  yield  in  importance  to  the 
more  famous  and  spectacular  enactments  of  1807. 

Let  us  consider  these  achievements,  beginning  with 
the  realm  of  education.  By  a  series  of  laws  the  Prus- 
sian schools  were  coordinated  into  a  comprehensive 
national  system.  This  was  done  by  means  of  improved 
provisions  for  high-schools  (gymnasia)  and  the  exten- 
sion of  the  Lehrfreiheit  und  Lernfreihelt  of  the  new 
university  of  Berlin  to  the  older  universities  of  the  land ; 
but,  above  all,  the  existing  primary  schools  (Folks- 
schnlen)  were  multiplied  until  they  became  general  and 
attendance  at  them  was  made  obligatory.  In  Prussia, 
first  among  European  states,  the  rudiments  of  learning 
were  carried,  at  public  expense  and  by  the  coercion  of 
law,  to  every  boy  and  girl  in  the  realm,  with  the  result 


Progress  and  Reaction  109 

that  by  the  middle  of  the  century  illiteracy  had  almost 
disappeared,  and  Prussia,  in  the  matter  of  the  educa- 
tion of  its  people,  rose  head  and  shoulders  above  all 
its  neighbors. 

It  is  a  curious  circumstance  that  England  and  France, 
in  political  matters  so  much  more  democratic  than  Prus- 
sia, should  in  education,  assuredly  a  democratic  con- 
cern, have  limped  so  far  behind  her  that  half  a  century 
passed  before  they  even  made  an  effort  to  do  anything 
on  approximately  the  same  universal  scale.  Even  today 
the  Prussian  literacy  record  is  a  just  source  of  pride  to 
ruler  and  people,  and  gives  the  state  a  kind  of  moral 
primacy  over  its  rivals. 

No  less  conducive  to  the  welfare  of  the  people  was 
the  new  economic  policy.  Prussia  had  taken  over  from 
the  eighteenth  century  and  from  Frederick  the  Great 
an  antiquated  economic  system  involving  an  officious 
interference  of  the  state  authorities  in  every  phase  of 
production  and  exchange.  I  described  it  in  an  earlier 
lecture  as  an  integral  part  of  the  prevailing  patriarchal 
concept.  By  virtue  of  it,  the  government  did  not  scru- 
ple arbitrarily  to  block  off  province  from  province  and 
town  from  town.  To  illustrate  this  closing  of  the  ave- 
nues of  trade,  let  me  mention  that  there  were  in  force, 
within  the  Prussian  boundaries  of  1815,  no  less  than 
sixty-seven  separate  tariff  systems!  How  with  such 
hindrances  was  a  smooth  and  profitable  exchange  of 
goods  to  be  effected  between  even  nearby  markets  ?  The 
arbitrary  policy  was  by  no  means  exclusively  Prussian, 
for  all  the  continental  states  followed  a  similar  system. 
But  recently  freer  ideas  of  trade  had  begun  to  spread. 


110       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

They  emanated  largely  from  Great  Britain,  where 
Adam  Smith  and  other  students  of  the  new  science  of 
Political  Economy  thundered  against  the  system  of 
capricious  restrictions. 

The  new  ideas,  based  on  scientific  considerations,  had 
greatly  influenced  the  reformer,  Stein,  and  since  Stein's 
day  had  made  further  headway  by  converting  many  of 
the  high  officials  of  the  Prussian  state.  In  1818  the 
favorers  of  economic  reform  celebrated  a  great  victory. 
They  persuaded  the  king  to  end  at  a  stroke  of  the  pen 
the  old  confusion  and  to  declare  Prussia  a  single  eco- 
nomic area  where  trade  could  move  to  and  fro  in  entire 
freedom. 

So  much  gained,  these  wide-awake  administrators 
applied  themselves  to  the  still  more  ambitious  task  of 
creating  a  tariff  union,  or  Zollverein,  with  the  other 
German  states.  The  boundaries  of  the  thirty-eight 
sovereign  territories  were  so  much  an  affair  of  hap- 
hazard that  they  crisscrossed  at  innumerable  points, 
making  the  collection  of  customs  dues  an  absurdly 
expensive  business,  besides  paralyzing  all  trade  that 
involved  any  considerable  journey. 

The  Prussian  government  took  up  the  idea,  indicative 
of  a  large  and  modern  outlook,  of  leveling  these  arti- 
ficial barriers  and  converting  Germany  into  a  single 
trading  territory.  It  began  by  offering  admission  into 
its  own  system  to  its  most  immediate  neighbors.  The 
terms  were  fair:  participation  in  the  total  tariff  revenue 
in  proportion  to  population.  It  is  amusing  to  look  back 
and  note  the  wild  upflare  of  indignation  against  this 
socalled  aggressive  proposal.  There  was  nothing  dearer 


Progress  and  Reaction  111 

to  each  princeling  than  his  traditional  sovereignty,  and 
how,  he  asked  plaintively,  could  this  apple  of  his  eye 
be  preserved  if  he  made  over  his  economic  policy  to 
other  hands?  Still,  the  financial  advantages  redound- 
ing from  the  Prussian  plan  were  so  overwhelming  that 
one  state  after  another  grumblingly  gave  way.  By  1 842 
the  great  amalgamation  had  been  substantially  carried 
through. 

The  rival  power,  Austria,  was  not  invited  to  join  the 
Zollverein,  but  intrigue  as  she  might,  she  could  not  put 
a  stop  to  a  movement  which  brought  untold  advantages 
to  all  concerned.  From  now  on  Germany,  from  the 
Alps  to  the  North  sea,  constituted  a  free  market  for  all 
Germans.  Trade  responded  quickly  to  the  opportunity 
of  profit,  and  capital  felt  encouraged  to  build  factories 
and  introduce  the  new  methods  of  machine  production. 
As  the  Prussian  tariff  schedule  fixed  a  low  scale  of 
duties,  not  only  domestic  but  also  foreign  trade  was 
stimulated  and  caused  German  merchants,  so  long  con- 
fined to  a  parochial  outlook,  to  raise  their  eyes  to  for- 
eign parts  and  gradually  to  reacquire  the  lost  Hanseatic 
spirit  of  enterprise. 

But  while  the  economic  advantages  of  the  union  were 
immediate  and  tangible,  certain  moral  and  political 
after-effects  were  not  slow  to  appear.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  Zollverein  preached  daily  the  patriotic  les- 
son of  strength  from  union,  and,  on  the  other,  it  gave 
evidence  to  every  thinking  man  that  the  logical  head 
of  Germany  was  not  Austria  but  Prussia,  the  state  with 
a  progressive  policy,  the  power  that  did  things. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  German  national  con- 


112       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

sciousness  gradually  developed  an  energy  which,  in  the 
long  run,  would  have  to  be  reckoned  with.  We  have 
seen  that  in  1815  the  handful  of  eager  patriots  who 
nursed  the  hope  of  German  unification  found  them- 
selves  balked  in  their  plans  largely  through  a  lack  of 
support  from  public  opinion.  The  fact  was,  Germany 
had  been  so  long  politically  impotent,  and  had  fallen 
so  far  behind  in  the  race  of  life,  that  a  painstaking 
apprenticeship  was  required  to  enable  her  to  compete 
with  her  neighbors  on  a  basis  of  equality.  Everything 
considered,  the  useless  Bund  concocted  at  Vienna  was 
as  good  a  union  as  the  Germany  of  1815  deserved.  The 
country  was  not  ripe  for  a  closer  federation  and  would 
not  be  ripe  until  a  change  had  been  operated  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  average  German,  a  change  as  the 
result  of  which  he  would  feel  a  waxing  pride  in  his 
nation  and  make  a  clamorous  outcry  for  political 
reform. 

That  the  oppression  of  Napoleon  had  done  some- 
thing toward  arousing  the  Germans  to  opposition  and 
therewith  to  a  national  consciousness  we  are  aware.  It 
now  behooves  us  to  consider  what  the  German  intel- 
lectual classes  of  the  period  both  before  and  after  Napo- 
leon contributed  to  the  same  end.  Though  primarily 
concerned  with  the  advance  of  civilization,  their  work 
was  bound  to  have  an  indirect  political  bearing. 

In  speaking,  in  an  earlier  lecture,  of  Frederick  the 
Great,  I  took  occasion  to  note  the  eighteenth-century 
revival  in  Germany  of  literature,  music,  and  philosophy. 
Poets  like  Goethe  and  Schiller,  composers  like  Bach 
and  Handel,  critics  and  philosophers  like  Lessing  and 


Progress  and  Reaction  113 

Kant,  are  names  of  which  any  nation  may  be  proud  and 
show  that  the  dismal  mental  stagnation  caused  by  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  was  yielding  to  a  new  bloom  of  the 
spirit.  And  the  development  thus  auspiciously  begun 
went  on.  Madame  de  Stael,  the  famous  contemporary 
and  antagonist  of  Napoleon,  in  spite  of  a  passionate 
devotion  to  her  French  homeland,  conceded  to  the 
intellectual  life  of  the  Germany  of  her  day  the  palm 
over  that  of  every  other  country  of  Europe  and  pro- 
claimed her  conviction  in  her  book,  De  I'  Allemagne 
(1810),  widely,  though  perhaps  incredulously,  read  by 
her  astonished  countrymen. 

Presently  the  natural  sciences,  somewhat  neglected 
at  first  owing  to  the  dominant  metaphysical  tendency, 
gained  an  honored  standing  in  the  universities.  Physics, 
chemistry,  botany,  and  the  other  branches  were  eagerly 
seized  upon  by  fresh  minds,  and  that  good  results  were 
not  wanting  is  sufficiently  shown  by  such  names  as  Alex- 
ander von  Humboldt,  the  traveler,  and  Justus  Liebig, 
the  chemist.  At  the  same  time  a  new  generation  of 
writers  and  musicians  seized  the  torch  from  their  prede- 
cessors, and  poets  like  Heine  and  Eichendorff,  com- 
posers like  Beethoven  and  Schubert,  philosophers  like 
Hegel  and  Schopenhauer,  historians  like  Niebuhr  and 
Ranke  indicated  plainly  that  the  nineteenth  century 
would  not  prove  an  era  of  decline.  Even  insular  Great 
Britain  now  awakened  to  the  vitality  of  the  German 
message,  and  Thomas  Carlyle,  owing  much  of  his  inspi- 
ration to  Teutonic  influences,  by  masterly  translations 
and  essays  undertook  to  familiarize  his  countrymen 
with  the  varied  products  of  the  German  workshop. 


114      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

Thus  the  brilliant  work  of  a  host  of  composers, 
authors,  scientists,  and  scholars  did  much  to  counteract 
the  disgrace  of  Germany's  political  impotence,  and 
caused  a  justifiable  pride  in  the  German  name  to  be- 
come more  and  more  general  through  the  country. 
Why,  with  its  intellectual  and  artistic  contribution  on 
a  level  with  that  of  any  other  nation,  should  Germany 
remain  politically  an  object  of  derision?  Increasing 
numbers  of  Germans  began  imperatively  to  demand  an 
effective  union,  and  toward  the  middle  of  the  century 
the  patriotic  sentiment  had  become  so  powerful  that 
some  sort  of  action,  perhaps  a  revolution,  might  be 
expected  at  any  moment. 

However,  as  long  as  Frederick  William  in  reigned 
in  Prussia  there  were  grave  obstacles  to  change,  because 
an  old,  dyed-in-the-wool  conservative  like  the  king  could 
not  be  weaned  from  his  convictions.  But,  in  1840, 
Frederick  William  ended  his  days  and  was  succeeded  by 
his  son,  Frederick  William  IV.  The  new  king  was  a 
fluid  and  rhetorical  personality,  the  very  opposite  of  his 
taciturn,  almost  petrified  father.  Undoubtedly  cultured 
and  gifted,  he  enjoyed  the  friendship  of  many  of  the 
intellectual  leaders  of  the  day,  but  in  the  field  of  politics 
he  was  as  much  devoted  to  tradition  as  his  father,  and 
as  little  inclined  to  change  as  Metternich  himself.  He 
shared  the  enthusiasm  for  the  Middle  Ages  so  common 
in  his  time,  believed  the  modern  materialist  and  demo- 
cratic tendencies  to  be  contrary  to  the  Christian  reli- 
gion, and  on  the  whole  fully  justified  the  title  of  the 
Romanticist  upon  the  Throne  which  the  disappointment 
and  contempt  of  the  age  fastened  upon  him. 


Progress  and  Reaction  115 

By  the  time  of  Frederick  William  iv's  accession  pub- 
lic opinion  had  definitely  crystallized  in  the  double  de- 
mand of  a  constitution  for  Prussia  and  union  for 
Germany.  When  the  new  king  showed  no  inclination 
to  further  these  ends,  signs  of  anger  rapidly  multiplied. 
In  order  to  placate  the  opposition,  in  the  year  1847  he 
called  together  at  Berlin  delegates  from  the  provincial 
assemblies  established  by  his  father  a  generation  before. 
This  United  Diet  (Vereinigte  Landtag)  must  always 
remain  memorable  as  the  first  body  Prussia  ever  had 
suggestive  of  a  national  representative  assembly.  The 
king  intended  it  to  exercise  only  consultative  powers, 
but  after  the  fashion  of  assemblies  that  feel  the  quick- 
ening breath  of  public  opinion,  it  immediately  attempted 
to  extend  its  prerogative,  quarreled  with  the  sovereign, 
and  was  dismissed  after  some  weeks  with  every  sign 
of  the  royal  disapproval. 

A  few  months  later  the  storm  burst.  A  revolution 
in  Paris,  which  broke  out  in  February,  1848,  and  ended 
in  the  overthrow  of  the  unpopular  Bourbon  monarchy, 
encouraged  the  people  of  the  continent  generally  to 
rise  against  their  repressive  governments.  Even  Vienna, 
the  long  acknowledged  mouthpiece  of  conservative 
Europe,  raised  the  cry  for  a  new  system  and  proved  its 
change  of  heart  by  driving  that  almost  sacred  symbol 
of  the  Holy  Alliance,  Prince  Metternich,  from  office. 
Thereupon  Berlin,  not  to  be  outdone,  on  March  18 
followed  the  Viennese  example.  After  a  bloody  clash 
had  taken  place  between  citizens  and  soldiers,  the  vacil- 
lating and  romantic  Frederick  William,  horrified  by  the 
prospect  of  a  civil  war,  resolved  to  come  to  terms  with 


116       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

the  insurgents  without  more  ado.  By  solemn  proclama- 
tion he  pledged  himself  to  the  two  demands  of  the  hour, 
a  constitution  for  Prussia  and  union  for  Germany. 
Thus  as  the  result  of  a  single  sharp  crisis  and  with  a 
minimum  of  bloodshed,  the  unpopular  conservative 
regime  seemed  to  have  been  brought  to  an  ignominious 
end. 

Meanwhile  the  patriotic  enthusiasm  released  through- 
out Germany  had  led  to  the  calling  of  a  national  assem- 
bly which  was  to  take  up  the  question  of  German 
unity.  Since  the  kings  and  princes  had  in  half  a  hun- 
dred years  made  no  headway  with  that  issue,  let  the 
people  try  was  the  general  sentiment,  and  on  the 
strength  of  it  an  election  was  held,  based  on  manhood 
suffrage,  which  in  May,  1848,  brought  together  the 
best  men  of  the  nation  at  Frankfort-on-the-Main. 

If  scholarly  equipment  and  earnestness  of  purpose 
could  ever  of  themselves  achieve  political  results,  the 
Frankfort  parliament  would  have  acquitted  itself  with 
credit.  But  German  unity  was  much  less  dependent  on 
theory  than  on  conditions;  in  fact  the  conditions  pre- 
sented so  tough  and  complicated  a  problem  that  the 
delegates  at  Frankfort  had  hardly  taken  up  their  con- 
stitutional debates  when  they  found  themselves  entan- 
gled in  an  inextricable  net. 

Among  the  many  grievous  features  of  the  general 
German  situation  the  worst  without  doubt  was  the 
Austro-Prussian  rivalry.  On  what  basis  of  obligations 
and  honors  were  the  two  states  to  be  yoked  together, 
or,  in  case  yoking  was  impractical,  to  which  should  be 
conceded  the  political  leadership?  Those  in  favor  of 


Progress  and  Reaction  117 

Prussia  were  for  excluding  Austria  altogether;  they 
pointed  to  the  racially  mixed  character  of  the  Hapsburg 
monarchy,  and  because  of  their  rejection  of  a  historic 
member  of  the  German  family  were  derisively  called 
Little  Germans  (Kleindeutsche).  All  in  favor  of  creat- 
ing a  Germany  enfolding  all  Germans  whatsoever,  and 
therefore  also  the  Austrians,  took  the  name  of  Great 
Germans  (Grossdeutsche). 

It  serves  to  prove  how  recent  developments,  consti- 
tuting, as  we  may  say,  the  logic  of  history,  had  been 
pushing  Prussia  to  the  front,  that  the  long  and  fierce 
debate  at  Frankfort  ended  in  the  complete  victory  of 
the  Little  Germans.  The  circumstances  that  produced 
this  result  I  cannot  stop  to  examine.  Suffice  it  that  Aus- 
tria was  formally  excluded  from  the  new  German  state 
and  the  headship  thereof  entrusted  to  the  Prussian  king, 
who  was  invited  to  adopt  the  title  of  emperor.  It  was 
a  moment  charged  with  electricity  when  in  April,  1849, 
a  -delegation  from  Frankfort  presented  itself  to  Fred- 
erick William  in  his  palace  at  Berlin  to  offer  him  the 
hereditary  German  crown. 

With  the  whole  nation  fastening  its  gaze  on  the 
impressive  scene,  the  king  declined  the  honor.  It  was 
an  act  of  rare  pusillanimity  and  yet  not  without  a  cer- 
tain measure  of  excuse.  The  crown  was  offered  by  the 
people  of  Germany  and  therefore  enjoyed,  in  the  light 
of  current  democratic  ideas,  the  very  highest  sanction; 
but  for  Frederick  William,  an  old-fashioned  believer 
in  divine  right,  the  only  sanction  at  all  conclusive  would 
have  to  proceed  from  the  consenting  vote  of  the  sov- 
ereign German  princes.  To  this  clash  of  principle  was 


118       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

added  a  substantial  issue  of  fact.  Since  his  fellow-rulers 
had  not  been  consulted  in  the  matter  of  the  German 
crown,  Frederick  William  had  as  good  as  no  guarantee 
of  their  loyalty  and  good-will.  Some  of  them  indeed  in 
their  frenzied  desire  to  retain  an  undiminished  preroga- 
tive had  not  scrupled  to  enter  into  a  secret  league  with 
Austria;  and  Austria,  encouraged  by  this  support  to 
offer  resistance  to  its  elimination  from  Germany,  sum- 
marily forbade  the  Prussian  king  to  accept  the  German 
crown.  A  diplomatic  note,  couched  in  no  uncertain 
terms,  threatened  war,  in  case  he  took  the  Frankfort 
offer  seriously. 

Doubtless  a  bold  man  might  have  faced  these  various 
risks,  summoned  the  people  with  drum  and  trumpet, 
and  won  eternal  honor.  But  Frederick  William  was 
not  such  a  man,  and  since  his  timid  nature  quailed  be- 
fore the  threatened  struggle,  in  which,  moreover,  as 
we  have  seen,  he  would  be  pushed  into  the  distasteful 
position  of  defending  a  democratic  crown,  he  told  the 
Frankfort  delegates  to  take  their  dubious  gift  whence 
they  had  brought  it.  Therewith  the  whole  tragi-comedy 
came  to  an  abrupt  end.  The  German  parliament,  "  a 
company  of  damned  professors,"  had  decreed  political 
unity  but  it  lacked  the  means  to  enforce  its  own  deci- 
sion. With  heavy  hearts  the  representatives  turned 
homeward.  German  unification,  the  dream  of  the  poets 
and  philosophers,  seemed  incapable  of  realization. 

But  what  of  the  other  hope  which  found  utterance 
in  the  March  revolution,  the  hope  of  putting  an  end 
to  Prussian  absolutism?  Contemporaneously  with  the 
national  parliament  at  Frankfort,  a  local  parliament 


Progress  and  Reaction  119 

(Landtag),  sitting  at  Berlin,  labored  with  the  narrower 
task  of  giving  Prussia  a  constitution.  The  assembly 
turned  out  to  be  inspired  with  very  radical  sentiments 
and  proceeded  to  concoct  an  instrument  which  was  very 
little  to  Frederick  William's  liking.  He  waited  for  the 
turning  of  the  revolutionary  tide,  and  when  he  thought 
the  political  excitement  had  abated,  in  December,  1848, 
adjourned  the  assembly  sine  die. 

Some  impetuous  radicals  now  issued  a  call  for  an 
insurrection,  but  the  people,  weary  of  the  everlasting 
political  turmoil,  showed  no  desire  to  repeat  the  tri- 
umphs of  the  month  of  March.  Almost  to  his  own 
surprise  the  king  found  himself  once  more  in  command 
of  the  situation,  and  with  the  thought  of  redeeming  his 
promise  issued  a  constitution  to  his  people.  In,  order 
to  show  a  spirit  of  conciliation  he  took  over  many  of 
its  paragraphs  from  the  constitution  drafted  by  the 
recent  Prussian  Landtag;  but  all  ultra-democratic  fea- 
tures were  carefully  eliminated  and  the  whole  tone  of 
the  document  became  frankly  monarchical. 

In  the  year  1850  this  constitution,  after  being  sub- 
jected to  revision  by  a  popular  assembly,  was  put  in 
force,  and  since  it  has  been  uninterruptedly  operative 
in  Prussia  from  1850  down  to  our  own  day,  a  brief 
examination  of  it  becomes  imperative.  First  to  observe, 
the  king's  position  was  carefully  secured,  for  the  civil 
and  military  administration  of  the  realm  was  left  in 
his  hands;  besides,  the  various  departments  of  state 
were  confided  to  ministers  appointed  and  dismissed  by 
him.  As  to  the  Prussian  people,  they  were  represented 
in  the  new  system  by  a  parliament  of  two  houses. 


120       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

The  upper  house,  or  house  of  lords,  was  made  up  of 
two  groups :  hereditary  members,  and  members  ap- 
pointed for  life  by  the  king  on  the  nomination  of  the 
larger  landowners,  of  the  universities,  and  of  the  cities. 
Thus  composed  it  was  sure  to  have  a  very  conservative 
character.  The  lower  house,  or  chamber  of  deputies, 
was  elected  by  the  people.  The  two  houses  had  the 
usual  rights  of  modern  legislatures;  that  is,  they  criti- 
cised the  administration,  they  voted  the  taxes,  they 
drew  up  the  annual  budget,  and  they  gave  their  con- 
sent to  all  new  laws.  The  right  of  dismissing  the  min- 
isters the  legislators  did  not  have,  for  the  ministers 
were  both  in  theory  and  in  practice  the  agents  of  the 
monarch.  All  points  considered,  this  constitution  con- 
ceded important  rights  to  the  Prussian  people,  but  it 
certainly  also  followed  the  line  of  Prussian  tradition 
by  securing  to  the  king  a  large  measure  of  authority 
and  the  genuine  headship  of  the  state. 

The  feature  of  the  Prussian  constitution  which  in- 
vited, and  to  this  day  invites,  the  severest  strictures  of 
radical  critics  was  the  franchise  with  its  so-called  three- 
class  system.  The  franchise  provisions  were  the  result 
of  a  desire  to  appear  to  grant  universal  suffrage  while 
definitely  favoring  the  propertied  elements.  The  whole 
body  of  voters  was  divided  into  three  classes  on  the 
basis  of  the  tax-lists.  The  first  class  was  composed  of 
the  largest  taxpayers  who  together  paid  one-third  of 
the  direct  taxes,  the  second  class  of  next  largest  taxpay- 
ers who  paid  another  third,  and  the  third  class  of  all 
the  rest. 

In  the  first  class  were  the  richest  citizens,  compara- 


Progress  and  Reaction  121 

tively  speaking  hardly  more  than  a  handful ;  in  the  sec- 
ond class,  which  was  more  numerous,  were  enrolled  the 
men  of  medium  income;  and  in  the  third  class  were 
aggregated  the  multitudinous  poor.  When  an  election 
to  the  Prussian  chamber  of  deputies  took  place  the 
following  procedure  was  observed:  i,  in  a  given  par- 
liamentary district  the  three  classes  of  voters  met  sep- 
arately in  their  respective  polling-places,  where  each 
class  elected  the  same  number  of  delegates  to  a  general 
assembly;  2,  the  delegates  of  the  three  classes  came 
together  in  a  general  assembly  and  elected  the  deputy 
by  majority  vote.  It  is  plain  that  in  the  meeting  of  the 
delegates  the  propertied  elements  were  as  two  to  one 
and  that  the  successful  candidate  was  likely  to  be  a  man 
both  conservative  and  well-to-do.  In  consequence,  the 
Prussian  chamber  of  deputies,  taken  as  a  whole,  has  not 
been  a  democratic  body  and  has  generally  shown  a  frank 
leaning  toward  vested  interests.* 

Germans  and  Prussians  who,  when  the  Revolution 
of  1 848  had  run  its  course,  compared  the  much  they  had 
hoped  for  with  the  little  they  achieved  were  struck  with 
a  profound  discouragement.  And  yet  nothing  would 
be  more  foolish  than  to  declare  that  the  great  move- 
ment had  been  utterly  in  vain.  True,  the  people  had 
not  been  able  to  effect  their  unification  through  a  popu- 
lar assembly,  but  the  violent  conflict  of  ideas  and  plans 
had  given  the  death  blow  to  many  cherished  and  absurd 
illusions,  and  had  brought  to  light  all  the  stout  realities 
of  the  situation. 

Thus  everyone  who  had  eyes  in  his  head  was  now 

*  For  a  fuller  description  of  the  Prussian  suffrage  see  Appendix  D. 


122       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

aware,  or  should  have  been  aware,  that  the  Austro- 
Prussian  rivalry  would  have  to  be  settled  before  an 
effective  German  unity  was  to  be  thought  of;  and  every- 
one should  have  been  equally  clear  in  his  mind  that  an 
Austro-Prussian  settlement  was  in  all  human  proba- 
bility attainable  only  by  war.  In  the  light  of  the  recent 
past  only  incurable  sentimentalists  continued  to  believe 
that  the  long-standing  quarrel  would  yield  to  peaceful 
negotiations  stimulated  by  after-dinner  oratory  and  a 
feast  of  song. 

To  the  growing  clearness  touching  the  problem  of 
unification  was  added  new  light  on  the  subject  of  Prus- 
sia. For  the  moment  its  credit  was  low  indeed,  and  the 
hopes  of  the  patriots  were  turned  to  aversion,  but  to 
thinking  Germans  the  great  crisis  must  have  brought  a 
much  more  intimate  knowledge  of  the  true  character 
of  the  Prussian  state  and  of  its  elements  both  of  strength 
and  weakness.  If  king  and  government  had  deceived 
every  generous  expectation  entertained  of  them,  they 
had  also  proved  to  all  but  those  hopelessly  blinded  by 
prejudice,  that  whatever  prospect  for  Germany  re- 
mained centered  in  the  tight  and  solid,  though  back- 
ward monarchy  of  the  north  German  plain. 

In  trying  to  present  a  final  summary  of  the  situation, 
let  us  ask  the  question:  what  did  the  record  of  a  year 
of  revolution  show?  It  showed,  first,  that  Prussia  had 
ridden  the  storm  much  more  gallantly  than  any  other 
German  state,  particularly  its  immediate  rival,  Austria, 
which  all  but  suffered  total  shipwreck;  second,  that 
when  the  German  people  in  parliament  assembled 
argued  out  the  question  of  their  unity  they  ended  by 


Progress  and  Reaction  123 

turning  instinctively  to  Prussia  and  the  house  of  Hohen- 
zollern;  and  third,  though  the  monarchy  had  proved 
immensely  reluctant  about  assimilating  modern  fea- 
tures, it  had  none  the  less  come  round  to  present-day 
ideas  by  putting  itself  on  a  constitutional  basis.  Ad- 
mitting that  the  constitution  was  conservative  and  that 
radicals  were  justified  in  visiting  it  with  their  disfavor, 
the  fact  stands  out  —  and  the  fact  denotes  an  epoch 
in  our  story  of  the  Prussian  system  —  that  political 
emancipation  was  conceded  to  a  people  who  in  all  ordi- 
nary respects  already  stood  among  the  leading  nations 
and  who  needed  just  this  added  stimulus  to  inaugurate 
a  new  era  of  development. 


V 

Bismarck  and  the  Unification 
of  Germany 


4Fift!)  Lecture 

BISMARCK  AND  THE  UNIFICATION  OF  GERMANY 

GREAT  as  was  the  disappointment  of  Germany  in 
the  revolution  of  1848,  it  was  none  the  less  an 
invaluable  experience  for  a  nation  which,  politically, 
still  lay  in  its  swaddling-clothes  —  such  was  the  reflec- 
tion with  which  I  closed  my  review  of  the  feverish  mid- 
century  crisis.  It  was  not  a  small  matter  that  Prussia 
had  become  a  constitutionally  governed  state,  and  it 
was  something  for  the  country  to  be  reminded,  by  refer- 
ence to  a  concrete  instance,  that  when  the  necessity  of  a 
definite  choice  arose  between  Austria  and  Prussia,  the 
eyes  of  all  had  fastened,  as  under  an  inner  compulsion, 
on  Berlin. 

On  that  great  occasion  Prussia,  the  chosen  of  the 
nation,  had  refused  to  act  and  assume  the  responsibili- 
ties of  leadership.  But  suppose  now  that  tardily  and 
under  altered  circumstances  she  resolved  to  act.  Sup- 
pose she  reflected,  or  some  king  or  statesman  reflected 
for  her,  that  in  1815,  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  the 
German  princes  had  faced  the  problem  of  unification 
only  to  produce  that  sorry  mongrel,  the  German  Bund; 
that  the  people,  the  broad  masses,  had  in  1848  tried 
their  hand  at  the  game,  achieving  an  utter  fiasco;  and 
that  it  was  now  the  turn  of  Prussia  to  see  what  she 
could  do  by  striking  out  for  herself.  The  reflection  is 

[127] 


128       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

not  fanciful,  for  it  supplies  the  true  clue  to  the  career 
of  Otto  von  Bismarck.  As  prime  minister  of  Prussia, 
commanding  the  power  and  resources  of  the  state,  he 
fashioned  a  unification  program  along  Prussian  lines 
and  carried  it  to  a  triumphant  conclusion.  But  before 
taking  up  the  story  of  Bismarck  we  must  recount  the 
succession  of  a  new  ruler,  particularly  important  since 
without  his  support  Bismarck  would  hardly  have  forged 
to  the  front. 

King  Frederick  William  IV  had  been  so  greatly  dis- 
credited by  the  events  of  1848  that  neither  friend  nor 
foe  looked  to  him  further  for  political  comfort,  and 
when,  in  1857,  he  was  obliged  to  retire,  owing  to  signs 
of  an  ominous  mental  derangement,  he  passed  from  the 
scene  unmourned.  In  default  of  children,  he  was  suc- 
ceeded by  his  brother,  William  I,  who  acted  as  regent 
until  the  death  of  the  royal  sufferer  in  1861  permitted 
him  to  take  the  title  of  king. 

When  summoned  to  the  throne  William  was  already 
sixty  years  old,  and  was  inclined  to  consider  the  book 
of  his  life  as  good  as  written.  In  this  he  was  mistaken; 
and  the  fame  which  he  harvested  in  a  long  reign  of 
thirty  years  was  not  so  wholly  thrust  upon  him  as  is 
sometimes  represented.  William  was  a  tall,  hand- 
some, soldierly  man,  son  of  the  beloved  Queen  Louise 
and  filled  with  much  of  her  high  sense  of  honor,  though 
possessed  of  little  of  her  emotional  vivacity. 

He  had  spent  his  life  in  military  service,  and  had 
acquired  a  very  correct  appreciation  of  what  the  Prus- 
sian army  had  done  for  the  monarchy  in  the  past  and 
what  it  might  still  do  in  the  time  to  come.  That  Prus- 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          129 

sia  had  yielded  to  the  threats  of  Austria  in  the  late  revo- 
lutionary crisis,  thereby  letting  slip  from  its  grasp  the 
headship  of  Germany,  had  terribly  wounded  his  suscep- 
tibilities, though  he  had  been  obliged  to  acknowledge 
that  the  unpreparedness  of  his  country  admitted  of  no 
other  policy.  None  the  less  he  took  the  disgrace  to 
heart  and  was  no  sooner  firmly  seated  in  the  saddle 
than  he  seized  upon  what  was  to  him  by  far  the  most 
pressing  question  of  the  hour  —  the  question  of  mili- 
tary reform. 

At  this  point  I  am  obliged  to  return  to  the  Prussian 
army  where  I  left  it  in  the  War  of  Liberation.  The 
labors  of  Scharnhorst  had  borne  fruit  in  a  series  of 
remarkable  victories,  and  had  culminated  in  1814  in 
the  proclamation  of  universal  obligatory  service.  But 
in  the  long  peace  period  that  followed,  the  system  had 
developed  certain  gaps  and  deficiencies,  of  which  the 
sum  and  substance  was  that  the  country,  though  doubled 
by  1860  in  wealth  and  population,  had  the  military 
establishment  of  half  a  century  before. 

In  consequence  of  this  immobility  the  law  of  uni- 
versal service,  which,  in  spite  of  the  hardships  it  im- 
posed, had  become  a  source  of  pride  to  the  people,  was 
practically  nullified  because  only  a  fraction  of  the  re- 
cruits, automatically  presenting  themselves  each  year  for 
military  training,  could  be  accepted  by  the  government. 
What  King  William  proposed  to  do  with  a  minimum 
of  delay  was  to  increase  the  number  of  regiments  so 
that  the  whole  annual  quota  of  recruits  could  be  accom- 
modated. But  while  thus  engaged  in  bringing  the  army 
abreast  of  the  population,  he  resolved  to  add  a  few 


130       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

minor  changes  calculated  to  make  for  increased  effi- 
ciency in  the  service. 

By  the  army  bill  as  elaborated  under  his  direction, 
the  statutory  universal  service  was  to  take  the  follow- 
ing form:  for  three  years,  beginning  as  a  rule  with  his1 
twentieth  year,  the  young  recruit  was  to  serve  with  the 
colors;  for  the  next  four  years  he  was  to  be  with  the 
Reserve,  subject  to  immediate  call  in  case  of  war;  after 
that,  for  five  years,  he  became  a  member  of  the  Land- 
ivehr  to  be  summoned  in  time  of  war  in  order  to  fill  gaps 
in  the  Reserve;  and  finally,  after  being  carried  on  the 
army  lists  for  twelve  years,  he  was  incorporated  to  his 
thirty-ninth  year  in  the  Landsturm  and  became  liable 
to  service  only  as  a  last  resort,  as  for  instance,  to  repel 
a  hostile  invasion.* 

Having  elaborated  this  bill  with  his  ministers,  King 
William  had  it  submitted  to  the  Prussian  parliament 
for  approval.  There  was  little  opposition  at  first,  and 
the  money  appropriation  necessary  to  provide  almost 
fifty  new  regiments  was  duly  voted.  But  it  was  ominous 
that  it  was  voted  only  for  a  year,  and  when,  in  1861, 
the  appropriation  came  up  a  second  time  the  chamber 
of  deputies  demanded  as  the  price  of  its  consent  a  num- 

*  It  should  be  noted  that  educated  young  men  who  got  as  far  as  a 
certain  class  in  the  gymnasium  (high-school),  served  only  one  year  with 
the  colors.  In  return  for  this  concession  they  were  obliged  to  equip  and 
maintain  themselves  at  their  own  expense.  The  system  as  outlined  above 
substantially  holds  to  the  present  time.  Perhaps  the  most  important 
single  change  since  William's  day  was  effected  shortly  before  1900  when 
the  service  with  the  colors  was  reduced  from  three  to  two  years,  except 
for  those  who  have  to  do  with  horses  and  artillery.  It  should  also  be 
noted  at  this  point  that  service  in  the  Landsturm  is  now  extended  to 
the  forty-fifth  year. 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          131 

her  of  unimportant  changes.  A  serious  conflict  followed 
between  the  government  and  the  legislators,  apparently 
over  minor  details  of  the  army  bill,  in  reality  over  a 
question  of  power.  Prussia  was  now  a  constitutional 
monarchy  —  but  where  did  the  final  authority  rest? 
With  the  crown  as  of  old,  or  with  the  creature  of  the 
new  era,  the  elected  chamber?  The  Liberal  party, 
elated  by  the  consciousness  of  a  considerable  majority 
in  the  house,  naturally  enough  desired  to  swing  the 
control  to  its  side;  while  the  king,  though  minded  to 
obey  the  constitution  as  he  understood  it,  stubbornly 
refused  to  agree  that  the  executive  had  become  a  mere 
adjunct  of  the  legislature. 

As  soon  as  this  constitutional  issue  loomed  up  behind 
the  army  bill,  not  only  was  the  measure  itself  threat- 
ened, but  a  struggle  was  initiated  which  carried  with  it 
the-  gravest  possibilities.  The  monarch,  greatly  agi- 
tated, tried  to  find  a  way  out.  He  changed  his  minis- 
ters, he  called  for  new  elections  in  the  hope  of  getting 
a  more  favorable  chamber  —  all  in  vain.  Every  move 
found  the  Liberal  majority  unimpaired  and  more  re- 
solved than  ever  not  to  vote  the  army  bill  until  the  king 
had  seen  the  evil  of  his  constitutional  interpretation  and 
knuckled  under  to  the  new  master.  But  knuckle  under 
he  would  not,  though  the  waves  of  hostile  opinion  were 
rising  steadily  and  beginning  even  to  beat  upon  the 
throne  itself. 

As  the  only  solution  which  promised  civil  peace  and 
at  the  same  time  satisfied  his  sense  of  honor  he  resolved 
at  last  to  abdicate  in  favor  of  his  son,  and  in  October, 
1862,  had  already  prepared  the  necessary  document, 


132       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

when  his  friends  persuaded  him  to  make  one  more 
attempt  to  carry  the  army  bill  under  a  new  minister. 
Yielding  to  their  counsels  he  summoned  Otto  von  Bis- 
marck. Bismarck  himself  has  told  us  in  his  Reminis- 
cences how  in  an  interview  with  the  king  at  the  castle 
of  Babelsberg  he  persuaded  the  old  gentleman  to  tear 
up  the  abdication  and  then  confidently  shouldered  the 
burden  of  the  parliamentary  conflict. 

The  man  who  now  stepped  upon  the  scene  was  des- 
tined not  only  to  uphold  the  army  bill  but  to  cut  the 
Gordian  knot  of  German  unity  and  to  carry  his  country 
to  the  front  rank  of  European  states.  In  1862  no  one 
as  yet  dreamed  of  the  fame  in  store  for  him.  He  was 
known  to  be  a  country  squire,  a  Junker,  of  the  most 
conservative  shade,  and  the  hostile  liberal  parliamen- 
tarians scanning  his  career  could  detect  nothing  in  it 
but  the  height  of  bureaucratic  commonplace.  The  fact 
that  he  had  not  figured  prominently  in  public  life  and 
was  therefore  relatively  unknown  is  the  adequate  excuse 
for  their  shortsightedness. 

Otto  von  Bismarck  was  born  in  1815  of  an  ancient 
land-holding  family  of  Brandenburg,  and  received  a 
good  education  with  a  view  to  preparing  him  for  an 
administrative  career  in  the  service  of  the  state.  Dur- 
ing his  stay  at  the  university  of  Gottingen  he  made 
the  acquaintance  of  an  American  student,  John  Loth- 
rop  Motley,  destined  to  acquire  fame  as  the  historian 
of  the  Netherlands.  The  two  men,  representative  of 
different  social  worlds  and  of  diametrically  opposed 
schools  of  political  thought,  none  the  less  found  enough 
in  common  for  a  warm  friendship  which,  revived  by 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          133 

occasional  later  visits,  ended  only  with  Motley's  death 
in  1877.  Bismarck's  letters  published  in  Motley's  Cor- 
respondence show  a  tender  and  loyal  side  of  his  nature 
which  the  exclusive  study  of  his  political  career  would 
hardly  lead  one  to  suspect. 

University  work  and  play  over,  the  young  squire, 
after  passing  the  necessary  examinations,  embarked  on 
the  administrative  drudgery  associated  with  all  bureau- 
cratic beginnings.  Finding  desk  work  highly  unpala- 
table, he  resigned  his  post  in  disgust  and  retired  to  his 
ancestral  estates.  By  close  attention  to  crops,  hogs, 
markets,  and  the  other  problems  of  a  busy  agriculturist, 
he  freed  the  family  fortune  from  embarrassment,  and 
might  presently  have  settled  down  to  the  humdrum  life 
of  a  country  gentleman  for  good  and  all,  if  the  mid- 
century  revolution  had  not  given  him  an  opening  and 
projected  him  into  public  life.  His  neighbors,  impressed 
with  his  ability,  sent  him  to  Berlin  to  sit  in  the  parlia- 
ment called  together  to  make  a  Prussian  constitution. 

In  this  assembly,  in  which  radical  and  anti-moftarchial 
sentiments  predominated,  he  showed  a  courage  fre- 
quently akin  to  folly  by  expounding  his  conservative 
opinions  in  and  out  of  season,  sometimes  at  the  very 
risk  of  his  life.  His  defense  of  the  royal  cause  suc- 
ceeded in  drawing  the  delighted  attention  of  Frederick 
William  IV,  who  resolved  to  employ  the  bold  champion 
of  monarchy  in  the  diplomatic  service.  Without  pass- 
ing through  any  of  the  preparatory  stages  Bismarck 
was  promoted  at  a  bound  to  one  of  the  most  responsible 
posts,  and  in  1851  went  to  Frankfort-on-the-Main  as 
Prussian  ambassador  to  the  German  Bund. 


134       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

During  the  next  eleven  years  Bismarck  served  as 
the  representative  of  his  country  at  Frankfort,  St. 
Petersburg,  and  Paris.  It  is  the  period  of  his  political 
apprenticeship,  during  which  he  not  only  acquired  a 
prodigious  knowledge  of  the  European  situation,  but, 
in  touch  with  the  great  world  and  breathing  its  vital 
atmosphere,  grew  to  the  full  stature  of  his  manhood. 
Although  he  always  remained  a  Prussian  Junker,  the 
child  of  a  long  line  of  Junker  forebears,  he  absorbed 
the  best  of  the  culture  of  his  time  into  his  being  and 
discarded  much  of  that  uncompromising  conservatism 
with  which  he  had  made  his  debut  in  1848.  But  how- 
ever much  he  grew  in  character  and  outlook,  nothing 
ever  swerved  him  from  a  whole-hearted,  almost  fanat- 
ical devotion  to  his  country. 

It  was  with  a  strong  Prussian  sentiment  that  Bismarck 
had  stepped  into  the  public  arena  in  1848,  and  in  spite 
of  the  disgrace  harvested  by  Frederick  William  and  the 
complete  ebb  of  Prussian  prestige,  he  never  for  one 
moment  faltered  in  his  faith  in  Prussia's  destiny.  It 
is  not  too  much  to  say  that  Prussia,  and  only  Prussia, 
filled  his  political  horizon  until  he  got  to  Frankfort; 
then  slowly  it  dawned  upon  him  that  beyond  Prussia 
there  lay  a.  German  fatherland.  At  Frankfort,  in 
accordance  with  the  articles  of  the  deplorable  Bund, 
the  representatives  of  the  German  princes  engaged  in 
the  useless  discussion  of  issues  which  they  had  no  power 
to  settle.  Ever  since  1815  they  had  been  occupied  with 
these  heavy  academic  sessions  and  in  almost  half  a  cen- 
tury had  not  agreed  on  a  single  measure  worth  record- 
ing. 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          135 

It  took  about  one  morning  of  windy  colloquy  to  open 
Bismarck's  eyes  to  the  whole  incredible  futility  of  this 
so-called  union.  Then  his  vigorous  and  elastic  mind  got 
to  work.  Capable  as  few  men  that  have  ever  lived 
to  penetrate  make-believe,  he  saw  that  the  whole 
tawdry,  Frankfort  edifice  was  nothing  but  a  device  to 
enable  Austria  to  dominate  Germany,  and  that  the 
beginning  of  all  good  things  would  be  the  extinction  of 
the  federal  sham.  Presently  a  definite  German  policy 
began  to  take  shape  in  his  mind.  The  center  and  kernel 
of  it  was  that  Germany  must  be  united  firmly  and  gen- 
uinely under  the  only  power  fit  to  do  the  work,  his  own 
beloved  Prussia. 

Such  were  the  private  views  which  Bismarck  had 
developed,  when  in  1862  his  sovereign  summoned  him 
to  Berlin  to  act  as  prime  minister  and  to  steer  the  threat- 
ened army  bill  past  the  rocks  and  shoals  and  into  port. 
His  ministerial  program  was  clear  in  his  mind,  so  far 
as  its  main  items  were  concerned,  from  the  first  day: 
he  would  dissolve  as  soon  as  possible  the  impotent 
Bund,  he  would  eliminate  Austria  from  Germany,  and 
he  would  unite  Germany  under  Prussian  leadership. 
The  steps  to  be  taken  to  bring  all  this  about  remained 
to  be  determined  and  would  of  course  depend  on  cir- 
cumstances; that,  as  a  preliminary,  Prussia  must  be 
armed  and  prepared  for  every  eventuality  was  as  clear 
as  sunlight.  Therefore  he  was  of  one  mind  with  the 
king  about  the  desirability  of  putting  through  the  army 
reform  and  ready  to  risk  his  life  in  a  struggle  with  the 
Liberal  party  rather  than  give  up  the  bill. 

Accordingly,  he  insisted  on  the  maintenance  of  the 


136       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

new  regiments,  even  though  the  appropriation  for  them 
was  angrily  struck  out  of  the  budget  by  the  opposition. 
Manifestly  guilty  of  a  breach  of  the  constitution,  he 
found  himself  fiercely  attacked  on  the  floor  of  the  house, 
and  presently  the  whole  country  caught  the  parliamen- 
tary infection  and  reechoed  with  bitter  constitutional 
strife.  Bismarck  became,  as  he  himself  stated,  the  best- 
hated  man  of  Prussia,  while  foreign  and  domestic  ob- 
servers freely  prophesied  a  revolution,  the  terrible  first 
fruits  of  which,  as  once  upon  a  time  in  England  in  the 
days  of  Charles  I  and  Strafford,  would  be  the  heads  of 
King  William  and  his  defiant  minister. 

Affairs  were  at  this  critical  juncture  when  an  event 
happened  that  drew  the  attention  of  the  public  else- 
where and  gave  Bismarck  the  opportunity  for  which 
he  was  waiting.  In  the  autumn  of  1863  the  names  of 
the  provinces  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein  passed  like  a 
flaming  torch  through  Germany  and  fired  all  the  stored 
powder  barrels  of  national  sentiment.  The  question 
of  these  two  provinces  was  many  decades  old,  and  so 
complicated  with  historical  claims  and  legal  quibbles 
that  justice  cannot  be  done  it  here.  It  will  suffice  if, 
neglecting  the  legal  side,  we  make  an  attempt  to  under- 
stand the  national,  and  really  only  essential  phase  of 
the  issue. 

Schleswig  and  Holstein,  two  provinces  lying  at  the 
southern  extremity  of  the  peninsula  of  Jutland,  had  a 
ruler  who  was  also,  by  an  accident  of  succession,  the 
king  of  Denmark.  The  union  was  merely  personal,  had 
lasted  for  generations,  and  had  aroused  no  opposition 
until  Denmark  attempted  to  convert  it  into  a  genuine, 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          137 

administrative  and  constitutional  reality.  Then  the 
inhabitants  remembered  that  they  were  not  Danes  but 
Germans,  at  least  in  overwhelming  majority;  for  Hoi- 
stein  was  wholly  German,  and  Schleswig  was  German 
except  for  a  northern  Danish  rim. 

A  great  revolt  broke  out  in  that  year  celebrated  for 
revolts,  the  year  1848,  but  the  Schleswig-Holsteiners 
were  defeated,  largely  because  the  European  powers 
interfered  in  behalf  of  the  king  of  Denmark.  As  usual 
in  such  cases,  the  fires  of  rebellion  continued  to  smoul- 
der under  the  embers,  and  when  in  1863  the  king  of 
Denmark,  with  the  consent  and  at  the  instance  of  the 
Danish  parliament,  made  a  new  effort  at  incorporation, 
the  Schleswig-Holsteiners  prepared  once  more  to  rise 
in  arms.  Of  course,  they  were  greatly  encouraged  in 
their  resistance  by  the  outspoken  partisanship  of  their 
brothers  throughout  Germany. 

North  and  south,  east  and  west,  the  Germans  were 
of  one  mind  and  declared  that  under  no  circumstances 
were  the  duchies  to  be  abandoned  to  the  Danes.  But 
how  give  effective  help?  Through  the  anaemic  Bund, 
the  only  national  government  which  Germany  pos- 
sessed? Bismarck,  with  his  sense  for  things  that 
counted,  laughed  a  scornful  no,  and,  regardless  of  his 
unpopularity  and  of  a  new  and  frantic  outbreak  of 
criticism,  pursued  the  only  course  which  in  his  view 
was  in  harmony  with  the  realities  of  the  situation. 

The  story  of  the  next  few  years  has  many  remark- 
able features  but  none  more  remarkable  than  this,  that 
Bismarck  stood  almost  literally  alone  and  achieved 
what  everybody  wanted,  the  unity  of  the  nation,  by  the 


138       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

policy  and  method  which  he  considered  feasible  but 
which  the  majority  of  his  countrymen  condemned  in 
unmeasured  terms.  To  begin  with,  he  made  up  his 
mind  that  Prussia  should  be  the  decisive  factor  in  the 
Schleswig-Holstein  imbroglio.  But,  before  interfering 
in  the  duchies,  he  saw  the  necessity  of  obtaining  secur- 
ity against  a  possible  Austrian  attack  from  the  rear. 
Logically  therefore,  he  opened  up  negotiations  with 
Austria. 

Although  the  Hapsburg  monarchy  was,  in  the  min- 
ister's profound  private  view,  the  power  to  be  humbled, 
the  enemy  above  all  others,  he  recognized  the  need  of 
adjourning  the  day  of  reckoning  with  Vienna  in  order 
to  dispose  first  of  the  more  immediately  pressing  busi- 
ness. He  therefore  proposed  to  Austria  a  united  inter- 
vention in  behalf  of  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  Austria, 
probably  in  the  hope  of  currying  favor  with  the  German 
patriotic  party,  consented.  In  January,  1864,  Prussia 
and  Austria  together  sent  an  ultimatum  to  the  Danish 
government  demanding  a  withdrawal  of  the  acts  injuri- 
ous to  the  rights  and  sentiments  of  the  people  of  Schles- 
wig-Holstein. Denmark  refused  and  war  followed  — 
the  so-called  Danish  war  of  1864. 

Though  a  war  have  a  basis  of  justice,  if  it  presents 
the  picture  of  two  strong  men  locked  in  combat  with  a 
boy,  it  will  not  be  adjudged  heroic  and  enlist  enthusi- 
asm. Waiving  the  question  of  justice,  always  a  difficult 
matter  to  decide,  we  may  imagine  that  Denmark,  con- 
fronted by  Austria  and  Prussia,  felt  very  much  like  a 
frightened  boy,  and  would  certainly  never  have  accepted 
the  challenge  of  its  doughty  antagonists  if  the  Danish 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          139 

ministry  had  not  persuaded  itself  that  it  would  receive 
help  in  its  struggle  from  France  or  Great  Britain  or 
from  both.  In  this  it  proved  itself  mistaken.  France, 
and  particularly  Great  Britain,  made  handsome  prom- 
ises but  declined  to  follow  them  up  with  deeds,  and  the 
result  was  that  the  Danish  army  fought  alone  and, 
after  a  valiant  resistance,  was  utterly  broken.  There- 
upon the  king  of  Denmark,  in  order  to  forestall  worse 
disasters,  was  obliged  to  sue  for  peace.  In  August, 
1 864,  he  made  over  his  rights  in  Schleswig  and  Holstein 
to  Austria  and  Prussia  jointly. 

An  arrangement  more  pregnant  with  dispute  could 
hardly  be  imagined.  Territorial  partnerships  have 
never  worked  well,  and  Bismarck,  a  hater  of  quack 
remedies,  can  not  possibly  have  had  any  confidence  in 
this  one.  Perhaps  he  consented  to  it  because  it  was 
the'  only  solution  that  could  be  reached  in  the  hurry  of 
the  moment;  perhaps  —  and  this  is  altogether  more 
likely  —  he  foresaw  it  would  prove  an  apple,  of  dis- 
cord and  so  furnish  a  plausible  excuse  for  that  break 
with  Austria  which  was  a  leading  feature  of  his  Ger- 
man policy.  In  any  case,  Austria  and  Prussia  got  into 
an  immediate  argument  over  the  spoils  of  their  Danish 
war.  They  tried  various  compromises,  more  or  less 
futile,  and  in  an  incredibly  short  time  were  transformed 
from  allies  to  enemies. 

Since  Bismarck  believed  that  war  with  Austria  was 
a  necessity,  and  since,  moreover,  the  army  reform  had 
by  this  time  been  effected,  he  would  personally  have  pre- 
ferred to  try  conclusions  without  more  ado.  But  here 
he  ran  into  a  difficulty  with  his  king  who,  as  already 


140      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

stated,  was  far  from  being  the  figurehead  which  some 
writers  picture  him.  William,  let  us  remember,  not 
Bismarck,  had  inaugurated  the  army  reform,  his  pur- 
pose being  to  make  the  universal  service  provision  a 
reality  and  to  increase  the  military  effectiveness  of  Prus- 
sia. But  he  had  no  such  high-flying  political  plans  as 
Bismarck  and  he  was  distinctly  averse  to  a  war  with 
Austria,  if  it  could  possibly  he  avoided.  The  result 
was  that  it  took  two  years  of  maneuvering  by  Bismarck 
before  he  could  get  the  war  he  wanted,  the  war  which, 
in  his  judgment,  had  to  be  faced  in  order  to  shatter  the 
existing  German  organization. 

Certain  of  the  coming  of  the  war  even  though  it 
delayed,  in  April,  1866,  he  signed  an  alliance  with  the 
kingdom  of  Italy.  This  young  state,  which  saw  in 
Austria  its  mortal  enemy,  eagerly  seized  the  opportunity 
of  completing  its  national  unity  by  taking  possession  of 
Venice,  still  in  the  Hapsburg  hands.  By  virtue  of  Bis- 
marck's arrangements,  Austria  in  the  impending  strug- 
gle would  thus  be  caught  between  the  Prussian  and 
Italian  fires.  In  order  to  offer  a  vigorous  resistance  the 
Austrian  government,  as  soon  as  it  got  wind  of  the  Italo- 
Prussian  arrangement,  made  overtures  to  the  German 
princes,  and  almost  all  of  them,  especially  the  more 
important,  such  as  the  kings  of  Bavaria,  Wiirttemberg, 
Saxony,  and  Hanover,  apprehensive  of  Bismarck's  uni- 
tarian  plans,  agreed  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  the  Haps- 
burg monarchy. 

In  June,  1866,  the  tense  situation  came  to  a  head  and 
war  broke  out.  All  central  Europe  was  engaged  on  one 
side  or  another,  but  the  north  and  the  south  German 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          141 

powers  were  the  giant  protagonists  of  the  struggle,  and 
the  question  between  them,  stripped  of  all  befogging 
minor  issues,  such  as  the  possession  of  Schleswig-Hol- 
stein,  was  the  question,  born  over  a  hundred  years  ago 
in  the  days  of  Frederick  the  Great :  which  was  supreme 
in  Germany,  Austria  or  Prussia? 

The  campaign  of  1866  was  destined  to  reveal  the 
reorganized  Prussian  army  to  an  astonished  world. 
The  Prussian  parliament  and  people,  still  venomously 
hostile  to  Bismarck,  at  first  opposed  the  struggle  as 
they  had  opposed  the  military  bill,  the  Danish  war,  and 
every  issue  with  which  Bismarck's  name  was  connected, 
but  once  confronted  with  the  necessity  of  fighting  for 
their  country,  they  gathered  as  one  man  around  their 
sovereign.  Over  the  subsequent  enthusiasm  they 
gradually  forgot  their  exaggerated  animosity  against 
a  better  military  establishment.  Doubtless,  too,  they 
were  impressed  with  the  circumstance  that  the  decisive 
factor  of  the  war  was  Prussia's  readiness  in  every  tiny 
detail;  owing  to  it,  the  advantages  were  from  first  to 
last  with  the  northern  kingdom. 

Not  only  was  the  Prussian  army  mobilized  more 
rapidly  than  that  of  its  antagonists,  but  it  was  better 
equipped,  above  all,  with  a  quick-firing  infantry  weapon, 
the  so-called  needle-gun;  it  boasted  a  more  highly 
trained  set  of  officers;  and  it  was  under  a  more  effective 
supreme  command.  This  had  been  entrusted  to  General 
von  Moltke,  the  scientific  continuator  of  the  military 
traditions  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  Moltke,  a  taciturn 
and  studious  man,  believed  in  having  everything  planned 
out  beforehand  down  to  the  last  button  of  the  last 


142      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

uniform,  and  had  prepared  a  plan  of  campaign  which 
aimed  to  strike  Austria  to  her  knees  with  one  over- 
whelming blow.  Accordingly,  he  invaded  the  Hapsburg 
province  of  Bohemia  on  three  converging  lines,  and 
on  July  3,  1866,  with  all  his  assembled  forces  fell  upon 
the  enemy. 

The  battle  that  followed  is  known  sometimes  by  the 
name  of  Koeniggraetz,  sometimes  by  the  name  of 
Sadowa,  and  constitutes  an  impressive  tribute  to  the 
genius  of  its  planner  and  to  the  courage  and  discipline 
of  the  Prussian  soldiery.  With  the  closing  in  of  night 
the  Austrians  were  dead,  captured,  or  scattered,  and 
their  resistance  as  good  as  broken.  The  Prussian  army 
immediately  proceeded  southward  toward  Vienna  and 
might  have  taken  the  city  if  the  beaten  and  discouraged 
Austrian  sovereign  had  not  made  up  his  mind  to  sue 
for  peace. 

That  Austria  had  won  some  successes  against  its 
other  enemy,  Italy,  fell  with  hardly  the  weight  of  a 
feather  into  the  scales,  in  view  of  the  completeness  of 
the  catastrophe  in  Bohemia.  Besides,  the  south  Ger- 
man allies  of  the  Austrians  had  been  defeated  by  the 
Prussians  in  a  number  of  minor  engagements  and 
further  help  from  them  was  out  of  the  question.  It 
was  therefore  the  part  of  wisdom  to  close  with  Prussia 
before  worse  befell.  Negotiations  on  being  opened 
led  to  a  provisional  settlement,  which  was  shortly  after 
converted  into  the  definitive  treaty  of  Prague  (August, 
1866).  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  whole  war  barely 
lasted  seven  weeks  and  is  one  of  the  shortest  in  history. 

By  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Prague,   Germany 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          143 

entered  upon  her  new  and  long-wished-for  career  of 
unity.  True,  the  unity  of  1866  was  imperfect,  but  the 
foundations  laid  were  so  ample  and  solid  that  the  com- 
pletion of  the  edifice  was  a  foregone  conclusion.  If 
Bismarck  did  not  get  all  he  "wanted,  he  managed  at 
least  to  have  the  essentials  of  his  German  program 
written  into  the  treaty.  These  were :  First,  the  Bund 
was  declared  dissolved;  second,  Austria  acknowledged 
her  exclusion  from  Germany;  third,  Prussia  was  author- 
ized to  form  a  union  of  all  those  German  states  lying 
north  of  the  river  Main,  the  union  to  receive  the  name 
of  the  North  German  Confederation. 

You  will  observe  that  the  south  German  states,  four 
in  number,  Bavaria,  Wiirttemberg,  Baden,  and  Hesse, 
were  excluded  from  the  newborn  Germany.  And 
thereby  hangs  a  diplomatic  tale  fraught  with  very 
notable  consequences.  Bismarck  was  naturally  not 
averse  to  completing  the  German  union  at  one  stroke, 
and  Austria,  his  prostrate  antagonist,  was  in  'no  posi- 
tion to  hinder  him.  But  another  and  a  fresh  power 
stepped  into  the  arena  at  this  juncture  —  France. 
France  was  ruled  in  this  period  by  Napoleon  in,  who 
had  at  first  taken  no  very  passionate  interest  in  the 
threatening  Austro-Prussian  conflict. 

Napoleon  had,  if  anything,  favored  Prussia  in  the 
mistaken  expectation  that  Prussia,  as  the  smaller  of  the 
two  German  powers,  would  be  defeated  and  would  have 
to  gather  under  his  wing  clamoring  for  protection.  The 
rapidity  of  the  Prussian  triumph  took  his  breath  away 
and  not  unnaturally  alarmed  both  him  and  his  people  as 
soon  as  they  discovered  that  Bismarck  planned  nothing 


144       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

less  than  the  unification  of  the  whole  of  Germany;  that 
is,  the  creation  of  a  formidable  empire  just  across  the 
Rhine.  French  public  opinion  was  emphatic  that  this 
purpose  should  not  be  consummated  and,  really  a  bit 
reluctantly,  for  Napoleon  personally  believed  that 
German  unification  could  not  in  the  long  run  be 
thwarted,  the  emperor  sent  an  ambassador  to  the 
Bohemian  battlefields  to  forbid  the  carrying  out  of 
Bismarck's  plans. 

The  inflexible  Bismarck,  who  could  always  yield  a 
point  when  yielding  was  politic,  agreed  to  be  content 
with  something  less  than  the  whole  bill,  and  the  result 
was  the  compromise  already  mentioned,  authorizing 
the  union  of  north  Germany  with  the  express  exclusion 
of  the  south  German  states.  With  regard  to  them  the 
declaration  was  written  into  the  treaty  that  they  were 
to  remain  sovereign  and  independent.  Napoleon  had 
undoubtedly  scored  a  success,  but  it  was  a  dangerous 
victory  since  it  was  built  on  an  act  of  interference  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  Germany  and  created  a  sentiment 
of  rancor  between  France  and  the  increasingly  self- 
confident  kingdom  of  Prussia. 

Meanwhile  peace  had  been  declared  and  the  Prus- 
sian armies  withdrawn  from  Austrian  soil.  King  Wil- 
liam, with  Bismarck  and  Moltke  at  his  side,  was 
received  in  triumph  in  Berlin.  Amidst  enthusiastic 
acclamations  a  reconciliation  was  effected  between  the 
monarch  and  his  people  as  well  as  between  the  minister 
and  the  parliament.  In  fact  the  minister  suddenly  fell 
heir  to  a  popularity  that  was  as  immense  and  unreason- 
ing as  his  former  disfavor.  His  proposals  touching  the 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          145 

new  union,  the  North  German  Confederation,  were 
therefore  received  with  approval  and  the  constitution, 
which  he  drew  up  with  his  own  hand  and  submitted  to 
the  representatives  of  the  people,  was  passed  with  little 
alteration. 

Adopted  and  put  in  force  in  1867,  this  instrument 
has  remained  with  a  few,  insubstantial  changes  the  con- 
stitution of  Germany  down  to  our  own  day.  By  virtue 
of  it,  the  federal  executive  was  declared  to  be  hereditary 
in  the  king  of  Prussia  who  received  the  title  of  President 
of  the  North  German  Confederation.  As  to  the  legis- 
lative power,  it  was  to  be  exercised  by  two  bodies,  the 
Bundesrath  and  the  Reichstag.  The  Bundesrath  was 
a  sort  of  national  senate  made  up  of  representatives  of 
the  component  governments;  in  this  assembly  Prussia 
cast  a  larger  number  of  votes  than  any  of  the  other 
states  but  did  not  control  a  sufficient  number  to  carry 
any  measure  by  herself. 

The  Reichstag  represented  the  most  interesting  and 
novel  because  most  democratic  feature  of  the  consti- 
tution. It  was  elected  on  the  basis  of  universal  male 
suffrage  —  one  representative  being  apportioned  to 
every  one  hundred  thousand  inhabitants  —  and  was 
authorized  to  vote  all  taxes  and  pass  all  laws.  It  did 
not,  however,  control  the  federal  ministers,  who  were 
appointed  and  dismissed  by  the  executive.  For  the 
leading  federal  minister,  the  prime  minister  as  he  is 
called  in  other  countries,  was  revived  the  ancient  title 
of  chancellor,  and  naturally  Bismarck  received  the  first 
appointment  to  the  post. 

It  is  a  composite  and  not  always  logical  instrument, 


146      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

this  Bismarckian  constitution  of  1867,  but  one  thing  is 
clear,  to  wit,  that  Prussia  —  its  king  and  government  — 
by  means  of  it  secured  a  dominating  role  in  the  new 
Germany.  This  has  been  lamented  in  some  quarters, 
both  in  Germany  and  abroad,  but  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  any  other  result  could  have  been  obtained  in  view 
first,  of  Prussia's  historical  development,  and  second, 
of  her  area  and  population,  her  mere  material  weight, 
which  was  considerably  greater  than  that  of  all  the 
other  states  put  together.* 

The  chief  interest  during  the  first  years  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  new  Germany  attaches  to  the  relations  it 
maintained  to  the  great  nation  beyond  its  western 
boundary.  We  have  noted  the  irritation  occasioned 
in  France  by  the  victory  over  Austria.  French  opinion, 
which  looked  with  almost  unanimous  ill-will  upon  the 
powerful  state  formed  under  Prussian  leadership,  urged 
Napoleon  III  to  do  his  best  to  delay  the  German  con- 
solidation and,  in  the  event  of  failure,  to  insist  on  some 
sort  of  territorial  compensation.  It  was  in  pursuit  of 
this  policy  that  Napoleon,  after  having  done  his  utmost 
to  keep  the  four  south  German  states  from  being  sucked 
into  the  national  whirlpool,  now  came  forward  with 
new  demands.  He  asked  successively  for  Prussia's 
consent  to  his  acquiring  German  territory  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine,  the  kingdom  of  Belgium,  and  finally 
the  little  state  of  Luxemburg. 

Bismarck  managed  to  thwart  all  these  plans  with 

*  On  further  features  of  the  Constitution  see  the  Appendix:  for  the 
full  list  of  the  German  states  Appendix  B ;  for  the  title  and  powers  of 
the  executive,  Appendix  C ;  for  the  Reichstag  suffrage,  Appendix  D. 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          147 

the  result  of  a  growing  exasperation  between  the  French 
and  the  Prussian  governments  and  the  nations  behind 
them.  It  was  plain  that  if  the  two  states  continued  to 
live  long  at  such  nerve-racking  tension,  they  would  not 
be  able  to  control  either  themselves  or  the  situation. 
When  two  neighbors,  engaged  in  daily  intercourse,  go 
about  with  hate  in  their  hearts  and  concealed  weapons 
on  their  persons,  no  sensible  man  will  be  surprised  to 
hear  that  there  has  been  a  collision. 

It  was  the  so-called  Spanish  incident  that  dropped  the 
match  in  the  powder-barrel.  This  incident  enjoys  a 
great  fame,  much  greater,  in  my  view,  than  it  merits, 
because  of  the  blind  habit  of  mankind  to  be  impressed 
with  the  immediate  occasion  rather  than  to  deeply  con- 
sider the  ultimate  causes  of  an  event.  If  I  have  cor- 
rectly interpreted  the  intensely  hostile  feeling  between 
France  and  Germany,  it  came  from  the  unification  of 
Germany  on  which  Bismarck  and  the  majority  of  the 
German  people  were  set,  and  which  France  was  equally 
resolved  to  hinder  or  at  least  delay.  This  is  the  nub 
of  the  matter,  but  I  acknowledge  and  say  again  that 
a  succession  of  incidents,  befalling  between  1866  and 
1870,  contributed  to  swell  the  existing  envy  and  sus- 
picion. Of  these  incidents  the  Spanish  affair,  leading 
to  a  dramatic  climax  and  catastrophe,  certainly  de- 
serves attention,  provided  we  are  agreed  not  to  lose 
our  historical  perspective  and  accept  a  part  of  the 
story  for  the  whole. 

The  Spanish  affair  grew  out  of  a  rebellion  in  Spain 
with  which  in  itself  we  are  not  concerned.  The  throne 
being  vacant,  a  Spanish  committee  in  July,  1 870,  offered 


148       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

the  succession  to  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern-Sigmarin- 
gen,  a  German  prince  distantly  related  to  the  king  of 
Prussia.  When  the  French  government  heard  of  the 
offer,  it  dispatched  an  ambassador  to  King  William, 
who  happened  to  be  taking  the  waters  at  Ems,  to  ask 
him  to  forbid  his  relative  to  accept  the  Spanish  crown. 
Thereupon,  either  of  his  own  free  will  or  under  private 
pressure  from  the  king  the  young  prince  declined  the 
proffered  honor.  It  would  have  been  the  part  of  wis- 
dom if  the  French  government  had  contented  itself  with 
this  result.  But  moved  by  the  desire  to  score  as  heavily 
as  possible  against  its  hated  rival,  it  now  came  forward 
with  a  new  demand  to  the  effect  that  King  William 
should  give  assurances  that  no  Hohenzollern  prince 
would  ever  in  the  future  be  a  candidate  for  the  Spanish 
throne. 

To  such  a  sweeping  pledge  the  king  would  not  com- 
mit himself  and  a  deadlock  ensued  which  was  broken 
by  the  action  of  Bismarck.  The  chancellor  of  the 
North  German  Confederation  had  had  no  hand  in  the 
early  stages  of  the  Ems  negotiations.  He  was  enjoying 
a  vacation  on  his  estates,  miles  away  from  Ems,  and 
was  kept  informed  of  developments  by  an  irregular 
correspondence.  Not  till  the  second  French  demand 
was  presented  did  the  king,  rendered  indignant  by  the 
insistence  of  Napoleon,  feel  that  he  needed  his  chan- 
cellor's advice.  He  telegraphed  him  a  detailed  account 
of  his  conversations  with  the  French  ambassador  and 
Bismarck  incontinently  communicated  an  abbreviated 
form  of  the  dispatch  to  the  press.* 

*  On  the  Ems  dispatch  see  Appendix  G. 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          149 

His  undoubted  purpose  was  to  answer  the  French 
blast  with  a  counterblast  and  to  stand  by  the  conse- 
quences even  though,  as  seemed  not  unlikely,  the  French 
people  would  take  the  brusque  tone  of  Bismarck's  com- 
munication as  an  insult  and  insist  on  war.  The  truth 
is  that,  in  view  of  the  abnormally  strained  relations 
between  Paris  and  Berlin,  Bismarck  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  war  with  France  in  the  near  future  was 
inevitable;  and  further,  he  had  recently  been  brought 
around  to  the  opinion  that  such  a  war  was  not  undesir- 
able since  it  would  almost  certainly  complete  the  still 
fragmentary  union  of  Germany  in  an  outburst  of  patri- 
otic passion.  He  had  avoided  the  war  for  four  years, 
sometimes  in  the  face  of  considerable  provocation,  but 
he  would  not  avoid  it  any  longer  if  an  opportunity 
presented  itself  that  was  favorable  to  his  side.  As 
such  an  opportunity  he  looked  upon  the  Spanish  inci- 
dent, and  in  so  far  must  undoubtedly  be  regarded  as  a 
promoter  of  the  war.  But  that  recognition  should  not 
for  a  moment  hinder  us  from  seeing  the  equal  or 
greater  responsibilities  of  France  arising  from  the 
headlong  combativeness  of  the  French  government  and 
from  the  permanently  bad  temper  of  the  French  public 
obstinately  hostile  to  German  unification. 

On  July  15,  1870,  the  French  empire  declared  war 
on  Prussia  and  of  course,  by  implication,  on  the  North 
German  Confederation.  The  whole  North  sprang  to 
arms  as  one  man;  but  what  would  the  South  do,  the 
South  on  which  Prussia,  only  four  years  before,  had 
made  war  and  which,  by  virtue  of  the  treaty  of  Prague, 
was  excluded  from  the  new  union?  The  South  acted 


150       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

precisely  as  Bismarck  had  foreseen.  The  inflamed 
nationa.1  sentiment  crowded  all  petty  animosity  into  the 
background  and  insisted  on  making  common  cause  with 
the  northern  brothers. 

In  point  of  fact,  four  years  before,  Bismarck  had 
arranged  secret  treaties  with  the  South  German  States, 
providing  that  they  unite  their  forces  with  Prussia's 
in  case  of  war.  He  now  asked  that  the  treaties  be  exe- 
cuted; but  even  if  they  had  not  existed,  Bavaria,  Wiirt- 
temberg,  Baden,  and  Hesse  would  have  entered  the  fray 
for  the  simple  reason  that  the  popular  clamor  in  favor 
of  joining  hands  with  the  North  was  unanimous  and 
irresistible.  Thus  all  sections  armed  themselves  with- 
out delay  and  it  was  a  united  Germany  which,  for  the 
first  time  in  many  centuries,  marched  against  the  foe. 

The  enthusiasm  and  union  of  Germany  were  import- 
ant moral  factors  in  the  subsequent  conflict,  but  they 
would  never  have  been  decisive  if  the  German  armies 
had  not  been  properly  prepared  for  the  struggle.  Since 
1866  the  military  system  of  Prussia  had  been  copied 
by  the  lesser  states  and  the  advantages  springing  from 
this  general  readiness  were  great.  The  German 
armies  were  sooner  in  the  field,  they  were  more  per- 
fectly equipped,  they  outnumbered  their  adversary,  and 
they  were  more  ably  officered  under  the  supreme  direc- 
tion of  the  famous  strategist,  Moltke.  As  soon  as  the 
rival  forces  clashed,  the  French  lines  bent  and  broke 
and  Germany  marched  from  victory  to  victory. 

In  a  series  of  battles,  culminating  on  August  18,  in 
the  battle  of  Gravelotte,  one  French  army  was  shut 
up  in  the  fortress  of  Metz,  and  two  weeks  later,  on 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          151 

September  2,  a  second  French  army,  the  last  available 
for  field  service,  was  driven  into  the  fortress  of  Sedan 
and  forced  to  surrender.  Napoleon  led  the  Sedan  army 
in  person  and  with  it  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
As  soon  as  his  capture  was  announced  in  Paris,  the 
people  of  the  capital  rose,  overthrew  the  disgraced 
empire,  and  on  September  4  proclaimed  a  republic. 

The  republic  marks  the  last  and  most  honorable 
phase  of  the  French  resistance.  The  hurriedly  organ- 
ized government  did  what  it  could  to  create  a  new  fight- 
ing force  and  save  France  from  defeat,  but  the  problem 
exceeded  its  strength.  From  Sedan  the  Germans  pro- 
ceeded to  Paris  and  subjected  the  capital,  which  since 
the  two  easy  captures  in  the  time  of  Napoleon  I  had  been 
converted  into  the  greatest  fortress  of  Europe,  to  a 
strenuous  siege.  It  was  not  a  light  task  to  surround 
with  an  unbroken  cordon  of  troops  a  city  of  such  size, 
especially  as  the  provisional  French  government  saw 
in  the  breaking  of  German  lines  its  main  military  object 
and  battered  at  them  incessantly. 

After  a  four  months'  struggle  the  German  circle  was 
still  intact  while  the  Parisians,  cut  off  from  the  rest  of 
the  world,  were  reduced  to  the  point  of  starvation. 
Under  the  circumstances  Paris  was  obliged  to  capitu- 
late and  the  government  to  sue  for  peace.  A  prelimi- 
nary treaty  signed  at  Versailles  in  February,  1871,  was 
followed  a  few  months  later  by  the  definitive  peace  of 
Frankfort.  By  its  terms  France  paid  Germany  an 
indemnity  of  one  billion  dollars  and  ceded  Alsace  and 
a  part  of  Lorraine. 

Even  before  the  treaty  was  signed  Germany  had 


152       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

reached  the  goal  of  her  efforts  and  effected  her  final 
unification.  The  spontaneous  action  of  all  sections  of 
the  people  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  coupled  with  the 
profound  emotion  released  by  the  German  victories, 
created  an  irresistible  sentiment  in  favor  of  the  entrance 
of  the  southern  states  into  the  North  German  Confed- 
eration. Negotiations,  begun  between  Bismarck  and  the 
representatives  of  Bavaria  and  her  neighbors,  were 
rapidly  brought  to  a  head,  and  on  January  18,  1871, 
the  completed  union  was  proclaimed  to  the  world  in  an 
impressive  ceremony,  conducted  by  one  of  those  strokes 
of  irony  in  which  history  abounds  in  Louis  xiv's  splen- 
did palace  at  Versailles. 

In  this  former  home  of  the  French  monarchy  and  in 
the  midst  of  the  roar  of  cannon  from  the  siege  of  Paris, 
King  William  of  Prussia  was  hailed  by  the  new  title 
of  German  emperor.  As  the  constitution  of  1867  had 
been  wisely  drafted  with  an  eye  to  the  early  entry  of 
the  South  German  States,  very  few  changes,  most  of 
them  merely  verbal,  sufficed  to  bring  it  abreast  of  the 
new  situation. 

In  the  light  of  the  unity  crowned  and  sanctified  by 
means  of  the  war  of  1870,  that  struggle  came  to  be 
regarded  by  Germans  with  something  almost  suggestive 
of  religious  fervor.  But  however  much  they  were 
inclined  to  congratulate  themselves  on  the  unity  re- 
gained, they  had  to  accept  one  dangerous  fruit  sprung 
from  the  late  conflict.  The  war  left  France  with  a  sting- 
ing resentment  in  her  heart,  partly  because  of  her  defeat 
and  consequent  loss  of  self-esteem,  partly  because  of 
the  cession  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  She  made  it  per- 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          153 

fectly  clear  from  the  first  hour  that  she  had  her  purpose 
set  upon  revenge  and  would  sooner  or  later  attempt  to 
undo  the  verdict  of  1870.  The  grave  breach  therefore 
between  France  and  Germany  that  marked  the  period 
1866-70,  so  far  from  being  healed,  was  made  irrepar- 
able. Could  this  result  have  been  avoided  by  means  of 
more  generous  terms  imposed  on  France,  above  all, 
by  not  insisting  on  the  cession  of  Alsace-Lorraine? 

As  many  well-disposed  persons  have  answered  this 
question  in  the  affirmative  the  opinion  deserves  at  least 
to  be  recorded.  The  Germans  for  their  part  have  not 
failed  vigorously  to  defend  their  act.  They  have 
pointed  out  that  the  territory  of  Alsace-Lorraine  had 
been  torn  from  Germany  by  force  in  the  period  of  Ger- 
man weakness  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  cen- 
turies, and  that  what  the  sword  has  taken,  the  sword 
may  in  fairness  also  restore.  The  population,  they 
further  insisted,  was  in  its  overwhelming  majority  still 
German  in  speech  and  manners,  although  its  long  asso- 
ciation with  France  had  undoubtedly  given  it  a  super- 
ficial French  veneer.  Finally,  with  regard  to  the 
abstract  question  of  justice  among  nations  they  declared 
that  such  justice  can  not  be  construed  as  an  obligation 
of  Germany  in  its  dealings  with  France  but  not  of 
France  in  its  dealings  with  Germany.* 

Looking  at  the  issue  from  every  side  the  fair-minded 
student  will  probably  agree  that  Alsace-Lorraine  is  a 
thorny  problem  which  can  not  be  settled  by  an  Olym- 
pian verdict.  Assuming  the  historical  view-point,  and 
letting  our  mind  travel  back  into  the  past,  we  become 

*  On  the  Alsace-Lorraine  question  see  Appendix  H. 


154       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

aware  that  the  issue  belongs  to  the  familiar  category  of 
boundary  disputes;  that  it  has  been  in  debate  between 
France  and  Germany  for  about  a  thousand  years ;  and 
that  it  has  thus  far,  in  accordance  with  the  imperfect 
nature  of  man,  been  handled  exclusively  by  the  crude 
and  primitive  method  of  force.  Will  the  time  ever 
come  when  it  shall  be  solved  by  the  dictates  of  reason 
and  humanity?  We  are  privileged  to  hope  so,  nay,  we 
must  nurse  that  hope  if  the  amelioration  of  man's  lot 
is  ever  to  be  more  than  a  dream;  but  for  the  immediate 
day  in  which  we  live,  let  us  remember  that  our  first 
obligation  as  students  and  observers  of  life  is  to  see 
things  as  they  are.  In  this  realistic  mood  we  may, 
without  dismissing  our  ultimate  hopes,  content  our- 
selves with  reiterating  that  Germany  acquired  the  ter- 
ritory of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  1870,  and  that,  since 
France  resented  the  seizure,  an  issue  was  created  which 
supplied  new  fuel  to  an  already  ancient  and  terrible 
heritage  of  strife. 

Far  back  in  the  Middle  Ages,  when  the  first  German 
empire  began  to  break  up  and  feudal  chaos  descended 
upon  the  land,  the  people  expressed  their  national  sor- 
row in  the  form  of  a  legend.  They  declared  —  and  the 
whisper  passed  from  mouth  to  mouth  —  that  the  last 
great  Kaiser  to  hold  the  enemies  of  Germany  in  check, 
the  Kaiser  Barbarossa,  was  not  dead;  he  was  sleeping 
in  the  depths  of  Kyffhausser  in  the  very  heart  of 
Germany,  to  awaken  in  his  own  good  time  and  descend 
from  his  mountain  side  in  the  glory  of  crown  and  scep- 
ter. Century  after  century  the  legend  lived  on  refusing 
to  perish,  so  that  when  the  new  empire  was  born  in 


Bismarck  and  the  Unification          155 

1871  it  seemed  no  more  than  the  realization  of  an  age- 
long dream. 

Emperor  William,  a  tall  and  chivalrous  figure 
touched  with  the  reverence  of  almost  four-score  years, 
looked  not  unlike  the  legendary  Barbarossa,  and  Bis- 
marck and  Moltke,  titanicin_£erson  as  well  as  in 
achievement,  seemed  no  unworthy  paladins  to  ride  in 
state  at  either  side  of  their  imperial  master.  A  touch 
of  mysticism  inherent  in  the  Germanic  character  saw 
the  new  empire  as  the  old  come  back  to  earth,  and 
swept  the  nation  with  a  tumultuous  sense  of  the  renewal 
of  its  youth.  Just  as  the  German  people  had  lost  their 
old  unity  largely  by  their  own  faults  and  weaknesses, 
so  they  had  won  their  new  coherence  under  superb 
leadership,  it  is  true,  but  essentially  by  their  own 
strength,  by  their  own  will.  That  proud  consciousness 
started  them  on  their  fresh  career  with  a  remarkable 
momentum.  What  would  they,  thus  elated,  do  for 
themselves  and  for  the  world? 


VI 

Germany  Since  Her 
Unification 


Lecture 

GERMANY  SINCE  HER  UNIFICATION 

IN  my  sixth  and  concluding  lecture  I  shall  concern 
*  myself  with  the  story  of  Germany  since  her  unifica- 
tion in  1871.  However,  a  narrative  of  events,  pure  and 
simple,  will  not  suffice,  and  will  have  to  be  supplemented 
from  time  to  time  by  exposition  and  argument  because 
a  great  deal  of  recent  German  development  has  pro- 
ceeded upon  lines  unfamiliar  to  Americans,  and  because 
a  passionate  antagonism,  having  its  origin  in  the  resent- 
ments created  by  the  present  war,  has  spread  a  mist 
before  our  eyes  obscuring  many  things  of  which  we 
should  none  the  less  strive  to  obtain  a  clear  picture. 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan  of  narrative  coupled  with 
discussion,  I  shall  take  up,  precedent  to  all  else,  that 
profound  mystery  in  American  eyes,  that  eternal 
enigma,  the  German  state.  The  German  state  of  1871 
was,  as  we  have  seen,  the  perfectly  logical  development 
of  the  Prussian  state,  the  successive  phases  of  which 
I  must  be  permitted  once  more  to  recall.  In  the  first 
place,  I  have  shown  that  the  early  Prussian  state  from 
the  Elector  Frederick  William  to  Frederick  the  Great 
was  patriarchal  in  principle  and  method,  the  hereditary 
chief  directing  its  energies,  with  good  intentions,  doubt- 
less, but  exactly  as  in  his  wisdom  and  pleasure  he  saw 
fit.  Next,  I  have  shown  that  when  this  state  miserably 

[159] 


160      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

broke  down  at  Jena  it  was  rebuilt  by  Stein  and  other 
worthies,  along  the  traditional  lines  of  authority,  it  is 
true,  but  with  modifications  resulting  from  the  recogni- 
tion that  the  cooperation  of  the  people  was  indispensable 
to  its  health  and  vigor.  This  second  phase  was  fol- 
lowed by  a  third  when,  as  a  consequence  of  the  revolu- 
tion of  1848,  the  king  issued  a  constitution.  A  direct 
share  by  the  representatives  of  the  people  in  making 
laws  and  voting  taxes  was  now  admitted  without,  how- 
ever, as  the  crisis  over  the  army  bill  showed,  subjecting 
the  crown  to  the  dictation  of  the  legislature. 

The  German  state  of  1871  built  around  Prussia  was 
the  fourth  stage  in  this  evolution  and,  having  been  built 
by  the  Prussian  Bismarck,  shows  essentially  Prussian 
features.  That  means,  to  put  the  matter  in  a  nutshell, 
that  the  modern  German  state  constitutes  a  fusion  — 
so  far  as  I  can  see  unique  in  the  world  —  of  the  princi- 
ples of  authority  and  democracy.  The  authority  all 
Americans  recognize  and  many  denounce  in  unmeas- 
ured terms;  the  democracy,  which  is  the  undeniable 
yokefellow  of  authority,  is  often  willfully  ignored.  But 
democracy  and  authority  in,  on  the  whole,  healthy 
interaction,  constitute  what  I  must  insist  on  as  the 
peculiar  German  contribution  to  the  political  experi- 
ments of  the  present  day. 

The  equilibrium  of  the  two  principles  may  be  ob- 
served all  along  the  line,  from  the  central  government 
at  Berlin  to  the  village  affairs  of  Weissnichtwo.  The 
new  federal  authorities  —  Kaiser,  Bundesrath,  and 
Reichstag  —  did  not,  as  already  pointed  out,  destroy 
the  state  governments  any  more  than  the  federal  author- 


Germany  since  Unification  161 

ities  in  the  analogous  organization  of  our  own  United 
States  meant  the  wiping  out  of  the  component  entities. 
The  state  governments  of  Prussia,  Bavaria,  and  the 
other  twenty-odd  states  continued  to  handle  all  strictly 
local  business  by  means  of  their  own  separate  legis- 
latures and  administrations. 

Below  the  state  governments  we  encounter  the  pro- 
vincial and  municipal  governments  with  their  still  more 
restricted  tasks.  Government  in  Germany  is  therefore 
not  over-centralized,  but  carefully  graded  and  distrib- 
uted in  order  to  meet  the  needs  of  a  complex  social 
body;  moreover,  at  every  point,  high  and  low,  an  adjust- 
ment is  attempted  —  the  most  characteristic  thing  as  I 
am  insisting  in  the  German  system  —  between  an 
authoritative  administration,  which  exercises  the  actual 
direction  of  affairs,  and  a  body  representative  of  the 
people,  the  chief  function  of  which  is  to  remind  the 
administration  that  it  does  not  exist  for  its  own  sake. 

Certain  advantages  springing  from  the  system  are, 
at  least  in  German  eyes,  undeniable  and  must  be  glanced 
at  if  we  are  to  serve  any  useful  purpose  with  this  inquiry. 
First,  a  German  would  have  you  observe  the  high  char- 
acter of  the  administration.  All  the  administrative 
posts  are  open  to  the  citizens  on  the  basis  of  special 
study  proved  by  an  examination.  The  consequence 
is  that  Germany  is  governed  by  trained  men,  by  experts. 
The  nation  has  convinced  itself  that  government  in  these 
days  of  multiplied  public  enterprises  and  countless 
human  ramifications  demands  intelligence  fortified  by 
special  preparation,  and  that  the  best  brains  of  the  coun- 
try ought  to  feel  tempted  to  choose  a  public  career  as 


162      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

a  regular  livelihood.  Of  course  dull  individuals  make 
their  way  into  office  and  even  originally  alert  men  often 
lose  their  briskness  in  the  heavy  routine  of  a  bureau- 
cratic existence  but,  allowance  made  for  human  failings, 
the  statement  may  be  ventured  that  in  Germany  more 
than  elsewhere  the  affairs  of  nation,  province,  and  city 
rest  in  the  hands  of  specially  trained  public  servants. 

A  second  advantage  is  that  the  German  administra- 
tion has  the  continuity  and  independence  required  for 
fearlessly  carrying  through  large  undertakings.  In 
many  other  countries  a  popular  election  or  an  adverse 
vote  in  the  legislature  suffices  to  check  and  even  to 
paralyze  the  transaction  of  necessary  public  business. 
In  such  countries  the  legislature  possesses  a  control  over 
the  government  which  produces  some  admitted  evils; 
as,  for  instance,  the  promotion  of  friends  and  relatives 
of  the  legislators  to  office,  boss  rule,  which  means  the 
control  of  legislature  and  administration  in  the  interest 
of  a  clique,  and  finally,  corrupt  contracts  involving  what 
we  familiarly  know  as  graft. 

If  these  evils  are  almost  unknown  in  Germany  it 
goes  without  saying  that  it  is  not  owing  to  the  purer 
moral  character  of  the  German  public  servants,  but  to 
the  system  which  does  not  put  the  administration  under 
the  thumb  of  the  legislators  prone  —  since  they  are 
human,  too  prone,  alas !  —  to  abuse  an  extraordinary 
power.  The  independence  of  the  German  adminis- 
tration from  minute,  legislative  control  would  therefore 
appear  to  make  for  honesty  of  service  and  continuity 
and  efficiency  of  performance. 

A  third  advantage  lies  in  the  extraordinarily  firm  and 


Germany  since  Unification  163 

close  organization  of  the  nation  secured  by  an  authori- 
tative government.  Germany  has  a  social  and  economic 
unity  that  is  probably  without  parallel.  The  reason  is 
simple  enough,  for  it  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  country  is 
not  and  has  never  been  passionately  individualistic. 
Individualism  was  the  great  creed  of  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries  and  did  a  magnificent  service,  since 
it  freed  mankind  from  many  ancient  trammels  imposed 
by  king,  church,  nobles,  guilds,  law  courts  and  other 
medieval  inheritances. 

England  and  the  United  States  are  the  two  countries 
where  individualism  celebrated  its  greatest  triumphs  and 
where,  in  consequence,  there  became  fixed  in  the  laws 
and  habits  of  the  people  a  political  system  combining 
the  greatest  freedom  of  the  citizen  with  a  state  exer- 
cising a  minimum  of  control.  Where  the  individual 
insists  on  free  play  for  himself  and  a  laissez  faire  atti- 
tude on  the  part  of  the  government,  you  will  always 
have  a  loose  social  organization  often  with  a  sorry 
appearance  of  disorder  and  cross  purposes.  Germany, 
in  sharp  contrast  to  England  and  the  United  States, 
represents  the  victory  of  the  collectivist  spirit  by  vir- 
tue of  which  the  individual  is  subordinated  to  the  whole, 
and  a  magnificent  order  binds  and  animates  the  mass. 

Whenever  man  does  not  work  for  a  personal  end, 
his  energy  and  interest,  we  have  been  told  by  partisans 
of  individualism,  must  needs  flag;  but  it  would  be  very 
difficult  to  discover  an  unusual  degree  of  individual 
slackness  in  modern  Germany.  On  the  contrary,  let 
the  riddle  be  solved  as  it  will,  even  though  the  German 
sees  himself  as  a  mere  cog  in  a  collectivist  society,  he 


164      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

is  one  of  the  most  energized  individuals  alive  today. 
Apparently  the  idea  of  a  whole,  outside  and  beyond 
himself,  lends  his  labor  at  his  appointed  post  a  certain 
exaltation  and  makes  him  alertly  responsive  to  the  call 
of  society  which  is  the  call  of  duty.  In  fact  his  duty 
is  a  more  important  concept  to  him  than  his  rights,  and 
instead  of  his  spending  his  time  fighting  for  his  rights, 
he  gets  what  he  considers  his  fair  citizen  measure  of 
them  through  the  performance  of  his  duty. 

Precisely  here  belong  the  Verboten  signs  which  the 
self-assertive  individualist  from  foreign  parts  invari- 
ably picks  out  as  marks  of  German  passivity  and  inferi- 
ority. It  is  verboten  to  walk  on  the  railroad  tracks; 
it  is  verboten  to  spit  on  the  sidewalk;  it  is  verboten  to 
take  your  wraps  to  your  seat  at  the  theater,  and  so  forth 
and  so  forth.  A  traveling  American  feels  himself  out- 
raged by  such  injunctions,  but  your  communistically 
minded  German  does  what  he  is  told  without  a  single 
rebellious  thought  because  he  appreciates  the  value  of 
order,  and  recognizes  that  individual  compliance  with 
social  regulations  furthers  the  good  of  the  whole. 

Finally,  it  remains  to  point  out  that  the  German 
claims  for  his  system  that  it  is  democratic  since  it  enfolds 
every  man,  woman,  and  child,  and  actively  contributes 
to  the  welfare  of  each  and  all.  In  effect  the  German 
state  recognizes  the  right  of  every  member  of  the  com- 
monwealth to  a  living  and  accepts  the  obligation  of 
finding  him  work.  In  consequence,  while  there  is  pov- 
erty in  Germany,  there  is  no  pauperism;  and  certainly 
a  much  more  evenly  distributed  well-being  prevails 
than  in  individualist  countries,  like  England  and  the 


Germany  since  Unification  165 

United  States.  These  latter  countries  are  loth  to  admit 
that  authoritative  Germany  is  or  can  be  democratic, 
and  urge  the  claim  that  their  individualism  has  produced 
the  only  true  democracy,  hall-marked  and  authentic. 

In  view  of  such  sharply  opposed  opinions  can  it  be 
that  democracy  is  susceptible  of  different  definitions  and 
does  not  present  the  same  face  to  every  observer?  Let 
us  rest  our  eyes  for  a  moment  on  the  familiar  condi- 
tions of  our  own  country.  Our  competitive  individual- 
ism has  demanded  and  produced  a  rare  freedom  of 
action.  Liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness  —  mark 
the  coupling  of  these  two  concepts  in  our  Declaration 
of  Independence  —  are  the  ends  at  which  we  aim  and  in 
which  we  discover  the  essence  of  democracy.  But  free- 
dom and  the  pursuit  of  happiness  necessarily  bring  with 
them  inequality  of  status,  since  the  strong  come  to  the 
front  and  more  and  more  monopolize  the  wealth  of 
the  nation  together  with  its  political  control. 

Immense  pauperized  masses  are  a  feature  of  every 
purely  competitive  society,  and  these  masses  can  not 
possibly  have  or  at  least  long  retain  any  enthusiasm  for 
a  freedom  that  grinds  them  in  the  dust.  In  no  case 
will  they  agree  that  competitive  freedom  makes  for 
democracy  or  that  any  such  democracy  is  more  than 
the  hollowest  of  phrases.  What  these  submerged  groups 
•  understand  by  democracy,  a  democracy  that  is  more 
than  painted  fruit  for  the  thirsty,  is  a  guaranteed  living 
for  everybody,  a  community  enterprise  in  which  every 
man  to  the  lowest  ditcher  and  hedger  is  a  shareholder. 
In  their  eyes  the  competitive  system  with  its  swollen 
profits  and  inordinate  power  for  the  few,  is  a  passing 


166      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

phase  which  can  not  be  overcome  fast  enough.  Its 
beneficiaries  are  the  capitalists  and  their  hangers-on,  the 
upper  and  middle  classes,  of  which  classes  the  whole 
individualist  system  merely  serves  to  consecrate  the 
triumph. 

The  more  we  think  about  the  matter  the  clearer  it 
becomes  that  our  dominant  classes  have  abused  the 
word  democracy  in  their  group  interest.  They  carry 
the  expression  on  their  lips  like  a  conjuring  formula, 
but  the  thing  they  mean  in  their  heart  is  not  democracy 
but  Liberalism.  Liberalism,  in  fact,  has  been  the  genu- 
ine capitalist  faith  in  the  United  States  and,  above  all, 
in  England  throughout  the  industrial  expansion  of  the 
nineteenth  century. 

It  is  Liberalism  that  asks  for  freedom,  both  political 
and  economic,  in  order  that  its  upper  and  middle  class 
adherents  may  amass  wealth  and  climb  the  ladder  of 
happiness;  but  Liberalism  is  not  in  the  least  concerned 
with  anything  resembling  an  equal  distribution  of  goods 
among  all  members  of  society,  indeed  it  is  passionately 
opposed  to  any  such  idea.  But  if  economic  equality, 
rejected  by  Liberalism,  is  at  all  a  true  democratic  ideal, 
Liberalism  and  democracy,  instead  of  being  identical, 
are  fairly  antipodal,  antipodal  in  the  same  sense  as  the 
two  concepts  for  which  they  respectively  stand,  freedom 
and  equality.  A  belief  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding, 
absolute  freedom  and  absolute  equality  are  what  the 
philosophers  call  theoretic  opposites;  you  can  only  enjoy 
them  together  by  a  practical  fusion,  that  is,  on  the  basii 
of  a  compromise. 

Now  Germany,  which  never  bowed  to  the  sway  of 


Germany  since  Unification  167 

individualism  and  never  experienced  an  out-and-out 
capitalist  rule,  has  declared  her  readiness  to  get  along 
with  less  freedom  in  order  to  have  more  equality,  and 
bases  her  claim  to  being  democratic  on  this  choice.  And 
if  democracy  is  the  problem  of  the  masses,  the  powerful 
engine  of  their  material  and  moral  uplift,  I  do  not  see 
how  we  can  fail  to  admit  that  the  American  and  English 
attachment  to  Liberalism  works  undemocratically  and 
that  non-Liberal,  authoritative  Germany  is  dedicated 
to  a  much  more  genuinely  democratic  course.* 

*  Our  American  failure  to  understand  that  Democracy  and  Liberal- 
ism as  well  as  equality  and  liberty  are  antithetical  rather  than  synony- 
mous concepts  could  be  illustrated  by  daily  statements  from  every  news- 
paper in  the  land.  I  submit  an  excerpt  from  the  Albany  correspondent 
of  the  Chicago  Tribune  of  August  13,  1915: 

"  William  Barnes  Jr.  today  warned  the  constitutional  convention,  now 
in  session  here,  that  if  a  stop  was  not  put  to  what  he  termed  '  socialistic ' 
or  class  legislation  there  would  be  established  in  this  country  an  auto- 
cratic state  similar  to  that  of  Germany,  '  denying  utterly  the  American 
theory  of  equality.' 

"  Mr.  Barnes'  attack  was  contained  in  a  speech  urging  the  convention 
to  adopt  his  amendment  prohibiting  the  legislature  from  passing  mini- 
mum wage,  old  age  pensions,  or  similar  laws." 

Mr.  Barnes  is  the  Republican  boss  of  the  state  of  New  York,  agent  of 
capital  and  the  instrument  of  its  political  control.  He  therefore  believes 
in  middle  class  Liberalism  and  very  properly  is  opposed  to  the  German 
system.  Observe,  however,  that  he  represents  himself  as  enamored  of 
"  the  American  theory  of  equality."  "  To  be  thy  defender  I  hotly  burn, 
to  be  a  Calidore,  a  very  Red  Cross  Knight."  The  attitude  never  fails 
to  bring  a  political  meeting  to  its  feet.  My  opinion  is,  not  that  Mr. 
Barnes  is  insincere  in  his  professions,  but  that  he  is  just  mentally  con- 
fused, like  the  whole  body  of  our  middle  classes.  Unfortunately  the 
confusion  redounds  to  the  personal  advantage  of  the  New  York  boss  and 
all  other  bosses,  whose  rule  is  likely  to  continue  until  we  intellectually 
exert  ourselves  and  recognize  that  liberty  and  equality,  under  prevailing 
'conditions,  are  antagonistic,  and  that  we  must  choose  between  them. 
What  Mr.  Barnes  and,  for  that  matter,  the  whole  American  middle 
class,  really  think  about  equality  is  charmingly  illustrated  by  his  naively 
expressed  aversion  for  "  minimum  wage,  old  age  pensions,  or  similar 
law.." 


168      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

To  turn  now  from  discussion  to  the  movement  of 
events,  I  would  have  you  understand  that  Germany 
from  the  moment  of  winning  her  unity  showed  an 
enormous  vitality,  not  only  because  the  fetters  fell  away 
from  her  limbs  but  also,  and  perhaps  chiefly,  because 
she  became  filled  with  a  great  and  uplifting  faith  in  her 
destiny.  The  result  was  a  powerful  forward  movement 
along  all  lines  of  human  endeavor,  producing  notable 
achievements  in  government,  industry,  science,  educa- 
tion, and  the  arts. 

For  many  years  after  the  French  war  the  great  name 
was  Bismarck.  Like  Siegfried  in  the  epic  story  of 
the  Nibelungs,  he  had  stood  at  the  anvil  and  had  swung 
the  hammer  in  order  to  forge  the  mighty  sword  where- 
with to  slay  the  dragon.  But  none  knew  better  than  the 
Iron  Chancellor  that  the  proclamation  of  the  empire 
was  only  a  beginning.  The  landmarks  of  a  long-stand- 
ing national  division  could  not  be  obliterated  over  night 
and  called  for  unremitting  labor  if  a  genuinely  new 
order  was  to  replace  the  old.  The  first  Reichstag,  filled 
with  the  spirit  of  hope  and  confidence,  cooperated  with 
Bismarck  and  passed  laws  establishing  a  national  coin- 
age, an  Imperial  Bank,  and  a  national  system  of  weights 
and  measures;  at  the  same  time  it  entirely  overhauled 
the  system  of  justice,  crowning  its  work  with  a  codifi- 
cation of  the  German  civil  law. 

Bismarck  also  began  a  struggle  with  the  Catholic 
Church,  the  socalled  Kulturkampf,  the  purpose  of 
which  was  to  establish  the  unquestioned  supremacy  of 
the  state;  but  his  success  in  this  contest  was  far  from 
brilliant  and  after  a  few  years  he  was  glad  to  bury  the 


From  a  fainting  by  Lentach 


BISMARCK 


Germany  since  Unification  169 

hatchet  on  the  basis  of  a  compromise.  A  weighty  con- 
sequence of  this  episode,  very  little  to  Bismarck's  taste, 
was  the  creation  of  a  Catholic  political  party  which  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  the  Catholic  voters  lined  up  behind 
it  and  which  has  played  an  important  part  in  German 
affairs  ever  since. 

Far  and  away  the  most  important  legislative  measure 
of  this  period  was  Bismarck's  new  economic  policy. 
On  its  creation  in  1871  the  German  Empire  found  itself 
in  possession  of  an  economic  policy  inherited  from  an 
earlier  time.  It  was  expressed  by  the  word  Zolherein, 
the  economic  union  of  Germany,  effected,  as  we  are 
aware,  by  Prussian  statesmanship  in  the  first  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  Now  Germany  had  enjoyed 
undoubted  advantages  under  the  Zollverein,  not  the 
least  of  which  was  the  encouragement  of  capital  and 
the  gradual  introduction  of  the  new  system  of  machine 
production.  But  England  and  France,  which  were 
earlier  on  the  scene  as  industrial  powers,  long  retained 
an  easy  lead  and  were  able  to  swamp  the  German  mar- 
kets with  their  exports. 

Partly  to  encourage  native  manufactures,  partly  to 
swell  the  German  revenues,  Bismarck  took  under  con- 
sideration a  plan  to  replace  the  low  tariff  schedules  of 
the  Zolherein,  not  far  removed  from  free  trade,  with 
a  system  of  high  duties.  This  was  protection,  and  in 
the  year  1879  it  passed  the  Reichstag  and  became  the 
law  of  the  empire.  From  that  day  to  this  Germany,  in 
contrast  to  England,  but  in  essential  agreement  with 
the  United  States,  has  been  true  to  the  protective  sys- 
tem and  has  increased  its  industrial  output  and  its  for- 


170      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

eign  trade  by  leaps  and  bounds.  However,  that  the 
increase  is  due  to  protection  is  clamorously  denied  by 
free  traders,  who  insist  on  ascribing  it  to  other  causes. 

You  will  permit  me  to  waive  this  complicated  aca- 
demic issue  and  content  myself  with  reiterating  the 
undeniable  fact  of  the  rise  of  a  new  economic  Germany 
after  1879.  Its  leading  features  were  individual  energy, 
coupled  with  intelligent  business  organization.  Larger 
and  larger  masses  of  capital  were  invested  in  manu- 
facturing enterprises,  science  put  its  widening  knowl- 
edge at  the  service  of  industry,  a  merchant  marine 
carried  the  products  of  labor  to  foreign  parts,  and 
agriculture,  taking  advantage  of  the  new  chemistry, 
doubled  and  even  trebled  the  output  of  the  farms.  It 
should  be  carefully  observed  that  this  German  devel- 
opment was  not  one-sidedly  industrial,  or  commercial, 
or  agricultural^  but  that,  in  consequence  of  the  unre- 
laxed  supervision  of  the  government,  it  embraced  all 
departments  of  human  activity  and  gave  birth  to  an 
unusually  well  balanced  economic  system.  The  amaz- 
ing multiplication  of  manufactures,  accompanied,  as  is 
always  the  case,  by  the  magic  growth  of  towns,  has 
undoubtedly  given  preponderance  to  the  urban  over  the 
agricultural  element  —  and  this  preponderance  is  cer- 
tain to  increase  rather  than  diminish  —  but  this  devel- 
opment does  not  mean  that  the  interests  of  those  having 
land  investments  have  been  neglected  as  in  England, 
where  the  favor  extended  to  the  manufacturers  has 
gone  the  length  of  effectively  driving  the  farmers  off 
the  land. 

All  this  economic  expansion  was  brought  about,  not 


Germany  since  Unification  171 

over  night,  but  through  many  decades  and  was  prima- 
rily the  work  of  individuals  —  bankers,  engineers,  chem- 
ists, merchants,  managers,  and  all  the  motley  company 
of  modern  captains  of  industry.  But  from  all  I  have 
said  before  about  the  directive  character  of  the  German 
state  it  must  be  clear  that  the  labor  of  the  individuals 
was  not  permitted  to  become  unsocial,  but  was  adjusted 
and  harmonized  under  the  intelligent  control  of  the 
government  which  never  failed  on  need  to  descend  into 
the  arena  in  order  to  remind  the  individual  atoms  of 
their  subordination  to  the  whole. 

The  principle  of  social  control  inherent  in  the  German 
state  celebrated  its  most  famous  triumph  in  connection 
with  the  problems  of  the  workingman.  Wherever  in 
the  world  the  new  industrialism  flourished,  there  was  a 
tendency  for  great  masses  of  men  to  be  crowded  into 
unhealthy  slums  and  tenements  within  reach  of  the 
smoke-belching  factories,  to  which  they  were  tied  for 
a  living.  Illness,  unemployment,  under-nourishment, 
mutilation,  and  violent  death  were  some  of  the  more 
glaring  evils  to  which  they  were  exposed.  Individualist 
countries,  like  the  United  States,  were  inclined  to  leave 
the  situation  to  agreement  between  those  immediately 
concerned,  to  employers  and  employed,  but  it  was  not 
in  accordance  with  the  German  idea  for  the  state  to 
stand  aside  in  a  matter  of  such  supreme  concern  to  the 
whole  community. 

Accordingly,  in  1881,  Bismarck  came  forward  with 
a  comprehensive  plan  for  giving  the  workingmen  pro- 
tection against  some  of  the  worst  evils  of  their  lot. 
He  drew  up  the  compulsory  Insurance  Laws  and  sue- 


172      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

ceeded  in  having  them  passed  by  the  Reichstag.  The 
Insurance  Laws  are  three  in  number,  insurance  against 
accident,  insurance  against  illness,  and  insurance  against 
invalidism  and  old  age.  They  benefit  the  whole  work- 
ing population,  the  money  required  to  apply  them  being 
assessed  upon  the  employers,  the  workmen  themselves, 
and  the  state. 

The  annual  sum  paid  out  to  the  beneficiaries  of  the 
system  has  steadily  increased  until  the  amount  expended 
at  present  in  a  single  year  falls  not  far  short  of 
$200,000,000,  a  figure  which  is  not  much  behind  the 
annual  expenditure  for  the  army  and  navy  taken  to- 
gether.* As  the  bulk  of  the  money  comes  from  the 
employers  and  the  state,  which  two  agencies  contribute 
considerably  more  than  the  workingmen  themselves, 
the  tidy  sum  just  mentioned  mainly  represents  additional 
wages  distributed  among  the  laborers  and  charged  upon 
the  industry  and  the  public. 

Here  was  pioneer  work  in  labor  legislation  which 
brought  much  honor  to  Germany  and  to  the  great  chan- 
cellor who  framed  it.  The  Englishman  Dawson,  who 
has  made  a  very  sympathetic  study  of  the  insurance 
system,  does  not  hesitate  to  call  its  author  the  leading 
social  reformer  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  another 
Briton,  the  well-known  Liberal  minister,  David  Lloyd 
George,  was  moved  to  pay  it  the  subtlest  of  all 
compliments,  the  compliment  of  imitation.  Since  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  the  Bismarckian 

*  In  addition,  a  reserve  fund  of  $500,000,000  has  been  accumulated 
which  is  invested  in  hospitals,  sanatoriums,  public  baths,  asylums  for 
the  blind,  dwellings  for  workmen,  etc.  Robinson  and  Beard,  Readings 
in  Modern  European  History,  Ginn  &  Co.,  Vol.  II,  192. 


Germany  since  Unification  173 

Insurance  Laws,  modified  to  meet  local  conditions,  have 
become  the  keystone  of  British  labor  legislation. 

But  a  disappointment  was  in  store  for  Bismarck  of 
which  we  must  take  account  if  we  would  appreciate  one 
of  the  gravest  problems  of  present-day  Germany.  The 
chancellor's  initiative  in  the  insurance  legislation  sprang 
not  from  theoretic  considerations  —  he  was  too  much 
of  a  realist  for  that  —  but  from  an  actual  labor  situa- 
tion, of  which  the  main  feature  was  that  the  proletariat, 
steadily  growing  in  numbers  and  in  misery,  was  becom- 
ing more  and  more  alienated  from  the  existing  state 
and  society  and  more  and  more  attached  to  the  revolu- 
tionary doctrine  known  as  Socialism. 

Socialism  was  really  of  French  origin,  but  in  the 
period  of  German  unification  a  German  by  the  name  of 
Karl  Marx  gave  it  a  more  precise  and  intelligible  form, 
and  succeeded  in  establishing  a  political  party  to  help 
hasten  the  day  of  its  triumph.  Devoted  men  preached 
the  doctrine  to  the  workers  in  the  mills  and  soon  made 
proselytes  by  the  scores  and  hundreds.  What  they 
declared  was,  in  substance,  that  capitalist  control  of 
industry  must  cease  and  that  the  community  must  take 
over  the  means  of  production  to  the  end  that  every  man 
may  secure  a  just  share  in  the  total  product  of  labor. 
This  revolutionary  preachment  alarmed  the  propertied 
classes  and  so  seriously  threatened  the  state  that  Bis- 
marck was  largely  prompted  thereby  to  inaugurate  his 
insurance  legislation.  I  am  not  denying  that  he  was 
moved  by  the  charitable  wish  of  granting  additional 
economic  benefits  to  the  wronged  workingmen,  but 
I  also  insist  that  he  was  stirred,  in  an  at  least 


174      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

equal  degree,  by  the  hope  of  reattaching  them  to  the 
existing  order. 

In  view  of  these  diverse  motives  behind  the  Insur- 
ance Laws  it  behooves  us  not  to  rest  content  with  noting 
the  added  wages  distributed  among  the  laborers  but 
also  to  inquire  how  far  Bismarck  succeeded  in  persuad- 
ing them  to  stop  their  ears  against  the  siren  call  of 
Socialism.  And  here  we  must  report  an  almost  com- 
plete failure.  While  the  workers  eagerly  took  the 
financial  benefits,  they  utterly  refused  to  surrender  their 
socialist  faith.  The  revolutionary  propaganda  contin- 
ued among  them  exactly  as  before,  with  the  final  result 
that  the  socialist  party  has  uninterruptedly  grown,  poll- 
ing at  the  last  Reichstag  election  of  1912  the  grand 
total  of  three  and  a  half  million  votes.  This  is  more 
than  twice  the  vote  of  any  other  party  and  not  far  from 
half  of  all  the  votes  cast. 

The  alienation  of  the  socialists  from  the  existing 
state  and  society  is  not  however  so  thorough-going  as 
their  votes  and  their  speeches  would  lead  one  to  suspect. 
More  telling  than  speeches  are  deeds,  and  when  in  the 
summer  of  1914  the  great  war  burst  upon  Europe,  the 
German  socialists  rallied  to  the  defense  of  the  country 
with  no  less  fervor  apparently  than  the  classes  to  which 
they  were  opposed.  In  the  face  of  a  common  danger 
Germany  again  proved  itself,  as  in  1870,  to  be  a  single 
national  unit;  but  the  solidarity  exhibited  in  the  war 
should  not  blind  us  to  the  fact  that  a  serious  inner  divi- 
sion exists  which  will  reappear  the  moment  the  war  is 
over. 

While  occupying  himself  with  the  many  domestic 


Germany  since  Unification  175 

problems  of  Germany,  Bismarck  did  not  neglect  the 
department  of  foreign  affairs.  In  his  eyes  Germany, 
brought  to  unity  and  completion  by  the  war  of  1870, 
needed  nothing  but  security  in  order  to  achieve  a  bril- 
liant, peaceful  development.  While  the  strong  power 
which  had  suddenly  arisen  In  the  heart  of  Europe  was 
not  particularly  welcome  in  any  quarter,  there  was  only 
one  neighbor  who  looked  upon  it  with  settled  aversion 
—  France. 

Bismarck  was  fully  aware  of  French  opinion  and 
resolved  to  provide  against  it,  first,  by  isolating  France 
as  far  as  possible;  and,  second,  by  so  strengthening  his 
own  country  with  alliances  that  France  would  see  the 
hopelessness  of  renewing  the  struggle  for  Alsace-Lor- 
raine. To  this  end,  in  the  years  immediately  after 
1871,  he  cultivated  intimate  relations  with  his  two 
eastern  neighbors,  Russia  and  Austria.  With  both 
these  powers  on  the  German  side  France  was  diplo- 
matically checkmated.  But,  to  Bismarck's  deep  regret, 
the  bonds  uniting  Berlin  with  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg 
soon  snapped;  for,  though  Russia  and  Austria  might 
be  brought  together  by  Bismarck's  friendly  mediation, 
they  could  not  be  kept  joined  as  soon  as  it  appeared 
that  they  entertained  violently  opposed  ambitions  on 
the  Balkan  peninsula. 

Southeastern  Europe  had  been  the  apple  of  discord 
between  Hapsburg  and  Romanoff  since  the  decline  of 
Turkey  in  the  seventeenth  century,  and  with  an  occa- 
sional brief  lull  has  remained  so  to  our  own  day.  In 
fact  we  are  now  aware  that  it  was  this  particular  rivalry 
which  ignited  the  world  conflagration  of  1914. 


176      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

In  the  year  1876,  just  as  Bismarck's  arrangements 
for  a  league  embracing  Germany,  Russia,  and  Austria 
seemed  to  have  been  clinched,  a  Balkan  crisis  inter- 
vened which,  in  spite  of  all  the  masterful  statesman 
could  do,  got  out  of  hand  and  led  to  a  war  between 
Russia  and  Turkey.  Austria,  naturally  enough  in  the 
light  of  her  traditions,  declared  for  Turkey,  and  in  the 
Congress  of  Berlin,  held  in  1878  for  the  purpose  of 
settling  Balkan  affairs,  Austrian  influence  was  strongly 
enlisted  against  Russia.  Accordingly,  against  his  wish 
and  judgment,  Bismarck  was  obliged  to  make  a  choice 
between  the  former  friends  and  present  enemies,  and 
cast  his  vote  for  Austria.  His  calculation  seems  to  have 
been  that  if  Russia  persisted  in  her  forward  policy  in 
the  Balkan  peninsula,  the  existence  of  Austria  would  be 
imperilled  and  that  the  decline  of  Austria  would  prove 
a  danger  to  Germany  itself. 

Having  the  courage  of  his  convictions  he  signed  with 
Austria  in  1879  a  treaty  of  alliance.  It  was  undoubt- 
edly directed  against  Russian  designs,  but  Bismarck, 
who  had  a  fundamental  belief  in  the  necessity  of  remain- 
ing friends  with  Russia  for  the  purpose  —  if  there  were 
no  other  —  of  keeping  Russia  from  joining  hands  with 
France,  succeeded  in  convincing  the  Czar  that  the 
Austro-German  alliance  was  purely  defensive.  The 
result  was  that  Russia  and  Germany  did  not  become 
incurably  estranged  in  1879  or  for  more  than  a  decade 
later.  Though  always  fearing  that  France  and  Russia 
might  discover  the  advantage  of  forming  an  alliance 
in  order  to  counteract  the  Austro-German  treaty,  Bis- 
marck's extraordinary  diplomatic  skill  succeeded  in 


Germany  since  Unification  177 

keeping  them  from  committing  themselves  to  a  formal 
contract  as  long  as  he  retained  the  chancellorship. 

Meanwhile,  always  on  the  qui-vive  to  strengthen  the 
position  of  Germany  against  its  one  implacable  foe  to 
the  west,  he  succeeded  in  drawing  Italy  into  the  Austro- 
German  union.  Needless  to  say,  he  would  hardly  have 
scored  this  triumph  without  a  number  of  circumstances 
which  came  to  his  aid.  In  the  year  1881  France  sud- 
denly descended  on  Tunis  and  took  it,  thereby  gravely 
affronting  Italy  which  had  been  nursing  the  secret  hope 
of  making  Tunis  a  colony  of  its  own.  The  Italian 
government,  angered  by  an  act  of  apparently  wanton 
aggression,  applied  to  Berlin  for  support,  and  in  1882 
was  formally  admitted  to  the  Austro-German  partner- 
ship. 

In  this  way  was  born  the  Triple  Alliance  of  Germany, 
Austria,  and  Italy,  an  alliance  which  continued  unin- 
terruptedly in  force  until  it  was  broken  in  May,  1915, 
by  the  developments  of  the  present  war.  Because  it 
crumbled  under  an  extraordinary  strain  we  are  probably 
now  inclined  to  set  small  store  by  it,  but  that  would 
be  a  mistake  since  for  the  thirty-three  years  it  held  it 
was  a  weighty  factor  in  the  diplomacy  of  Europe  and, 
above  all,  from  the  point  of  view  of  German  affairs, 
successfully  strengthened  the  hand  of  Germany  against 
France. 

These  swiftly  sketched  developments  present  the 
picture  of  Germany  in  the  council  of  European  nations 
to  the  very  end  of  Bismarck's  term  of  office.  In  March, 
1890,  he  took  his  departure  from  a  post  which  he  had 
held  for  twenty-eight  years  and  which  he  had  utilized 


178      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

to  bring  about  the  most  epoch-making  changes  in  the 
fatherland.  At  that  moment  the  position  of  Germany 
was  so  secure  as  to  be  beyond  the  possibility  of  over- 
throw, for,  while  the  hostility  of  France  had  not  abated, 
the  Triple  Alliance  of  the  central  powers  rendered 
France  harmless,  and  the  Russian  bear,  although  emit- 
ting an  occasional  growl  from  his  northern  lair,  was 
yet  far  from  planning  a  mortal  combat. 

But  why  did  Bismarck  leave  office  in  the  year  1890? 
The  answer  to  this  question  introduces  us  to  the  per- 
sonality of  William  II,  who  became  king  of  Prussia 
and  German  emperor  in  1888  by  virtue  of  the  death  in 
that  year  of  his  grandfather,  William  I,  at  the  vener- 
able age  of  ninety-one,  and  of  his  father,  the  Emperor 
Frederick,  who  died  after  a  reign  of  a  little  more  than 
three  months.  William  II,  who  was  only  twenty-nine 
years  old  when  he  mounted  the  throne,  immediately 
showed  that  he  had  an  impetuous  disposition,  consonant 
with  his  years,  but  also  that  he  possessed  a  good  natural 
intelligence  joined  to  the  firm  will  to  be  a  genuine  leader 
of  his  people. 

For  two  years  after  his  accession  he  retained  Bis- 
marck in  office,  often  taking  the  occasion  to  profess  a 
great  reverence  for  the  maker  of  Germany;  but  gradu- 
ally differences  of  opinion  developed,  and  in  March, 
1890,  the  hot  young  sovereign  abruptly  dismissed  his 
famous  minister.  The  details  of  the  crisis  have  never 
been  divulged  but,  given  two  head-strong  men  of 
opposed  temperament,  separated  in  years  and  in  experi- 
ence by  the  space  of  half  a  century,  and  it  is  safe  to 
assume  that  they  will  quarrel. 


Germany  since  Unification  179 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  German  Empire  was 
Bismarck's  handiwork,  his  dismissal  caused  an  immense 
stir  throughout  the  world,  and  Cassandra  voices  were 
raised  here  and  there  prophesying  that  his  structure 
was  artificial  and  would  fall  with  him.  Such  forecasts 
were  quickly  refuted  by  the  events,  for  a  national  devel- 
opment now  set  in  that  carried  Germany  forward  in 
the  race  of  life  at  an  accelerated  pace  and  soon  led  many 
observers  to  declare  that  the  age  of  William  II  did  not 
yield  in  brilliance  to  the  age  of  Bismarck. 

In  spite  of  its  air  of  exaggeration,  there  is  a  certain 
justification  about  such  a  statement,  although  we  are 
not  permitted  to  deduce  therefrom  that  William  II  is 
anything  like  the  same  overtowering  personality  as  the 
Iron  Chancellor.  The  new  German  emperor  has 
proved  himself  a  complex  character.  If,  as  already 
said,  he  was  well-intentioned  and  energetic,  more  nota- 
ble still  was  the  fact  that  he  was  enthusiastically  and 
constructively  modern.  It  is  true  he  often  talked  in 
language  suggestive  of  a  buried  past,  of  his  sovereign 
rights,  and  prayed  to  a  God  who  —  terrible  to  think  — 
looked  for  all  the  world  like  an  enlarged  Protestant 
pastor,  but  these  were  idiosyncrasies  which  did  not  in 
the  least  interfere  with  the  recognition  that  he  was  liv- 
ing in  an  age  which  was  being  transformed  by  science, 
machinery,  and  organization,  and  that  he  could  perform 
a  unique  service  by  helping  to  establish  these  various 
means  of  progress  in  his  country.  The  laboratories 
of  the  inventors  and  investigators,  the  agricultural 
experiment  stations,  the  great  industrial  enterprises  on 
the  Rhine  and  in  Silesia,  not  to  mention  the  schools, 


180      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

hospitals,  and  welfare  establishments  in  every  city  in 
the  land,  became  objects  of  his  zeal,  while  every  project 
that  even  remotely  promised  a  betterment  of  the  ma- 
terial and  moral  condition  of  his  people  was  sure  to 
elicit  his  encouragement. 

The  eagerness  and  ubiquity  which  he  displayed 
caused  him  to  be  laughed  at,  at  first,  even  in  his  own 
country  as  a  sort  of  traveling  charlatan;  then,  as  the 
effects  of  his  stimulation  made  themselves  felt,  opinion 
swung  to  the  opposite  extreme  and  awed  voices  were 
heard  which  ascribed  the  least  sign  of  unusual  activity 
in  Germany  to  the  imperial  initiative  and  by  implication 
reduced  the  share  of  the  German  people  in  their  own 
achievements  to  little  better  than  zero. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  here  as  always  the  truth 
is  a  golden  mean,  and  that  while  conceding  to  William 
a  really  remarkable  gift  for  arousing  sleeping  ener- 
gies to  life,  we  would  be  shooting  wide  of  the  mark 
if  we  did  not  do  justice  to  the  part  taken  by  the  people 
themselves  in  their  recent  expansion.  We  may  profit- 
ably recall  at  this  point  the  peculiar  character  of  the 
German  state  in  which,  as  we  have  seen,  authoritative 
leadership  is  combined  with  free  popular  activity. 

William  II  has  proved  on  the  whole  an  excellent 
executive  after  the  German  pattern,  but  his  direction 
would  without  doubt  have  amounted  to  a  blight  rather 
than  a  help,  if  it  had  not  been  exercised  in  healthy  inter- 
action with  the  million-fold,  coordinated  labor-offering 
of  his  subjects.  Once  again  I  submit,  it  is  wiser  for 
the  convinced  individualists  of  other  countries  to  try 
to  understand  the  collectivist  system  of  Germany  than 


Germany  since  Unification  181 

to  scorn  it  as  unworthy  of  attention.  There  is  neither 
a  moral  nor  an  intellectual  excuse  for  speaking  con- 
temptuously of  the  German  people  as  an  obedient  flock 
of  sheep  under  an  autocratic  shepherd;  and  even  a 
declared  enemy,  like  Lord  Northcliffe,  owner  of  the 
London  Times  and  leader  of  the  English  press,  is  not 
doing  his  country  any  real  service  by  sinking  to  the 
vituperative  level  of  a  recent  public  letter,  wherein 
he  speaks  of  the  Germans  as  "  second-rate  imitators," 
and  "  a  nation  of  house-servants."  * 

I  have  now  prepared  the  ground  for  an  open-minded 
consideration  of  the  German  achievements  in  the  reign 
of  William  n.  And  just  as  only  exaggeration  and  mis- 
understanding will  lay  them  to  the  emperor's  door,  so 
only  willful  ignorance  will  speak  of  them  as  a  sudden 
mushroom 'growth.  Take  German  science,  for  example. 
Does  science,  by  which  I  mean  the  deliberate  conquest 
of  Nature  through  the  devoted  study  of  her  processes, 
show  anywhere  in  Europe  a  more  steady  and  cumulative 
expansion?  True,  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries,  German  science,  though  not  negligible,  lagged 
behind  that  of  France  and  England;  but  one  hundred 
years  ago,  in  the  days  of  Napoleon,  it  took  its  place 
by  the  side  of  its  rivals,  and  in  the  last  decades  has  in 
many  particulars  led  the  van;  for  example,  in  the  fields 
of  chemistry  and  experimental  medicine. 

To  pick  out  almost  at  hazard  a  few  medical  names: 
Dr.  Behring,  who  gave  the  world  the  diphtheria  serum, 
Dr.  Koch,  the  discoverer  of  the  tuberculosis  and  cholera 
bacilli,  and  Dr.  Ehrlich,  whose  Salvarsan  promises  to 

•Published  in  the  Chicago  Tribune,  July  29,  1915. 


182      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

end  the  ravages  of  syphilis,  are  among  the  great  bene- 
factors of  our  age.  But  chemistry,  in  its  two  depart- 
ments of  experimental  and  applied  chemistry,  best  illus- 
trates the  constructive  benefits  of  German  science. 
What  the  experimental  chemist  discovers  in  the  labora- 
tory, the  applied  chemist  turns  to  account  in  the  indus- 
trial life  of  the  nation.  Thus  the  work  of  Liebig, 
touching  the  composition  of  foods  and  their  relation 
to  the  soil,  was  tirelessly  utilized  by  scores  of  hands 
until  the  ancient  art  of  agriculture  was  revolutionized. 
The  German  farmers  on  being  told  what  elements  were 
necessary  for  every  article  they  grew  began  to  use 
artificial  fertilizers  in  ever  increasing  amounts  until 
their  annual  expenditures  on  this  item  exceeded  that  of 
any  other  nation.  Result:  Germany,  occupying  an 
area  not  quite  so  large  as  Texas,  much  of  it  soil  that  a 
farmer  in  the  United  States  would  regard  as  beneath 
his  notice,  produces  sufficient  food  for  sixty-seven  mil- 
lion people.  Without  this  achievement,  an  achievement 
of  chemistry,  she  would  long  ago  have  been  starved  out 
in  the  present  war. 

Let  us  look  a  little  farther  into  the  triumphs  of  the 
chemical  laboratory.  One  of  the  most  important  agri- 
cultural fertilizers  is  saltpeter,  which  owes  an  added 
significance  to  the  fact  that  it  is  necessary  in  the  manu- 
facture of  ammunition.  Germany  has  been  in  the  habit 
of  importing  it  in  immense  quantities  from  Chili.  Only 
recently  German  chemists  have  perfected  a  process  for 
extracting  it,  or  rather  its  nitrogen  ingredient,  from  the 
atmosphere,  thus  enabling  their  countrymen  to  tap  an 
inexhaustible  supply  of  this  element  at  home.  Artificial 


Germany  since  Unification  183 

rubber,  in  the  absence  of  the  real  article  cut  off  by  the 
war,  now  serves  to  produce  German  tires,  and  a  cheap 
substitute  for  gasoline,  partly  derived  from  potatoes, 
drives  the  German  automobiles.  But  the  greatest  mir- 
acle has  been  wrought  with  coal  which  is  made  to  yield, 
in  addition  to  coke,  its  fuel  element,  various  pharmaceu- 
tical preparations  such  as  asperin,  phenacetin,  and  sac- 
charin; and,  above  all,  the  precious  anilin  dyes.  The 
development  of  these  has  become  a  German  specialty  to 
such  a  degree  that  all  the  nations  of  the  world  pay 
tribute  to  Germany  for  the  coloring  substances  needed 
by  their  textile  mills. 

But  dip  into  other  departments  of  modern  activity 
and  similar  results  appear.  In  the  production  of  iron 
and  steel  Germany  in  the  twentieth  century  completely 
outstripped  her  rival,  Great  Britain,*  while  in  the  man- 
ufacture of  electrical  apparatus  she  stands  facile  prln- 
ceps  among  the  powers  of  Europe.  In  the  invention  of 
new  machinery  she  has  at  least  maintained  a  conspicu- 
ous place,  as  the  name  of  Dr.  Diesel,  whose  motor 
solves  one  of  the  greatest  engineering  problems  of  our 
time,  may  serve  to  prove. 

Not  to  make  myself  a  plague  with  heaped  up  facts 
and  figures,  I  conclude  by  pointing  to  the  amazing 
growth  of  German  foreign  trade.  Since  1870  the  fig- 
ures have  risen  from  one  billion  to  five  billion  dollars; 
that  is,  German  foreign  trade  has  multiplied  five  times. 

*  The  total  iron  output  of  Germany  in  1912  was  about  twice  as  large 
as  that  of  Great  Britain.  The  respective  figures  are  nine  and  eighteen 
million  tons.  Binz,  Die  Chemische  Industrie  and  der  Krieg.  Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalr,  Stuttgart. 


184      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

In  the  same  period  British  foreign  trade  has  done  well 
too,  for  it  has  increased  from  two  billions  of  dollars  to 
five  and  a  half  billions,  but  compared  with  the  rush  of 
German  trade  it  shows  a  far  more  deliberate  move- 
ment of  advance. 

Before  leaving  the  economic  field,  permit  me  to  say 
a  word  as  to  the  vital  significance  of  these  various 
statistical  statements,  which,  taken  by  themselves,  are 
about  as  palpitating  as  the  multiplication  table.  Reflec- 
tion will  show  that  they  spell  economic  organization,  an 
organization  which  is  in  last  analysis  no  more  than 
the  industrial  equivalent  of  the  political  organization 
already  examined.  Exactly  as  in  the  case  of  the  govern- 
ment, German  economic  enterprise  recognizes  the  neces- 
sity of  leadership;  it  believes  in  expert  advice,  which  it 
gets  by  allying  itself  with  the  scientist;  and  it  keeps  the 
benefit  of  the  whole  before  its  eyes  by  submitting  to  regu- 
lation in  the  interest  of  the  consuming  public  and  to  the 
special  taxation  of  the  Insurance  Laws  in  the  interest 
of  the  workingmen. 

The  control  of  production  and  exchange  by  the  state, 
often  in  minute  detail,  has  perhaps  aroused  the  aston- 
ishment of  Americans  more  than  any  other  feature.  In 
our  individualist  eyes  state  interference  is  ruinous,  and 
scores  of  learned  professors  of  political  economy  and 
hundreds  of  capitalist  newspaper  editors  have  pro- 
claimed with  far-sounding  eloquence  that  government 
abstention  is  the  very  palladium  of  our  liberties.  And 
yet  the  opposite  of  ruin  has  been  wrought  in  Germany, 
because  state  interference  has,  in  the  main,  been  honest, 
intelligent,  and  directed  by  the  high  social  purpose  of 


Germany  since  Unification  185 

keeping  a  group  of  rich  trust  magnates  and  their  mid- 
dle-class dependents  from  appropriating  to  their  exclu- 
sive benefit  the  profits  of  the  nation's  industry. 

And,  note  well,  interference  has  not  concerned  itself 
one-sidedly  with  the  employing  class.  The  vast  army 
of  workers  has  been  "  interfered  "  with  by  industrial 
courts  for  the  trial  of  cases  arising  between  employers 
and  employed;  *  by  government  employment  bureaus 
instituted  to  reduce  the  evil  of  .non-employment;  and, 
above  all,  by  an  excellent  body  of  technical  and  com- 
mercial schools  in  the  industrial  towns.  Even  in  our 
country  we  do  not  scruple  to  "  interfere  "  with  the 
rights  of  the  individual  when  it  comes  to  education,  but 
Germany,  which,  like  ourselves,  compels  school  attend- 
ance only  to  the  fourteenth  year,  has  recently  prepared 
the  way  for  a  momentous  forward  step.  Why  stop 
educating  at  fourteen,  was  the  question  raised  by  school 
authorities,  before  the  boy  and  girl  have  been  sup- 
plied with  the  equipment  necessary  to  cope  with  the 
modern  world?  Why  should  not  the  state  extend  a 
helping  hand  to  its  youth  to  the  eighteenth  year  and 
send  it  forth  into  life  in  possession  of  definite  industrial 
or  commercial  training?  To  this  end  Fortbildungs- 
schulen,  continuation  schools,  have  been  established  in 
increasing  numbers. 

Before  long  we  may  expect  a  law  making  the  con- 
tinuation system  general  and  obligatory  through  the 

*  These  courts  are  over  400  in  number,  handle  about  100,000  cases  a 
year,  and  settle  the  majority  of  cases  in  a  few  minutes'  time  with  prac- 
tically no  expense  to  the  litigants.  They  are  properly  courts  of  arbitra- 
tion only,  from  which  appeal  may  be  made  to  the  regular  courts.  That 
step  is  hardly  ever  taken.  Dawson,  The  German  Workman,  p. 


186      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

land.*  Even  though  much  remains  to  be  done,  these 
newest  schools  with  their  vocational  features  afford 
another  illustration  of  the  thoroughness  of  German 
organization  which  neglects  no  factor  of  success,  neither 
capital  nor  labor  nor  science  nor  education,  and  cher- 
ishes as  its  ideal  the  simultaneous  forward  movement 
of  the  whole  nation. f 

Even  uncompromising  American  critics  of  the  Ger- 
man system  have  often  praised  the  success  obtained  by 
Germany  in  the  government  of  her  cities.  This  is  really 
very  illogical  on  their  part,  since  German  municipal 
government  is  absolutely  of  a  piece  with  government 
in  general ;  however,  the  Teutonic  success  in  this  depart- 
ment has  been  so  conspicuous  in  comparison  with  our 
failure  that  the  verbal  admission  was  unavoidable.  But 
what  are  the  leading  features  of  the  German  system? 
Let  us  consider  them  briefly  since  they  must  needs  open 
another  avenue  of  understanding  to  German  life. 

We  are  all  aware,  we  are  even  painfully  oppressed 
by  the  fact  that  modern  conditions  have  enormously 
enlarged  the  towns  and  increased  their  problems. 
There  are  the  problems  of  public  service  including 
water,  gas,  sewage,  electricity,  and  transportation,  the 

*  "  Attendance  at  continuation  schools  is  now  compulsory  in  twenty- 
two  out  of  twenty-six  German  states."  Cyclopedia  of  Education,  ed.  by 
Paul  Monroe,  The  Macmillan  Company.  Article  "  Industrial  Educa- 
tion." 

t  A  good  deal  of  additional  educational  effort  is  expended  by  private 
societies,  notably  the  Social-Democratic  parry.  For  a  brief  review  see 
Muthesius,  Das  Bildungsiuesen  im  neuen  Deutschland.  (Deutsche  Ver- 
lags-Anstalt..)  The  author  speaks  with  justifiable  pride  of  "  the  demo- 
cratization of  knowledge "  in  modern  Germany.  He  also  points  out 
shortcomings,  and  makes  interesting  suggestions  as  to  improvements. 


Germany  since  Unification  187 

problems  of  public  health  involving  diseases,  hospitals, 
and  food-inspection,  the  problems  of  tenements,  slums, 
parks  and  playgrounds  —  in  a  word,  the  infinitely  mul- 
tiplied problems  of  present-day  community  housekeep- 
ing. Now  it  is  certain  that  all  these  problems  are 
immediate  practical  issues,  that  they  interest  all  resi- 
dents of  a  town  alike,  and  that  fundamentally  they 
have  nothing  to  do  with  national  party  programs,  that 
is,  with  what  we  currently  call  politics.  They  can  in 
consequence  be  most  effectively  met  by  a  vigorous  local 
authority  proceeding  under  expert  advice  —  the  famil- 
iar German  system  already  observed  in  state  and  indus- 
try !  In  its  application  to  the  town  the  system  often 
shows  local  variation,  but,  generally  speaking,  it  exhibits 
as  the  controlling  factor  an  expert  mayor  with  a  cabi- 
net of  experts  making  up  together  the  executive,  the 
so-called  Magistral. 

A  German  mayor  is  an  out-and-out  professional,  like 
a  lawyer  or  a  physician;  he  has  specialized  in  general 
administration  from  his  college  days,  has  begun  his 
career  in  a  small  municipal  post,  and  has  looked  forward 
to  becoming  mayor  somewhere  or  other  as  the  crown  of 
a  life  of  labor.  Together  with  his  cabinet  of  depart- 
mental heads  he  is  appointed  by  the  town  council  which 
in  its  turn  is  elected  by  the  voters  and  exercises  a  gen- 
eral supervision,  above  all,  in  financial  matters  to  see  to 
it  that  the  experts  keep  close  to  the  earth  and  are  not 
ridden  to  death  by  their  respective  hobbies.  The  pre- 
vailing custom  is  to  let  the  Magistral  handle  the  city 
affairs  with  a  minimum  of  restraint  from  the  city  coun- 
cil, thus  encouraging  initiative  and  enterprise.  To 


188      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

serve  on  the  town  council  is  an  honor  but  not  a  pecuniary 
advantage,  since,  besides  drawing  no  pay,  the  members, 
in  consequence  of  their  aloofness  from  the  actual  details 
of  government,  have  no  jobs  to  distribute  among  friends 
and  relatives.  Their  main  business,  when  all  is  said, 
is  to  keep  the  Magistral  in  touch  with  public  opinion. 
In  the  search  for  its  paid  officials  a  town  is  willing  to 
go  far  afield,  literally  advertising  for  mayor,  engineers, 
and  the  other  members  of  the  Magistral  and  giving 
the  posts  to  the  most  experienced  and  promising  indi- 
viduals presenting  themselves  as  candidates. 

That  under  this  absolutely  business-like  system  Ger- 
many has  clean,  well-lighted  streets  and  excellent  pub- 
lic utilities,  that  she  has  abolished  the  slums  and 
removed  the  worst  features  of  industrial  congestion, 
that  business  and  residence  sections,  parks  and  play- 
grounds, have  been  articulated  into  a  town-unit  meet- 
ing the  demands  of  usefulness  and  beauty  need  cause 
no  particular  surprise.  A  less  expected  merit  of  the 
system  is  that  it  has  avoided  routine  and  shown  a 
remarkable  openness  to  new  ideas. 

The  German  towns,  for  example,  and  so  far  as  I 
know  they  alone,  have  taken  up  a  comprehensive  land 
purchase  policy  by  which  they  are  acquiring  more  and 
more  of  the  area  within  their  administrative  district 
and  often  considerable  areas  outside.  In  this  way  they 
provide  for  future  growth,  limit  private  speculation  in 
land  values,  secure  forest  and  recreation  grounds  for 
the  inhabitants,  and  add  to  their  revenues  by  appropri- 
ating the  unearned  increment.  By  the  unearned  incre- 
ment, a  term  much  bandied  by  political  economists,  is 


Germany  since  Unification  189 

meant  the  increased  value  of  land  resulting  automatic- 
ally from  the  growth  of  population. 

There  can  be  no  question  that  in  justice  the  automatic 
increase,  to  which  the  individual  has  not  contributed 
by  his  labor,  should  go  to  the  community  itself;  how- 
ever, under  the  regime  generally  prevailing  it  goes  to 
the  individual  owners  who  literally  grow  rich  while 
they  sleep.*  German  towns  have  energetically  attacked 
the  evil  by  going  into  the  real  estate  market  and  buying 
property  right  and  left.  Freiburg  (in  Baden)  already 
owns  seventy-seven  per  cent  of  its  administrative  area 
(exclusive  of  streets),  Stettin  owns  sixty-two  per  cent, 
Munich,  Cologne,  Wiesbaden  between  thirty  and  forty 
per  cent,  and  so  on  down  the  list.  The  policy  is  not 
without  its  problems  and  it  would  be  absurd  to  recom- 
mend the  system  for  imitation  elsewhere,  but  it  is  worth 
pondering  that  all  progressive  German  towns  are  per- 
suaded that  the  ownership  of  a  large  part  of  their  area 
and  of  the  circumambient  region  is  indispensable,  and 
that  by  means  of  the  control  of  the  real  estate  market 
they  try  to  secure  the  systematic  development  of  the 
town  in  the  interest  of  the  sum  of  the  inhabitants. f 

*  The  great  English  dukes  in  possession  of  London  real  estate  and  the 
Astor  family  in  New  York  furnish  excellent  examples  of  unearned  incre- 
ment fortunes. 

t  The  most  recent  book  on  the  subject  is  Dawson's,  Municipal  Life  and 
Government  in  Germany,  Longmans,  Green,  &  Co.,  1914.  The  opinion 
of  Dawson,  an  Englishman,  may  be  gathered  from  the  following  excerpts 
from  the  preface:  "Impressed  by  the  larger  autonomy  enjoyed  by  the 
German  towns,  I  have  even  dared  to  ask  the  question  whether  in  this 
country  [England] — the  proverbial  home  of  free  institutions  —  we  yet 
really  understand  what  true  self-government  means."  And  again: 
"  Their  [the  German]  institutions  of  the  professional  and  salaried  mayor 
and  aldermen  represent  the  highest  and  most  efficient  development  of 
municipal  organization  reached  in  any  country." 


190       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

But  it  is  time  to  take  up  the  diplomatic  develop- 
ment under  William  II,  and  therewith  broach  the  story 
of  the  rivalries  among  the  European  powers  which  led 
to  the  present  war.  We  left  Germany  at  the  time  of 
Bismarck's  dismissal  in  1890  in  a  very  favorable  situa- 
tion. Her  unalterable  enemy  was  France,  but  she  was 
amply  fortified  against  the  possible  action  of  France 
by  means  of  the  Triple  Alliance  of  the  central  powers. 
During  the  time  the  Triple  Alliance  was  hatched 
France,  anxious  though  she  was  to  fortify  her  position, 
had  not  succeeded  in  drawing  any  state  into  an  alliance 
with  herself.  Undeniably  she  was  isolated. 

Now  Bismarck  had  no  sooner  disappeared  from  the 
scene  than  the  French  situation  was  improved  by  the 
magnetic  drawing  together  of  France  and  Russia.  In 
view  of  the  alignment  of  the  central  states  it  was  quite 
the  natural  thing  for  them  to  do,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  even  Bismarck  could  have  hindered  a  rap- 
prochement in  the  long  run.  In  any  case,  in  1892,  the 
Latin  and  Slav  powers  joined  hands  across  the  width 
of  Germany  and  from  that  moment  steadily  perfected 
their  Dual  Alliance  as  a  counter-weight  to  the  partner- 
ship of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy. 

With  the  continent  thus  split  in  two,  each  group 
naturally  became  desirous  of  enlisting  Great  Britain 
on  its  side.  But  Great  Britain  at  first  remained  dis- 
creetly aloof,  preferring  not  to  be  drawn  into  the  quar- 
rels of  the  mainland  and  content  with  the  enormous 
political  and  economic  rewards  resulting  from  her  com- 
plete supremacy  over  the  ocean  highways.  This 
supremacy  she  was  resolved  to  maintain  as  her  historical 


Germany  since  Unification  191 

right  by  means  of  an  invincible  fleet,  and  all  the  interest 
she  showed  in  the  continent  sprang  exclusively  from 
the  occasional  alarm  she  felt  lest  one  or  another  of  the 
European  powers  was  venturing  to  look  beyond  the 
bars  of  its  continental  prison  to  the  wide  domain  beyond, 
which  Great  Britain  had  marked  for  its  own. 

It  is  important  to  observe  that  the  experience  accum- 
ulated during  the  eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  cen- 
tury inclined  the  British  public  to  see  in  France  and 
Russia  the  most  eager  aspirants  to  extra-European  ter- 
ritory, and  that  friction  with  them,  occasioned  by 
movements  on  their  part  of  national  expansion,  flared 
up  from  time  to  time  well  to  the  end  of  the  last  century. 
Then  suddenly  the  situation  changed.  By  the  year 
1900  the  forward  movement  of  Germany  had  reached 
a  sufficient  development  to  attract  British  attention. 
German  trade  was  making  its  rivalry  felt  in  all  the 
markets  of  the  world,  a  German  merchant-marine  was 
dispatching  its  ships  into  all  ports  and  waters,  Germany 
was  making  a  bid  for  trans-oceanic  colonies,  even  scor- 
ing a  few  modest  successes  in  Africa  and  the  islands  of 
the  Pacific,  and,  finally  and  most  important  of  all,  she 
aspired  to  become  a  sea-power  by  building  a  fleet. 

Beginning  with  the  twentieth  century  the  British  pub- 
lic with  a  perfectly  correct  instinct  sensed  in  the  rising 
power  across  the  North  Sea  an  ocean  rival  potentially 
far  more  dangerous  than  either  France  or  Russia,  and 
as  soon  as  this  conviction  became  general,  it  wisely  led 
to  an  adjustment  of  the  outstanding  claims  with  the 
older  rivals  in  order  to  leave  the  country  free  to  con- 
centrate attention  upon  the  newer  peril.  Edward  VII, 


192       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

who  had  mounted  the  throne  at  the  beginning  of  the 
twentieth  century,  may  claim  the  merit  of  having  inaug- 
urated the  diplomatic  action  made  necessary  by  the 
reinterpretation  of  English  interests.  In  spite  of  the 
English  theory  to  the  effect  that  as  king  he  was  a  purely 
ornamental  feature  of  the  constitution,  he  succeeded, 
by  virtue  of  a  remarkable  tact,  in  arousing  no  objection 
to  his  playing  the  part  of  an  unofficial  foreign  minister. 

Largely  through  his  influence  a  treaty  was  signed 
with  France  in  1904  by  means  of  which  certain  dis- 
putes, having  chiefly  to  do  with  French  and  British 
ambitions  in  the  Mediterranean  sea,  were  compromised. 
The  reward  of  France  was  Morocco,  a  sovereign  and 
independent  state,  be  it  observed,  which,  before  the 
rise  of  the  German  danger,  Great  Britain  had  jealously 
withheld  from  French  control.  Mutual  satisfaction 
with  a  partnership  thus  auspiciously  begun  led  inevitably 
to  still  closer  relations,  and  presently  England  and 
France  agreed  to  assume  obligations  which,  without  the 
name,  effectively  made  them  allies.  Thereupon  Great 
Britain  turned  to  Russia.  The  questions  between  these 
two  powers  were  more  serious,  involving  Turkey,  India, 
and  China,  and  had  repeatedly,  as  late  as  the  second 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  led  to  the  verge  of  vio- 
lence. Once  the  verge  was  passed  and  the  Crimean 
war  (1854-56)  followed. 

Of  course  issues  embracing  the  whole  of  Asia  could 
not  be  settled  at  a  moment's  notice,  but  a  beginning 
could  be  made,  as  an  earnest  of  good  will,  and  accord- 
ingly the  British  cabinet  tempted  Petersburg  with  the 
peace-offering  of  northern  Persia.  By  expressly  reserv- 


Germany  since  Unification  193 

ing  to  itself  the  southern  part  of  Persia  bordering  on 
the  Persian  gulf  it  did  not  unduly  sacrifice  British  inter- 
ests. This  Persian  treaty,  signed  in  1907,  cleared  the 
way  for  further  intimacy.  To  all  intents  and  purposes 
Great  Britain  became  a  sort  of  silent  partner  in  the 
Dual  Alliance  of  France  and  Russia,  thus  converting 
it  into  what  is  popularly  known  as  the  Triple  Entente. 

From  now  on  the  tension  in  Europe  was  tremendous 
and  the  alarms  never  ceased.  Triple  Alliance  and 
Triple  Entente  stood  face  to  face  like  armed  and  ready 
duellists  measuring  each  other  with  watchful  eyes. 
Though  they  still  exchanged  polite  words,  they  were 
prepared  at  any  moment  to  end  debate  and  fall  to.  Of 
course  it  is  true  that  if  men  were  not  the  creatures  they 
are,  if,  for  instance,  they  cared  more  for  spiritual  val- 
ues than  for  the  acres  of  the  earth  and  the  increase 
thereof,  the  quarrels  between  the  groups  and  the  vari- 
ous members  of  the  groups  could  have  been  adjusted. 
But,  accepting  men  for  what  they  are,  it  is  the  barest 
nonsense  to  say,  as  kindly  but  mistaken  people  have 
been  saying  with  afflicting  insistence,  that  the  nations 
themselves  have  no  real  quarrel  with  one  another,  and 
that  the  war  has  come  solely  in  consequence  of  the  secret 
plotting  of  the  foreign  offices  supplemented  by  the 
blood-lust  of  a  few  diabolical  autocrats. 

Calmly  directing  our  attention  to  the  actualities  of 
the  European  situation,  we  will  discover  that,  in  the 
score  or  two  of  years  preceding  the  present  war,  ques- 
tions of  lands,  commerce,  lines  of  expansion,  and  control 
of  small  or  backward  nations  had  arisen,  with  regard 
to  which  the  European  peoples  themselves,  or  the 


194      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

commercial  classes  which  everywhere  supplied  the 
watch-words,  substantially  dictated  the  policy  of  their 
governments.  If  a  popular  policy  is  the  desirable  policy 
for  a  government  to  pursue,  and  if  by  a  popular  policy 
we  mean  one  endorsed,  or  apparently  endorsed,  by  the 
bulk  of  the  public,  then  the  current  denunciation  of  the 
official  policies  of  the  European  states,  on  the  alleged 
ground  that  they  were  not  in  accord  with  the  popular 
will,  is  uncalled  for.  Take  the  issue  between  France  and 
Germany;  will  anybody  seriously  maintain  that  it  was 
artificially  kept  alive  by  the  dark  and  villainous  plotting 
of  the  Wilhelmsstrasse  or  the  Quai  d'Orsay?  Was  the 
rivalry  of  Austria  and  Russia  in  the  Balkans  a  monarch- 
ical fiction?  And  did  the  Russian  people,  for  instance, 
as  individuals  and  a  nation,  have  no  interest  in  the 
movement  aiming  at  the  control  of  Constantinople? 
Was  it  only  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  not  the  British  peo- 
ple, who  was  interested  in  the  Einkreisung,  the  envelop- 
ment of  Germany,  in  order  that  the  very  profitable 
British  sea-supremacy  might  be  indefinitely  prolonged? 
And,  finally,  was  it  the  Kaiser  only,  and  not  the  German 
people,  who  wished  to  get  the  full  benefit  of  the  national 
expansion  and  showed  a  growing  impatience  over  that 
feature  of  the  policy  of  the  Entente  which  aimed  at 
excluding  Germany  from  the  partition  of  the  earth 
among  the  European  powers? 

That  partition  has  been  steadily  going  on  in  spite 
of  all  the  humanitarians  have  urged  against  it  and  still 
urge.  I  do  not  here  raise  the  question  whether  it  is 
good  or  bad,  I  content  myself  with  the  fact.  The  fig- 
ures even  show  that  the  appropriation  of  the  earth  by 


Germany  since  Unification  195 

the  favored  nations  has  never  been  more  frenzied  than 
in  the  last  generation,  but  they  also  show  that  whereas 
Great  Britain  acquired  in  the  period  1890  to  1910 
nearly  two  million  square  miles,  Russia  almost  as 
much,  and  France  six  to  eight  hundred  thousand  —  a 
total  of  over  four  million  for  the  Entente  powers  — 
Germany  added  only  the  inappreciable  figure  of  two 
thousand  square  miles  to  her  territory.  The  figures 
indubitably  show  where  the  control  of  the  earth's  sur- 
face in  recent  times  has  lain  and  in  whose  interest  it  was 
exercised.* 

Although  I  have  been  arguing  that  the  rivalries  of 
the  European  nations  which  led  to  the  great  war  were 
national  rivalries,  I  am  not  unaware  that  I  lay  myself 
open  to  criticism  unless  I  meet  certain  apparent  facts. 
For  instance,  we  are  credibly  informed  that  millions 

*  On  these  figures  see  Appendix  E.  A  brief  narrative  of  German 
colonial  expansion  throws  further  startling  light  on  the  above  facts  and 
figures.  The  German  colonial  movement  did  not  begin  until  1884.  I* 
met  with  so  little  opposition  on  the  part  of  other  powers  that  by  1890, 
when  the  Anglo-German  convention  relative  to  Africa  was  signed, 
Germany  had  acquired  practically  all  the  colonies  that  ever  fell  to  her 
lot:  Kamerun,  Togo,  German  Southwest  Africa,  German  East  Africa, 
New  Guinea.  In  1890  Great  Britain  was  still  so  far  from  seeing  a  rival 
in  Germany  that  she  made  over  to  her  the  island  of  Helgoland  in 
return  for  concessions  in  Africa.  It  was  this  exchange  that  caused  the 
amused  remark  of  the  explorer  Stanley  that  Germany  gave  a  suit  and 
got  a  button  in  return.  True,  when  in  the  war  of  1914,  the  button  turned 
out  to  be  a  battery,  the  British  satisfaction  perceptibly  diminished. 
However,  the  point  I  wish  to  make  is  that  in  1890  the  relations  between 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  were  very  friendly.  Then  in  the  nineties, 
in  consequence  of  the  German  commercial  expansion,  Great  Britain 
began  to  scent  danger,  turned  gradually  to  France  and  Russia,  and  the 
result  was  that  the  colonial  door  was  shut  on  Germany  with  a  bang. 
From  1890  on,  Germany's  colonial  additions  were  inconsiderable  and 
she  consistently  met  a  flaming  sword  whenever  she  let  fall  an  eye  of 
desire  on  lands  beyond  her  shores. 


196       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

of  workmen,  peasants,  peace-advocates,  and  women  of 
all  classes,  representing  in  their  totality  perhaps  a 
majority  of  the  people,  are  in  all  the  countries  opposed 
to  the  present  war;  further,  we  may  safely  assume  that, 
before  the  war  broke  out,  these  same  groups  had  little 
knowledge  of  their  government's  expansion  policy  and 
no  sympathy  with  it  so  far  as  it  was  known. 

However,  even  though  these  facts  be  admitted,  they 
lose  much  of  their  importance  through  the  circumstance 
that  the  peace  elements  were  at  best  only  partially 
organized,  and  in  no  case  controlled  public  opinion. 
That  subtle  directive  influence  in  national  affairs  ema- 
nated and  emanates,  as  matters  stand  in  Europe,  from 
the  commercial  and  professional  groups  located  in  the 
urban  centers.  With  variations  due  to  one  cause  or 
another,  the  leading  countries  have  a  middle  class, 
capitalist  regime. 

While  dealing,  as  I  do,  with  Germany,  I  can  not  be 
expected  to  unroll  the  whole  evolution  of  modern 
society.  I  am  obliged  to  assume  and  have  indeed 
assumed  throughout  this  lecture  that  the  economic  de- 
velopment which  gave  birth  to  modern  capitalism  and 
brought  it  political  mastery  is  known  and  accepted.  In 
the  interpretation,  which,  though  I  thrust  it  on  no  one, 
underlies  this  whole  exposition,  capitalism  together 
with  its  middle-class  following  exercises  control  in  the 
leading  modern  countries  and  is  responsible  for  the 
opinion  which,  called  public,  is  in  its  origin  nothing  but 
the  opinion  of  a  group.  The  majority  —  the  working- 
men,  peasants,  and  other  elements  just  mentioned  — 
have  thus  far  at  least  docilely  accepted  the  opinion  and 


Germany  since  Unification  197 

rule  prepared  for  them,  and  so  long  as  this  submissive 
attitude  continues,  an  expansion  policy  however  visibly 
provided  with  the  bourgeois  and  capitalist  earmark, 
may  be  fairly  described  as  national. 

With  the  modification  conceded  by  this  interpreta- 
tion of  the  social  and  political  situation  in  the  European 
states,  I  reiterate  the  conclusion  that  the  nations  them- 
selves, set  on  material  advantages  as  much  as  they  have 
ever  been  since  the  beginning  of  the  world,  have  egged 
on  their  governments;  and  although  it  is  true  the  gov- 
ernments hesitated  deliberately  to  declare  for  war,  they 
took  so  uncompromising  a  stand  on  the  platform  of 
national  selfishness  that  war  was  bound  to  follow  as 
a  matter  of  course.  Since  1900,  and  more  particularly 
since  1907,  "  the  coming  war"  has  been  talked  of  in 
Europe  as  one  talks  of  the  weather;  that  is,  it  has  been 
the  inexhaustible,  recurrent  theme,  and  sudden  crises  — 
the  Morocco  crisis,  the  Bosnian  crisis,  the  Albanian 
crisis  and  so  forth  —  all  but  drew  the  dread  specter 
across  the  threshold  half  a  score  of  times. 

In  view  of  these  circumstances  it  is  absurd  to  declare 
that  one  or  another  of  the  powers  was  not  prepared; 
in  the  essential  sense  of  mental  preparation  they  had 
all  gone  as  far  as  it  was  possible  to  go,  for  they  had 
accustomed  themselves  to  look  upon  war  as  the  ultimate 
appeal  and  had  over  and  over  again  uncovered  it  as  a 
threat.  Of  course  the  governments  continued  to  make 
sonorous  public  professions  of  peace,  but  at  the  same 
time,  and  this  alone  was  essential,  they  asked  for 
increased  credits  for  the  army  and  navy  and  solemnly 
declared  they  would  never  betray  the  sacred  trust 


198      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

imposed  on  them  of  defending  the  legitimate  interests 
of  the  nation.  Such  words,  spoken  from  the  platforms 
of  the  respective  parliaments,  awakened  patriotic  dem- 
onstrations throughout  the  country.  This  was  the  last 
straw  —  the  growing  disposition  of  all  the  peoples  to 
envisage  the  horror  and  to  forget  over  the  waxing 
national  rancors  the  more  generous  sentiments  inspired 
by  a  common  civilization.* 

While  admitting  that  the  diplomats  and  foreign 
offices  might  have  exercised  a  more  effective  leader- 
ship, above  all,  admitting  that  it  is  regrettable  that  this 
class  with  such  store  of  human  treasure  placed  in  its 
safe-keeping,  should  not  have  worked  consistently  for 
peace,  I  can  not  persuade  myself  to  look  for  the  cause 
of  the  war  elsewhere  than  in  the  competition  of  the 
European  nations,  under  the  prevailing  regime  of  capi- 
tal, for  lands,  commerce,  and  power,  in  a  word,  for  a 

*  In  the  course  of  this  first  year  of  the  war  there  has  been  so  much 
solemn  profession  of  unpreparedness,  especially  on  the  part  of  the 
Entente  group,  that  I  wish  I  could  quote  freely  from  the  numerous  data 
at  my  disposal  serving  to  prove  my  contrary  opinion.  No  European 
government  would  have  the  face  to  represent  itself  as  surprised  by  the 
war  if  it  did  not  reckon,  and  reckon  correctly,  with  the  astonishing  for- 
getfulness  of  the  public.  I  have  space  only  for  a  little  evidence  concern- 
ing Russia.  In  March  and  again  in  June  of  1914  the  St.  Petersburg 
Birzheviya  Fiedomosti  (Bourse  Gazette),  published  authorized  inter- 
views with  the  Russian  minister  of  war,  Suchomlinov,  wherein  he 
described  with  extraordinary  frankness  the  Russian  military  situation. 
The  articles  were,  in  substance,  a  paean :  Russia  is  ready,  so  completely 
ready  that  in  "  the  coming  war  "  she  will  adopt  not  defensive  but  offens- 
ive tactics.  "  Russia  and  France  desire  no  war,  but  Russia  is  prepared 
and  hopes  that  France  will  also  be  prepared."  Remember  the  speaker 
was  minister  of  war!  He  added  that  arrangements  have  been  made  by 
which  the  Russian  standing  army,  exclusive  of  Reserves  and  Landwehr, 
will  be  brought  to  2,300,000  men,  and  concluded  significantly:  "  the«e 
figures  require  no  commentary." 


Germany  since  Unification  199 

material  good  which  in  the  minds  of  all  has  never  ceased 
to  constitute  the  end  of  life.  If  the  philosophers  and 
poets  should  ever  succeed  in  persuading  people  to  ex- 
change their  old  minds  for  new  ones,  we  may  hope  to 
achieve  an  era  of  peace  and  good  will;  but  until  then 
the  historian  will  do  well  to  deal  with  the  minds  as  they 
historically  reveal  themselves  and,  so  proceeding,  he 
will  have  to  deal  also  with  war. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  complicated  diplomatic  Vor- 
geschichte  of  the  present  war,  nothing  in  the  innumer- 
able White,  Red,  Blue,  and  other  prismatic  Papers  put 
forth  since  August,  1914,  as  documents  justificatifs  by 
the  various  governments,  which  moves  me  to  modify 
my  conclusions.  Naturally  a  close  study  of  the  situa- 
tion will  reveal  an  endless  number  of  details  which  I 
do  not  as  much  as  name  and  which  yet  contributed,  each 
its  perceptible  little  weight,  to  the  fateful  scales  on 
which  were  balanced  peace  and  war.  Take,  for 
instance,  the  case  of  Serbia.  Everybody  knows  that 
the  assassination  of  the  archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  fol- 
lowed by  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Belgrade  was  the 
immediate  occasion  of  the  war,  but  everybody  who 
cares  to  penetrate  below  the  surface  knows,  too,  that 
the  whole  Serbian  question  is  merely  an  episode  of  the 
larger  issue  as  to  whether  Austrian  or  Russian  influence 
shall  prevail  in  the  Balkan  peninsula. 

Thus  it  was  the  long-standing  Balkan  rivalry  between 
Austria  and  Russia  that  precipitated  the  irrepressible 
conflict,  as  some  of  the  best  observers,  by  the  way,  had 
often  predicted  it  would;  but,  owing  to  the  existing 
system  of  alliances  and  ententes,  the  other  powers  were 


200       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

drawn  into  the  vortex  and  with  the  frenzy  that  seizes 
men  when  they  face  the  inevitable,  they  suddenly  and 
recklessly  tossed  all  the  accumulated  historic  rivalries 
and  hates  into  the  great  melting-pot  of  war. 

France  and  Germany  once  more  drew  swords  over 
Alsace-Lorraine,  resuming  a  border-struggle  of  a  thou- 
sand years,  while  England  and  Germany  resolved  to  set- 
tle their  more  recent  issue  over  trade,  colonies,  and 
sea-power  by  the  same  primitive  method  —  by  force 
of  arms.  Doubtless  Serbia  remains  an  issue  in  the 
titanic  conflict;  also  Belgium,  Poland,  Turkey  and  other 
countries  have  become  issues,  upon  which  the  respective 
populations  hang  with  breathless  interest,  but  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  general  historian,  the  really  capital 
questions  are  between  the  great  powers  and  are  three 
in  number. 

The  first  touches  the  control  of  Southeastern  Europe : 
shall  it  rest  with  Russia  and  her  allies,  or  with  Austria 
and  those  who  have  joined  with  her?  This  question 
has  the  most  general  scope,  for  every  power,  large  or 
small,  may  expect  booty  or  no-booty  from  the  dominion 
of  the  dying  Turk  depending  on  whether  or  no  it  is  on 
the  winning  side.  The  second  question  may  be  equally 
important  but  concerns  only  France  and  Germany  and 
the  boundary  between  them.  The  third  question  is 
between  Germany  and  Great  Britain  and  involves  the 
continued  British  supremacy  of  the  seas. 

But  is  this  all  the  historian  has  to  offer  in  answer 
to  the  anxious  question,  What  is  it  all  about?  Is  the 
riot  of  destruction  of  which  we  are  the  amazed  and 
stricken  spectators  a  quarrel  over  booty,  on  a  different 


Germany  since  Unification  201 

physical  scale  but  on  the  same  moral  level  as  the  tribal 
warfare  of  our  distant  ancestors  ?  The  kinship  between 
us  and  our  savage  forebears  —  who,  looking  at  the 
substance  of  things,  would  dare  to  deny  it?  But,  in 
spite  of  resemblance,  there  is  also  a  difference  occa- 
sioned by  the  several  thousand  years  of  effort  in  which 
we  have  acquired  a  certain  control  of  natural  forces, 
invented  a  series  of  astonishing  tools,  and  perfected 
a  remarkable  social  and  political  organization. 

To  these  varied  benefits  we  currently  refer  as  Prog- 
ress and  Civilization,  and  hope  by  means  of  them  to 
achieve  in  the  future  as  in  the  past  a  steady  improvement 
of  our  lot.  At  the  end  of  the  development  our  enam- 
ored fancy  sketches  a  kind  of  heaven  on  earth,  the 
brotherhood  of  man  realized  from  pole  to  pole.  It 
may  be  that  we  are  wrong  in  our  premises  as  well  as  in 
our  expectations  —  the  wise  men  of  the  Orient  who 
proceed  from  other  assumptions  and  find  happiness  not 
in  possessions  but  in  the  vision  of  God  have  never  ceased 
to  tell  us  so  —  but  however  that  be,  our  confidence  is 
unshaken,  and  we  await  a  solution  of  all  our  troubles 
from  that  mysterious  agency,  which  we  think  we  have 
somehow  made  unmysterious  when  we  call  it  Progress 
or  Knowledge  or  something  equally  sonorous. 

This  universal  if  somewhat  vague  faith  explains 
why,  dissatisfied  with  the  greeds  and  rancors  which  the 
war  has  exposed  in  all  their  terrible  nakedness,  each 
nation  has  attempted  to  justify  itself  to  its  own  con- 
science and  before  the  bar  of  public  opinion,  in  terms 
of  the  prevailing  ideal.  Each  is  persuaded  that  Civil- 
ization is  on  its  side  and  that  inherent  in  the  enemy  is 


202       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

something  sinister  and  disruptive,  calculated  to  hurt 
Civilization  and  to  throw  the  world  back  into  barbarism. 
Among  the  group  we  call  the  allies  this  conviction 
has  swiftly  crystallized  into  a  watchword:  they  declare 
they  are  in  this  war  to  put  an  end  to  an  uncivilized  mon- 
ster which  makes  its  lair  in  Germany  and  is  called  Mili- 
tarism. Sit  anathema  is  their  passionate  cry.  It  is 
really  an  English  cry  which  Russia  and  France,  in  lieu 
of  a  better  fighting  formula,  have  rather  reluctantly 
adopted.  But  what  do  the  allies  mean  by  German 
militarism?  The  inquiry  is  decidedly  worth  prosecut- 
ing. Do  they  mean  a  standing  army?  Hardly;  for 
the  Russian  standing  army  is  much  larger  than  the  Ger- 
man, and  the  French  is  just  as  large,  in  spite  of  the 
much  smaller  population  of  the  country.*  Do  they 
mean  a  navy  always  ready  for  war?  Certainly  not, 
since  the  British  navy  alone  is  about  twice  as  large  as 
the  German.  Again,  total  expenditure  for  defense  can 
not  be  the  decisive  factor,  since  both  Russia  and  Great 
Britain  spend  more  on  their  army  and  navy  than  Ger- 
many.f  Since  therefore  there  is  nothing  peculiar  about 
the  German  army  in  the  matter  of  size  or  cost,  and 

*  The  figures  given  by  the  New  York  Times  of  November  8,  1914, 
are  as  follows:  Russia's  army  in  time  of  peace  consists  (in  round 
figures)  of  1,284,000  men ;  the  army  of  France  of  869,000  men ;  the  army 
of  Germany  of  800,000  men.  The  estimates  given  in  the  American 
Army  and.  Navy  Journal  of  October  3,  1914,  are:  France  749,000, 
Germany  735,000. 

t  The  Living  Age,  June  14,  1914,  gives  the  expenditures  compiled 
from  figures  furnished  by  the  British  Admiralty  and  War  Office  as 
follows:  Russia  $455,000,000;  Great  Britain  $375,000,000;  Germany 
$350,000,000;  France  $280,000,000;  Austria-Hungary  $145,000,000.  The 
per  capita  expense  for  1913  is  given  as  follows:  Great  Britain  $8.20, 
France  $740,  Germany  $5.50. 


Germany  since  Unification  203 

German  militarism  is  in  these  respects  indistinguish- 
able from  the  Russian,  French,  and  British  variety, 
where  does  the  special  hideousness  of  German  militar- 
ism come  in?  The  answer  is  plain:  it  inheres  unmis- 
takably in  its  superior  readiness,  and  that  is  a  matter 
of  superior  organization. 

And  here,  note,  that  while  superior  military  readi- 
ness is  immediately  a  matter  of  army  organization,  in 
the  last  analysis  it  is  much  more  than  that,  it  is  a  matter 
of  organization  in  general  —  organization  of  industry, 
organization  of  commerce,  organization  of  agriculture, 
organization  of  transportation,  organization  of  any  and 
every  national  interest  capable  of  instant  mobilization 
in  the  event  of  war. 

And  now  need  I  remind  you,  after  our  long  effort  to 
follow  the  thread  of  German  development,  that  it  is 
indeed  true  that  Germany,  beginning  with  Prussia,  the 
German  nucleus,  has  consciously  labored  at  her  national 
organization  for  a  matter  of  two  hundred  years,  and 
that  she  has  carried  it  farther  than  any  other  people? 
The  will  to  organize,  involving  trained  professional 
leadership  with  democratic  cooperation  from  every 
man,  woman,  and  child,  we  have  hit  upon  as  the  very 
essence  of  the  German  state  and  society.  And  by  writ- 
ten and  spoken  word  the  teachers  and  preachers  of  the 
nation  have  performed  the  feat  of  fervently  enlisting 
the  whole  people  for  this  program. 

In  fact  it  is  this  program  which  affects  with  its  rami- 
fications every  department  of  human  activity  and  which 
cherishes  as  its  ultimate  end  an  alert,  intelligent,  and 
prosperous  nation  that  the  Germans  have  in  mind  when 


204       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

they  speak  of  their  Kultur.  To  this  simple  perception 
has  the  confused  discussion  of  this  enigmatic  word  at 
last  boiled  down:  Kultur  means  the  national  program; 
and  when  the  Germans  declare  that  in  this  war  they  are 
defending  their  Kultur,  they  are  affirming  nothing  more 
or  less  than  that  they  are  dedicated  heart  and  soul  to 
the  peculiar  collectivist  form  of  Progress  and  Civili- 
zation which  their  past  has  evolved. 

But  that  and  nothing  else  is  what  the  British  mean 
by  German  militarism!  The  British,  as  ancient  and 
passionate  individualists,  have  an  instinctive  aversion 
for  the  German  system,  which  on  earlier  occasions  they 
have  derided  under  such  names  as  paternalism  and 
bureaucracy,  but  which  they  now  defy  and  denounce 
under  the  newer  name  of  militarism.  Regardless  of 
the  name,  it  is  always  the  same  familiar  thing,  the  Ger- 
man organization,  the  German  social  and  political  sys- 
tem, the  German  Kultur. 

The  German  system,  which  the  Germans  themselves 
exalt  as  their  Kultur,  and  the  British  decry  as  militar- 
ism, is  thus  moved  into  the  very  center  of  the  world 
struggle.  From  the  point  of  view  of  Progress  and 
Civilization,  the  highest  standards  for  judging  life  in 
which  we  Europeans  and  Americans  have  retained  faith, 
this  circumstance  is  to  be  welcomed,  for  it,  and  it  alone, 
raises  the  war  to  a  level  above  mere  land-hunger  and 
trade-hunger. 

In  order  to  convey  my  meaning  I  would  have  you 
recall  at  this  point  that  Progress  and  Civilization,  as 
they  have  unfolded  in  the  last  few  thousand  years,  have 
been  largely  concerned  with  social  experiment.  The 


Germany  since  Unification  205 

finding  of  new  forms  of  human  association  certainly 
takes  rank  in  the  forward  movement  of  the  race  with 
the  invention  of  new  tools  and  the  stealing  of  knowl- 
edge from  nature's  unconcern.  Now  in  the  historic 
succession  of  social  forms  the  British  individualist 
organization  holds  a  notable  place  and  has  for  several 
hundred  years  done  splendid  service.  But  its  past  rec- 
ord is  no  proof  that  it  will  not  be  superseded  by  a 
system  better  adapted  to  the  newer  needs  of  the  time. 

In  the  opinion  of  many  intelligent  observers  there 
are  good  reasons  for  thinking  that  the  German  system 
is  a  more  advanced  type  of  social  organization  than  the 
British  one,  and  that  the  war  will  bring  conviction  on 
this  head  to  the  whole  European  world.  I  do  not  mean 
that  individualism  will  be  abruptly  abandoned  —  that 
is  not  the  way  things  happen  in  this  world  of  gradual 
change  —  but  that  it  will  be  combined  somehow  with 
collectivism,  and  that  from  the  two  opposites  will  conie 
a  wholly  advantageous  fusion  and  synthesis.  From  this 
political  and  philosophical  point  of  view,  the  winning 
or  losing  of  the  struggle  by  Germany  will  be  an  entirely 
secondary  issue.  I  yield  to  the  passion  to  prophesy 
with  the  utmost  reluctance,  but  I  should  like  to  point 
out  that  if  I  am  right  the  war  may  prove  a  constructive 
event  of  the  highest  importance,  for  it  will  bring  the 
European  nations  together  more  closely  than  ever  be- 
fore on  the  basis  of  a  new  social  purpose  and  a  higher 
social  organization. 

May  I  point  out,  in  concluding,  another  hope  to 
which  we  may  cling  in  the  darkness  surging  around  us 
and  from  which  we  may  draw  an  unshaken  confidence 


206      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

that  the  future  of  Europe  will  not  be  stark  anarchy  and 
ruin?  That  hope  arises  from  the  European  man,  the 
homo  Europaeus,  who  through  hundreds  of  years  of  a 
masterful  struggle  with  nature  has  developed  a  sense 
of  order  diametrically  opposed  to  the  wastage  of  war. 
Of  this  European  man  we  may  unhesitatingly  declare 
that  he  will  not  rest  until  he  has  established  peace;  and 
since  the  high  human  valor  of  all  the  national  variants 
of  the  European  type  has  been  eloquently  affirmed  by 
the  terrible  crisis  of  this  conflict,  we  may  entertain  the 
hope  that  they  will  all  survive  and,  when  the  time 
comes,  act  together  to  lay  the  foundations  of  the  new 
Europe. 

Such  general,  coordinated  action  is  essential  to  all 
our  thoughts  about  the  brave  little  continent  which  from 
the  dawn  of  history  has  filled  the  world  with  its  achieve- 
ments, for  Europe  owes  what  it  is  to  the  presence  on 
its  diversified  soil  of  many  peoples  with  many  kinds  of 
endowments  and  to  their  age-long  rivalry  and  coopera- 
tion. May  the  Europe  of  the  future  be  in  this  respect 
not  different  from  the  Europe  of  the  past!  May  not 
one  people  be  permanently  injured  by  this  fratricidal 
struggle  I  May  they  all  manage  to  survive  the  storm 
and  continue  to  add  to  the  diversity,  the  charm,  and  the 
energy  of  the  movement  of  human  life  1 


appcnDiccs 


APPENDIX  A 

THE   HOHENZOLLERN   RULERS   FROM   THE   GREAT 
ELECTOR  TO  THE  PRESENT  DAY 

1640-1688.  Frederick  William,  margrave  and  elector 
of  Brandenburg,  called  the  Great 
Elector.  Creates  the  centralized  state. 

1688-1713.  Frederick,  son  of  the  Great  Elector. 
Known  as  Frederick  in  among  the 
electors  of  Brandenburg.  Adopts  in 
1700  the  title  of  King  in  Prussia  (soon 
changed  to  King  of  Prussia).  First 
of  the  new  title,  he  is  known  from  1700 
on  as  Frederick  I. 

1713-1740.  Frederick  William  I,  son  of  King  Fred- 
erick i.  Completes  organization  of 
the  autocratic  or  patriarchal  monarchy. 

1740-1786.  Frederick  II,  son  of  Frederick  William  I, 
commonly  called  Frederick  the  Great. 
Challenges  Austria,  makes  Prussia  a 
European  power. 

1786-1797.  Frederick  William  n,  nephew  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great.  Opposes  the  French 
Revolution  without  understanding, 
vigor,  or  success. 

[209] 


210      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

1797-1840,  Frederick  William  ill,  son  of  Frederick 
William  II  and  husband  of  the  famous 
Queen  Louise.  Defeated  by  Napoleon 
at  Jena ;  beneficiary  of  the  democratiz- 
ing revival  championed  by  Stein, 
Scharnhorst  and  others. 

1840-1861.  Frederick  William  iv,  son  of  Frederick 
William  III.  "  The  Romanticist  upon 
the  Throne."  Helplessly  opposed  to 
revolution  of  1848;  grants  Prussian 
constitution  of  1850. 

1861-1888.  William  I,  younger  brother  of  Frederick 
William  IV.  Serves  as  regent  from 
1857-61.  With  Bismarck  as  prime 
minister  defeats  Austria  (1866), 
France  (1870),  and  becomes  German 
Emperor  (1871). 

1888.     March-June.     Frederick  ill,  son  of  William  I. 

1888-  William  n,  son  of  Frederick  in.  Promoter  of 
German  national  expansion. 


APPENDIX  B 

THE  LIST  OF  STATES  COMPOSING  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE 


The  Statei 

Area  in 
Square 
Milea 

Population 
December 
1,  1910 
(in  Round 
Numbers) 

Number 
of  Memberi 
in  the 
Bundeirith 

Number 
of  Repre- 
sentatives in 
the 

Reichstag 

Kingdoms  (4)  : 

134  000 

40  000  000 

17 

236 

Bavaria               

29  200 

7  000  000 

6 

48 

5,700 

5,000,000 

4 

23 

Wiirttemberg     

7  500 

2  500  000 

4 

17 

Grand-duchies  (6): 
Baden        .     

5  800 

2  000,000 

3 

14 

2,900 

1  000  000 

3 

g 

Mecklenburg-Schwerin   .     . 
Mecklenburg-Strelitz  .     .     . 
Oldenburg     

5,000 
1,100 
2,400 

600,000 
100,000 
500  000 

2 
1 
1 

6 
1 
3 

Saxe-Weimar    

1,300 

400  000 

1 

3 

Duchies  (5): 
Anhalt      

800 

300,000 

1 

2 

Brunswick     

1,400 

500,000 

2 

3 

Saxe-Altenburg      .     .     .     . 
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha    .     .     . 
Saxe-Meiningen     .     .     .     . 
Principalities  (7)  : 
Lippe    . 

500 
700 
900 

400 

200,000 
250,000 
300,000 

150,000 

1 
1 
1 

1 

1 
2 
2 

1 

Reuss,  younger  branch  .     . 
Keuss,  older  branch   .     .     . 
Schaumburg-Lippe     .     .     . 
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt     . 
Schwarzburg-Sondershausen 
Waldeck  

100 
300 
100 
300 
300 
400 

75,000 
150,000 
50,000 
100,000 
90,000 
60,000 

1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

Free  Cities  (3): 
Bremen      

99 

300,000 

1 

1 

Hamburg  

150 

1  000,000 

1 

3 

Lubeck      

100 

•  100,000 

1 

1 

Imperial  Territory  (1): 
Alsace-Lorraine      .     .     .     . 

5,600 

2,000,000 

3 

IS 

208,000 

65,000,000 

61* 

397 

[211] 


APPENDIX  C 

CONCERNING    THE    TITLE    AND    THE    POWERS    OF   THE 
GERMAN   EMPEROR 

AS  the  titles  German  Emperor  and  Emperor  of 
Germany  are  often  used  interchangeably  outside 
of  Germany,  it  may  be  well  to  point  out  that  only  the 
title  German  Emperor  is  authorized  by  law  and  usage. 
The  form  Emperor  of  Germany  was  duly  considered 
in  1870,  but  rejected  as  having  a  feudal,  proprietary 
ring,  unsuited  to  the  supreme  executive  of  a  con- 
federation. 

The  German  people  very  generally  believed  in  1870 
that  they  were  reviving  a  title  which  had  had  currency 
among  them  at  the  time  of  their  earlier  medieval  unity. 
But  such  was  only  partially  the  case.  The  head  of 
medieval  Germany  originally  bore  the  title  king 
(Konig).  But  this  king,  in  the  person  of  the  Saxon 
Otto,  revived  in  962  A.  D.  what  he  conceived  to  be  the 
Roman  empire,  and  adopted  with  the  consent  of  the 
pope  the  title  emperor  (imperator,  Caesar,  Kaiser). 
Because  of  its  close  association  with  the  Catholic 
Church  the  adjective  holy  was  soon  added,  the  revived 
state  of  the  Caesars  presenting  itself  to  the  world 
as  the  Holy  Roman  empire  (sanctum  imperium 
romanum). 

For  several  centuries  the  title  king    (referring  to 

[212] 


The  German  Emperor  213 

Germany)  and  emperor  (referring  to  the  empire,  to 
which  the  king  might  or  might  not  succeed,  depending 
on  the  pleasure  of  the  pope)  were  kept  thoroughly  dis- 
tinct, and  the  king  never  employed  the  title  emperor 
until  he  had  been  crowned  at  Rome.  However,  begin- 
ning with  Maximilian  I  (1493-1519),  an  innovation 
occurred.  Maximilian  called  himself  emperor  with- 
out going  to  Rome,  and  from  his  time  on  the  title 
emperor,  on  the  ground  of  its  superior  ring,  tended  to 
become  the  ordinary  designation  of  the  chief  of  the 
German  state,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  title  king.  The 
emperor  even  came  to  be  called  popularly  the  German 
emperor,  although  there  was  not  the  least  legal  justifi- 
cation for  this  form.  I  repeat :  constitutional  law  knew 
only  a  sanctum  imperium  romanum,  and  its  head  the 
imperator.  This  continued  to  be  the  case  till  the  extinc- 
tion of  the  Holy  Roman  empire  in  1806. 

It  follows  from  all  this  that,  from  the  revival  of  the 
Roman  empire  by  Otto  I  to  the  beginning  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  European  usage  recognized  only  one 
emperor,  the  Roman  emperor,  occasionally  but  incor- 
rectly referred  to  as  the  German  emperor.  Now  for 
some  time  before  the  formal  end  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  it  was  so  plainly  approaching  its  last  gasp  that 
no  one  retained  any  respect  either  for  it  or  its  empty 
claims.  No  wonder  therefore  that  when  General 
Napoleon  Bonaparte  looked  about  him  for  a  suitable 
title,  he  should  have  seized  on  emperor  without  as  much 
as  a  by  your  leave  to  the  authentic  but  moribund  owner. 

In  1804  Napoleon  became  the  Emperor  of  the 
French.  Thereupon  the  head  of  the  house  of  Haps- 


214      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

burg,  Francis  II,  who  was  the  actual  Roman  (German) 
emperor,  invented  a  brand-new  title  for  himself,  Em- 
peror of  Austria.  Since  he  foresaw,  and  little  foresight 
was  required,  the  early  extinction  of  the  Roman  empire 
and  the  attendant  passing  of  his  Roman  title,  he  thought 
to  insure  himself  against  loss  of  dignity  by  having  a 
second  imperial  title  in  reserve.  Thus,  just  as  the 
emperor  perished  together  with  his  empire,  two  parvenu 
emperors,  the  Emperor  of  the  French  and  the  Emperor 
of  Austria  stepped  upon  the  scene. 

The  Napoleonic  title  did  not  long  survive,  but  the 
title  Emperor  of  Austria  has  lasted  to  our  own  day.  It 
was  supplemented  in  1871  by  the  invention  German 
Emperor  adopted  by  the  king  of  Prussia.  In  this  new- 
est instance  the  imperial  title  has  no  more  authentic 
association  with  the  medieval  emperor  and  empire  than 
the  French  and  Austrian  titles.  The  most  we  can  say 
is  that  it  revives  a  popular  German  memory  of  great 
vigor  and  persistence. 

As  the  reader  may  be  interested  in  the  powers  of  the 
German  emperor,  I  present  in  abbreviated  form  the 
articles  of  the  Constitution  relative  thereto. 


IV.     The  Presidency: 

Art.  11.  To  the  king  of  Prussia  shall  belong  the  presidency 
of  the  Confederation,  and  he  shall  have  the  title  of  German  em- 
peror. It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  emperor  to  represent  the 
empire  among  nations,  to  declare  war  and  to  conclude  peace 
in  the  name  of  the  empire,  to  enter  into  alliances  and  other 
treaties  with  foreign  countries,  to  accredit  ambassadors  and  to 
receive  them. 


The  German  Emperor  215 

For  a  declaration  of  war  in  the  name  of  the  empire,  the  con- 
sent of  the  Bundesrath  is  required,  unless  an  attack  is  made 
upon  the  federal  territory  or  its  coasts. 

Art.  12.  The  emperor  shall  have  the  right  to  convene  the 
Bundesrath  and  the  Reichstag,  and  to  open,  adjourn,  and  close 
them. 

Art.  13.  The  Bundesrath  and  the  Reichstag  shall  be  con- 
vened annually,  and  the  Bundesrath  may  be  called  together  for 
the  preparation  of  business  without  the  Reichstag;  the  latter, 
however,  shall  not  be  convened  without  the  Bundesrath. 

Art.  14.  The  Bundesrath  shall  be  convened  whenever  a 
meeting  is  demanded  by  one-third  of  the  total  number  of  votes. 

Art.  15.  The  imperial  chancellor,  to  be  appointed  by  the 
emperor,  shall  preside  in  the  Bundesrath,  and  supervise  the 
conduct  of  its  business. 

Art.  1 6.  The  necessary  bills  shall  be  laid  before  the  Reichs- 
tag in  the  name  of  the  emperor,  in  accordance  with  the  resolu- 
tion of  the  Bundesrath,  and  shall  be  advocated  in  the  Reichstag 
by  members  of  the  Bundesrath,  or  by  special  commissioners 
appointed  by  the  latter. 

Art.  17.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  emperor  to  prepare  and 
publish  the  laws  of  the  empire,  and  to  supervise  their  execution. 
The  decrees  and  ordinances  of  the  emperor  shall  be  issued  in  the 
name  of  the  empire,  and  shall  require  for  their  validity  the  coun- 
ter-signature of  the  imperial  chancellor,  who  thereby  assumes  the 
responsibility  for  them.* 


*  Dodd,  Modern  Constitutions,  Vol.  I,  p.  330. 


APPENDIX  D 

THE  SUFFRAGE   PROVISIONS   FOR  THE  REICHSTAG  AND 

FOR  THE  SECOND  CHAMBER  OF  THE  PRUSSIAN 

PARLIAMENT    (LANDTAG) 

TN  spite  of  the  somewhat  analogous  organization  of 
•*•  the  United  States,  it  has  been  my  experience  as  a 
teacher  that  students  do  not  carefully  distinguish  be- 
tween the  Reichstag,  the  German  equivalent  of  our 
national  House  of  Representatives,  and  the  Second 
Chamber  of  the  Prussian  parliament,  which  resembles 
the  lower  house  of  one  of  our  state  legislatures.  While 
insisting  on  the  analogy,  I  am  of  course  ready  to  admit 
that  the  Prussian  parliament,  in  keeping  with  the  pre- 
eminence of  Prussia  in  the  German  federation,  exercises 
a  much  greater  weight  in  German  affairs  than  attaches 
to  any  state  legislature  in  the  United  States. 

Reichstag  and  Prussian  Second  Chamber  exist  and 
operate  in  virtue  of  two  different  fundamental  laws: 
the  Reichstag  in  virtue  of  the  German  Constitution  of 
1867-70,  the  Prussian  Second  Chamber  in  virtue  of  the 
Prussian  Constitution  of  1850.  That  each  has  its  own 
suffrage  provisions  and  that  these  differ  widely  should 
never  be  forgotten.  The  Reichstag  has  universal  male 
suffrage  (see  Lecture  v,  p.  145)  and  the  Prussian  Sec- 
ond Chamber  the  so-called  three-class  system  (see  Lec- 
ture IV,  p.  120).  A  fuller  statement  of  the  two  suffrage 

[216] 


Reichstag  and  Landtag  217 

systems,  affording  the  opportunity  of  comparing  them 
at  close  range  may  be  welcomed  by  some  readers.  In 
the  interest  of  easy  comprehension  I  shall  quote  the 
summary  of  the  constitutional  articles  given  by  Lowell 
in  his  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe, 
rather  than  the  elaborate  original  text.* 

THE   REICHSTAG  SUFFRAGE 

The  Reichstag  is  elected  for  five  years  by  direct  universal 
suffrage  and  secret  ballot.  The  voters  must  be  twenty-five  years 
old,  and  not  in  active  military  service,  paupers,  or  otherwise 
disqualified.! 

THE  PRUSSIAN  SUFFRAGE 

The  Prussian  Second  Chamber  is  composed  of  four  hundred 
and  thirty-three  members  elected  for  five  years  by  a  suffrage, 
which  although  universal  is  neither  direct  nor  equal.  The  mem- 
bers are  chosen  in  districts,  each  of  which  elects,  as  a  rule,  two 
deputies.  The  members,  however,  are  not  chosen  by  the  people", 
but  by  electors,  and  for  this  purpose  the  districts  are  subdivided 
into  a  number  of  smaller  divisions  called  Unvahlbezirke,  or  orig- 
inal electoral  districts,  in  each  of  which  one  elector  is  chosen  for 
every  two  hundred  and  fifty  souls,  on  the  following  curious  sys- 
tem. The  voters  are  divided  into  three  classes  according  to  the 
amount  of  taxes  they  pay;  the  largest  taxpayers  who  together 
pay  one-third  of  the  taxes  forming  the  first  class ;  the  next  largest 
taxpayers  paying  another  third  of  the  taxes  forming  the  second 
class ;  and  the  rest  of  the  people  who  pay  of  course  the  remaining 
third  forming  the  third  class.  Each  of  these  classes  chooses 
separately,  and  by  absolute  majority  vote,  one-third  of  the  electors 
to  which  the  Urwahlbezirk  is  entitled.  All  the  electors  so  chosen 

*  For  original  text  see  Laband,  Das  Staatsrecht  des  Deutschen  Reichs, 
and  Altmann,  Ausgpwaehlte  Urkunden  zur  Brand. — Preuss.  Verfas- 
sungsgeschichte. 

t  Government  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe,  i,  252.  A.  L. 
Lowell,  Houghton,  Mifflin  Co. 


218      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

in  the  district  then  meet  together  and  elect  the  representative 
by  absolute  majority  vote. 

The  three  class  system  was  devised  in  1849,  and  is  a  singular 
compromise  between  universal  suffrage  and  property  qualifica- 
tion. Under  it  everybody  votes,  and  has  a  certain  share  in  the 
direction  of  public  affairs ;  but  the  largest  taxpayers,  that  is,  the 
richest  men,  who  are  of  course  comparatively  few  in  number, 
choose  as  many  electors  as  the  mass  of  the  laborers,  or  to  put  the 
same  thing  from  the  opposite  point  of  view,  property  .  .  . 
as  well  as  mere  numbers,  are  taken  into  account  in  the  apportion- 
ment of  power.  The  same  principle  is  applied  in  the  Prussian 
cities  and  villages,  where  the  councils  are  divided  into  three 
equal  parts,  one  of  which  is  elected  by  each  of  the  three  classes 
of  taxpayers** 


*  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe,  i,  308-5. 


APPENDIX  E 

THE  RACE  FOR  COLONIES 

HHHE  figures  given  in  Lecture  vi,  p.  195,  relative  to 
-••  the  colonial  acquisitions  of  Great  Britain,  France, 
Russia,  and  Germany,  in  the  period  18901910  are 
taken  from  J.  W.  Burgess'  The  European  War  of 
1914,  A.  C.  McClurg  &  Co.,  Chapter  in.  With  the  kind 
assistance  of  my  colleague,  Mr.  Scott,  I  have  attempted 
to  work  out  my  own  figures  from  the  Statesman's  Year 
Book,  the  Annual  Cyclopedia,  N.  D.  Harris'  Interven- 
tion and  Colonization  in  Africa,  Houghton  Mifflin  Co., 
and  other  similar  works.  There  is  considerable  diver- 
gence among  the  authorities  because,  for  instance,  pro- 
tectorates may  or  may  not  be  counted  as  possessions-, 
and  because  colonies  credited  in  a  given  year  with  a 
certain  area  may  suffer  enlargement  or  diminution 
through  subsequent  treaties.  No  wonder,  therefore, 
that  I  can  not  altogether  make  my  figures  on  the  colonial 
gains  between  1890  and  1910  march  with  those  of  Mr. 
Burgess.  As  to  Great  Britain,  I  arrive  at  essentially 
the  same  result,  that  is,  at  something  over  2,000,000 
square  miles,  but  as  to  France,  I  reach,  as  against  Mr. 
Burgess's  600,000  to  800,000  square  miles,  a  total  of 
about  2,000,000,  due,  without  doubt,  to  the  inclusion 
by  my  authorities  of  every  square  foot  of  Sahara  sand. 
Because  it  is  the  German  colonial  possessions  that 

[219] 


220      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

are  our  particular  concern,  and  because,  further,  the 
very  small  share  of  Germany  in  the  partition  of  the 
world  since  she  aroused  Great  Britain's  displeasure  may 
be  a  source  of  surprise  to  many,  I  shall  set  down  in 
order  the  German  acquisitions  in  the  period  1890-1910. 
The  year  1 890  is  chosen  as  the  point  of  departure  owing 
to  the  fact  that,  after  marking  the  achievement  of  a 
modus  vivendi  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
in  the  Anglo-German  convention,  it  was  followed  by 
relations  which  grew  gradually  more  and  more  strained 
until  they  led  to  permanent  iD-temper. 

GERMAN  ACQUISITIONS,    1890-1910 

Area  in 

sq.  miles 

1897.     Lease  of  Kiauchau  from  China 200 

1899.  The  Caroline,  Pelew,  and  Marianne  Islands  pur- 

chased  from   Spain 560 

1900,  Part  of  the  Samoan  Islands  (other  parts  assigned 

to  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States) 1000 


Total    1 760 

The  decade  1900-1910  was,  as  far  as  I  can  make  out, 
absolutely  unproductive  for  Germany.  However,  it 
was  not  free  from  colonial  conflicts  as  the  long  tension 
over  Morocco  sufficiently  shows.  In  the  Morocco  quar- 
rel the  Triple  Entente  prevailed  and  France  got  the 
African  sultanate,  but  not  without  being  obliged  to  make 
a  concession  to  Germany.  In  1911  the  latter  received 
territory  in  central  Africa,  swamp  and  jungle  belong- 
ing to  the  French  Congo,  of  about  100,000  square  miles. 
The  value  of  the  grant  was  very  questionable,  but  the 


The  Race  for  Colonies  221 

event  released  some  German  rejoicing  as  marking  the 
end  of  a  long  period  of  emptiness  and  dearth.  If  the 
100,000  square  miles  of  the  year  1911  be  added  to  the 
1,760  square  miles  of  the  period  1890-1910  and  the 
quarter  of  a  century  from  the  Anglo-German  conven- 
tion of  1890  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  1914  be 
taken  into  account,  the  German  figures  make  a  more 
favorable  showing  than  appears  from  Mr.  Burgess's 
statement.  However,  even  so  it  is  plain  that  Germany 
was  struck  with  a  sort  of  colonial  paralysis  about  1890, 
and  was  left  far  behind  in  the  race  by  the  three  for- 
tunate and  cooperating  members  of  the  Entente. 


APPENDIX  F 

THE   POLISH   QUESTION 

AS  there  exists  in  present-day  Germany  and  has  long 
existed  a  Polish  question,  it  is  proper  to  offer  some 
account  of  it,  even  though  I  found  no  room  for  this 
important  issue  in  the  body  of  the  lectures. 

For  the  student  of  German  history  the  Polish  ques- 
tion is  as  old  as  the  migrations  which  marked  the  end 
of  Rome,  for  when  the  fluid  ethnic  situation  began  at 
last  to  assume  a  certain  fixity,  it  was  found  that  the 
Germans  had  as  their  neighbors  on  the  east  a  belt  of 
Slav  peoples,  chief  among  whom  were  the  Poles.  The 
passionate  rivalry  of  Slavs  and  Germans  throughout 
the  Middle  Ages,  the  interminable  pushing  of  both  the 
language  and  state  boundaries  to  and  fro,  according  to 
the  alternation  of  victory  and  defeat,  I  am  obliged  to 
pass  over  in  silence,  and  shall  begin  with  the  situation 
as  it  was  at  the  time  of  the  founding  of  the  Prussian 
state  by  the  Great  Elector. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Great  Elector  was  moved 
to  create  a  centralized  government  primarily  in  order 
to  get  security  for  his  inherited  lands  against  foreign 
foes.  Sweden,  established  a  few  miles  from  Berlin  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Oder  and  the  Elbe,  was  to  his  mind  the 
main  peril;  but  he  was  also  aware  that  he  was  very 
much  at  the  mercy  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland.  The 

[222] 


The  Polish  Question  223 

area  of  Poland  was  immense,  extending  all  the  way 
from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  sea  and  eastward  far  into 
what  we  now  call  Russia.  Like  all  other  kingdoms  of 
medieval  origin,  Poland  was  not  a  national  state  but 
a  feudal  government,  unstable  and  involved  in  frequent 
wars.  Its  political  success,  according  to  contemporary 
standards,  appeared  clearly  from  the  fact  that,  though 
settled  only  in  its  western  section  by  Poles,  it  comprised 
many  subjected  or  partially  assimilated  races,  such  as 
the  Lithuanians,  Letts,  and  Little  Russians.  To  the 
lords  of  Brandenburg,  and  therefore  also  to  Frederick 
William,  it  was  a  source  of  particular  concern  that  along 
the  lower  course  of  the  Vistula  the  Polish  state  thrust 
itself  between  the  two  Hohenzollern  possessions  of 
Brandenburg  and  East  Prussia.  That  was  bad  enough 
but  not  all,  for,  in  addition,  the  elector  held  East  Prus- 
sia, not  in  fee  simple,  but  as  a  fief  from  the  Polish  king 
who,  as  suzerain,  was  able  in  many  ways  to  limit  the 
incumbent's  control. 

This  East  Prussian  situation  demands  a  little  further 
elucidation  in  the  light  of  its  development.  Originally, 
Prussia  was  the  name  given  to  the  territory  on  the 
Baltic  sea  lying  on  either  side  of  the  Vistula  and  inhab- 
ited by  a  tribe  called  Prussians.  In  the  course  of  the 
thirteenth  century  the  Prussians,  who  invited  disdain 
and  hatred  by  stubbornly  remaining  heathens,  became 
the  object  of  a  crusade  conducted  by  the  Teutonic 
knights,  a  military-monkish  order  on  the  pattern  of 
the  Templars. 

The  Teutonic  Knights  conquered  the  Prussians,  mak- 
ing so  thorough  a  job  of  it  that  the  Prussians,  as  a  peo- 


224      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

pie,  before  long  entirely  disappeared.  The  name,  it 
is  true,  lived  on,  being  taken  over  by  their  successors. 
These  successors  were  Germans,  the  Knights  themselves 
together  with  burghers  and  peasants  whom  the  enter- 
prising conquerors  settled  on  the  soil.  There  thus  grew 
up  a  curious  proprietary  state  ruled  by  a  monastic  order 
of  German  warriors  and  made  prosperous  by  German 
agriculturists  and  traders.  Of  course  it  was  an  anomaly 
and  could  not  live.  The  agriculturists  and  traders  were 
sure  to  resent  a  continued  exploitation  by  a  favored 
group,  and  if  a  neighboring  power  seized  the  oppor- 
tunity, afforded  by  the  local  dissensions,  to  interfere,  a 
calamity  was  unavoidable. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  fourteenth  century  the  Polish 
kingdom  which,  like  feudal  kingdoms  generally,  was 
subject  to  ups  and  downs,  experienced,  after  a  consid- 
erable eclipse,  a  new  period  of  expansion,  and  straight- 
way directed  its  attention  to  Prussia  which  barred  the 
way  to  the  Baltic.  The  Knights  were  invaded,  repeat- 
edly defeated,  and  obliged  at  last  to  bow  to  Polish  dic- 
tation. By  the  disastrous  treaty  of  Thorn  (1466)  they 
surrendered  West  Prussia,  involving  control  of  the 
Vistula  and  access  to  the  Baltic  sea,  to  the  king  of 
Poland;  and  though  they  retained  the  less  important 
East  Prussia,  they  did  so  on  condition  of  holding  it  as 
a  fief  of  the  Polish  crown.  With  defeat  and  the  result- 
ant loss  of  prestige  their  doom  was  sealed. 

In  the  year  1525  the  then  Grand  Master  of  the  Teu- 
tonic Knights  acknowledged  that  they  were  out  of  date 
and,  accepting  the  advice  of  Martin  Luther,  broke  up 
the  order.  Incidentally  the  Grand  Master  failed  not  to 


The  Polish  Question  225 

make  generous  provision  for  himself,  assuming  the  sec- 
ular lordship  of  East  Prussia  with  the  title  of  duke. 
His  change  of  status,  it  goes  without  saying,  did  not 
alter  his  relation  of  vassalage  to  the  king  of  Poland. 
The  first  duke  bore  the  name  Albert  and  was  a  member 
of  the  family  of  Hohenzollern,  the  same  which  in  its 
main  branch  was  established  in  Brandenburg.  A  hun- 
dred years  later  (1618)  Albert's  immediate  line  died 
out,  and  East  Prussia  passed  by  the  law  of  inheritance 
to  the  elector  of  Brandenburg. 

Such  then  was  the  situation  of  the  Great  Elector  in 
respect  of  Poland:  he  was,  as  duke  of  East  Prussia, 
the  vassal  of  the  Polish  king,  and  this  same  Polish  king 
was  an  over-shadowing  personage,  since  he  ruled  West 
Prussia,  which  lay  between  Brandenburg  and  East 
Prussia,  and  an  immense  east-European  territory  be- 
sides. Luckily  for  Frederick  William,  the  stature  and 
might  of  the  king  of  Poland  had  for  some  time  been 
dwindling.  He  was  a  feudal  king,  obliged  continually 
to  dispute  the  power  with  his  nobles  and  finally  worsted 
in  the  conflict.  Slowly  but  irresistibly  the  Polish  nobles 
appropriated  the  royal  lands,  authority,  and  revenues, 
leaving  their  sovereign  the  bare  husks.  As  if  their 
firmly  established  right  to  elect  the  king  did  not  of 
itself  bring  him  sufficiently  under  their  thumb,  they 
further  insisted  on  paralyzing  his  action  and  that  of 
the  state  for  which  he  stood  by  two  of  the  most  aston- 
ishing usurpations  ever  recorded  in  history.  First, 
every  Polish  noble  sitting  in  the  national  assembly 
claimed  the  right  to  veto  any  measure  of  the  assembly 
and  render  it  null  and  void;  and  second,  every  noble 


226      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

at  his  pleasure  presumed  to  resist  an  act  of  the  adminis- 
tration by  federating  with  other  nobles  and  offering 
armed  resistance. 

In  consequence  of  this  lamentable  development  the 
Polish  kingdom  of  the  seventeenth  century,  was,  even 
though  it  still  presented  a  broad  front  to  the  world,  the 
foredoomed  victim  of  its  own  internal  disorders.  The 
only  event  that  could  have  saved  it,  the  rise  of  a  burgher 
class,  never  occurred.  It  will  be  remembered  that  it 
was  the  social  transformation  wrought  by  the  growth 
of  towns  that  caused,  and  alone  caused,  the  overthrow 
of  feudalism  in  the  other  countries  of  Europe.  The 
Polish  nobles  and  the  Polish  clergy  owned  the  soil 
including  the  very  persons  of  the  peasants,  and,  having 
tied  the  hands  of  the  king,  found  themselves  in  a  situa- 
tion which  may  have  appealed  to  them  as  an  earthly 
paradise,  but  which  from  the  point  of  view  beginning 
to  prevail  in  western  Europe  was  unmitigated  chaos. 

In  sharp  contrast  to  Poland,  scene  of  a  belated  and 
unique  feudal  orgy,  all  the  neighbors  of  Poland  were 
at  this  juncture  casting  off  their  feudal  garment  and 
providing  themselves  with  an  attire  better  suited  to  the 
new  age.  We  have  seen  how  Frederick  William,  imi- 
tating Richelieu  in  France,  centralized  the  power  in 
his  person;  Sweden,  Russia,  and  Austria  were  either 
doing  or  trying  to  do  the  same  thing.  A  distracted 
medieval  anarchy,  surrounded  by  monarchies  of  a  mod- 
ern type,  was  sure  sooner  or  later  to  be  overwhelmed. 
And,  as  it  happened,  the  first  blow  was  struck  in  Fred- 
erick William's  lifetime  by  the  great  northern  power, 
Sweden.  The  king  of  Sweden,  pursuing  the  dream  of 


The  Polish  Question  227 

i 
a  Baltic  overlordship,   attempted  to  conquer  Poland 

and  almost  succeeded.  Frederick  William,  hovering 
uneasily  on  the  edge  of  the  conflict,  was  sucked  into 
the  vortex,  and  by  means  of  a  mixture  of  cunning  and 
valor  secured  a  notable  advantage  —  in  1657  the 
Polish  king,  in  payment  of  services  rendered,  renounced 
his  suzerain  rights  in  East  Prussia  and  proclaimed  his 
former  vassal  its  independent  ruler. 

Although  it  was  Sweden  which  first  shook  Poland 
to  the  foundations,  it  was  the  eastern  neighbor  of 
Poland,  Russia,  which  compassed  the  Polish  overthrow. 
With  the  advent  of  Peter  the  Great  (1689-1725), 
Russia  embarked  on  the  policy  of  winning  access  to 
the  west,  and  naturally,  in  the  course  of  time,  cast  a 
covetous  eye  on  the  distracted  realm  of  the  Poles. 
Border  troubles  between  the  two  Slav  peoples  had  been 
frequent  in  the  past,  and  thus  far  the  Poles  rather  than 
the  Russians  had  been  the  aggressors.  With  the  cen-~ 
tralizing  of  the  Russian  state  by  the  autocratic  will  of 
Peter  the  historic  roles  were  inverted. 

Slowly  Russian  influence,  based  on  Russian  military 
power,  made  its  way  into  Poland  until  the  Russian 
resident  at  Warsaw,  with  100,000  invisible  bayonets 
behind  him,  was  the  uncrowned  king  of  the  country. 
In  1764  the  Czarina  Catherine,  finding  herself  in  com- 
plete control  of  the  Polish  diet,  had  one  of  her  favor- 
ites elected  king  and  therewith  the  last  stage  of 
subjection  was  reached.  Probably  Catherine's  idea  was 
to  prepare  the  way  for  a  quiet  absorption  of  the  whole 
kingdom  into  Russia,  but  Poland's  western  neighbors, 
Prussia  and  Austria,  had  by  a  centralizing  policy  of 


228      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

their  own  grown  so  strong  that  they  could  force  con- 
sideration of  themselves.  The  result  was  negotiations, 
which  in  1772  led  to  the  first  partition  of  Poland. 

In  the  first  partition  of  Poland,  Russia,  Austria  and 
Prussia  took  each  one  a  convenient  slice  of  Polish  ter- 
ritory. Prussia  got  the  province  of  West  Prussia, 
which  had  never  ceased  being  a  predominantly  German 
territory  and  which  at  last  joined  up  distant  East  Prus- 
sia with  the  bulk  of  the  Hohenzollern  dominions. 
Though  reduced  in  area,  Poland  was  not  destroyed  by 
the  first  partition  and  continued,  after  1772,  exactly  as 
before,  to  be  a  helpless  Russian  satrapy.  But  even  the 
corrupt  feudal  nobles,  or  some  chastened  elements  of 
this  group,  were  now  stirred  to  a  sense  of  shame,  and 
in  1791  attempted  to  save  the  nation  by  strengthening 
the  monarchy.  The  belated  attempt  was  resented  by 
the  three  powerful,  land-grabbing  neighbors,  and  a  sec- 
ond and  third  partition  followed  in  1793  and  1795 
which  put  an  end  to  the  Polish  state.  But  not  in  unre- 
lieved ignominy  did  Poland  perish,  for,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  the  gallant  Kosciusko,  it  offered  resistance  to 
extinction  and  showed  the  world  that  a  Polish  patriot- 
ism, sole  earnest  of  a  better  future,  had  at  last  been 
born. 

The  arrangements  made  among  Russia,  Prussia,  and 
Austria  in  the  partitions  of  1772,  1793,  and  1795  were 
destined  not  to  last  long.  When  Emperor  Napoleon 
conquered  Prussia  (1806),  he  deprived  her  of  most 
of  her  Polish  acquisitions,  and  when  Napoleon  was 
overthrown  in  his  turn  (1814),  the  question  arose  what 
was  to  be  done  with  the  parts  of  Poland  which  he  had 


The  Polish  Question  229 

held.  The  Congress  of  Vienna,  which  took  the  matter 
in  hand,  finally  decided  that  these  Polish  spoils  of  war 
were  to  be  established  as  a  new  but  diminished  kingdom 
of  Poland  and  given  to  Czar  Alexander.  A  small  sec- 
tion however,  called  Posen,  was  returned  to  Prussia, 
largely  for  geographic  reasons,  while  German  territory, 
Saxony  and  the  Rhinelands,  was  offered  and  accepted 
in  compensation  for  the  rest. 

Thus  by  virtue  of  the  arrangements  of  1815,  which 
we  may  call  the  fourth  and  final  partition,  Prussia,  to 
her  undoubted  advantage  as  a  German  leader,  found 
her  share  in  Poland  reduced  to  West  Prussia  and  Posen. 
It  is  with  these  former  Polish  provinces  that  she  has 
remained  endowed  ever  since,  and  it  is  these  that  con- 
stitute the  basis  of  her  Polish  problem  in  recent  times. 
The  question  of  the  revival  of  the  Polish  state  and 
nationality,  a  question  which  has  never  ceased  to  agitate 
public  opinion,  primarily  concerns  Russia,  because  Rus- 
sia since  the  year  1815  has  been  in  possession  of  the 
bulk  of  the  former  Polish  territory. 

In  view  of  this  situation,  it  is  easily  understood  why 
the  only  two  considerable  revolts  conducted  by  the  Poles 
in  the  nineteenth  century  (1831  and  1 863 )  were  directed 
against  their  leading  enemy,  the  Czar.  Prussia  in  this 
same  century  has  had  trouble  with  her  Poles  but  hardly 
anything  that  can  be  dignified  with  the  term  rebellion. 
West  Prussia  and  Posen  constitute,  as  I  have  said,  the 
Polish  question  of  Prussia,  but  the  two  provinces  con- 
stitute only  a  minor  feature  of  the  Polish  question  as 
a  whole,  because,  located  on  the  Polish  fringe,  they  are 
incapable  of  determining  the  destiny  of  the  nation. 


230      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

The  Polish  question  in  Prussia,  in  the  century  1815 
to  1915,  may  be  defined  as  the  relation  of  the  Poles 
in  West  Prussia  and  Posen  *  to  the  Prussian  state.  This 
relation  has  been  marked  by  ups  and  downs,  has  been 
friendly  and  hostile  in  turn,  and  can  not  be  followed 
here  in  detail.  Summarizing  the  situation  (if  a  situa- 
tion of  the  greatest  variability  can  be  summarized), 
we  may  say  that  the  Prussian  state  has  been  at  consid- 
erable pains  to  further  the  material  interests  of  the 
provinces  of  West  Prussia  and  Posen,  to  extend  to  them 
the  advantages  of  an  honest,  reliable  administration, 
and  to  promote  the  cause  of  education;  but  at  the  same 
time  it  has  attempted  to  Germanize  the  Poles  by  the 
gradual  exclusion  of  the  Polish  language  from  the  pub- 
lic administration  and  the  schools. 

This  Germanization  policy  has  been  resisted  by  the 
Poles  with,  on  the  whole,  remarkable  success.  Aroused 
by  a  sense  of  oppression,  they  have  made  of  their  lan- 
guage and  customs  a  sacred  cult  with  the  result  that 
the  official  statistics  indicate  that  they  are  as  strong, 
if  not  stronger,  in  West  Prussia  and  Posen  at  the 
beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  than  they  were  a 
hundred  years  earlier.  But  West  Prussia  and  Posen, 
it  should  be  observed,  neither  are  now  nor  were,  at 
the  time  of  their  acquisition  by  Prussia,  Polish  in  a 
strictly  national  sense.  They  are  and  have  been  mixed 
provinces,  the  distribution  of  Poles  and  Germans  ac- 


•  There  are  Poles  in  the  two  other  eastern  provinces  of  Prussia, 
Silesia  and  East  Prussia,  but  these  constitute,  or  at  least  thus  far  have 
constituted,  a  body  of  loyal  Prussians,  and  are  a  negligible  part  of  the 
Polish  problem  in  Prussia. 


The  Polish  Question  231 

cording  to  the  statistics  of  1905  as  given  in  the  Encyclo- 
pedia Britannica  being  as  follows : 

Germans  Poles 

West  Prussia   —  1,073,000  567,000 

Posen   900,000         i  ,100,000 

It  thus  appears  that  the  Germans  constitute  about 
sixty-five  per  cent  of  the  population  of  the  West  Prus- 
sia and  about  forty-five  per  cent  of  the  population  of 
Posen.  Only  in  the  eastern  districts  of  Posen  is  it  pos- 
sible to  speak  of  an  indisputable  Polish  preponderance. 
However,  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  statistics  reveals 
a  weakness  in  the  German  situation.  The  Teutonic 
element  is  chiefly  urban,  while  the  Polish  element  is 
located  on  the  soil  in  the  capacity  either  of  landlords  or 
of  proprietary  peasants.  The  old  feudal  tenure,  so 
disastrous  a  feature  of  the  old  kingdom  of  Poland,  has 
long  given  way,  the  leading  evidence  of  its  former 
prevalence  being  the  persistence  of  large  estates. 

This  agricultural  preponderance  of  the  Poles,  Prince 
Bismarck  considered  the  chief  obstruction  to  German- 
ization,  and  accordingly,  in  1886,  he  put  through  the 
Prussian  diet  his  land  purchase  plan,  by  virtue  of  which 
the  state  was  authorized  to  buy  up  estates,  Polish  or 
German,  with  the  view  to  parceling  them  out  among 
German  peasant  colonists.  The  policy  has  had  a  certain 
success  in  so  far  as  German  colonists  to  the  number 
of  some  thousands  have  been  settled  on  the  soil,  but 
the  Poles  by  private  colonizing  enterprises  of  their 
own  have  settled  an  equal  or  larger  number  of  Poles 
on  the  land,  and  the  racial  distribution,  after  thirty 


232       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

years  of  government  effort  along  Bismarck's  lines, 
remains  substantially  unchanged. 

Exasperated  by  the  successful  Polish  counter-meas- 
ures, the  Prussian  government  in  the  first  decade  of 
the  twentieth  century  persuaded  the  legislature  to  pass 
a  measure  authorizing  the  expropriation  of  Polish  land- 
lords in  certain  indicated  districts  on  condition  of  pay- 
ing them  adequate  compensation;  but  the  measure  thus 
far  has  been  merely  dangled  as  a  threat  and  has  not 
been  put  into  practice. 

From  this  hurried  description  it  will  appear  that  the 
relation  of  the  Poles  to  the  Prussian  state  has  been 
characterized  in  recent  times  by  an  increasing  irritation. 
The  Germans  conceive  the  Poles  to  be  a  danger  and 
distrust  their  loyalty;  the  Poles  by  every  means  at  their 
disposal  resist  the  attempt  to  wean  them  from  their 
national  faith.  Behind  the  cantankerous  situation, 
wholly  and  adequately  explaining  it,  lurks  the  shadow 
of  the  larger  Polish  question,  the  question  whether  or 
no  the  Polish  state  will  be  revived. 

Without  any  doubt  that  revival  has  been  moved 
within  the  realm  of  probability  by  the  present-day  con- 
dition of  the  Poles  in  all  the  partitioned  sections.  They 
have  outgrown  the  hampering  feudal  system  which 
ruined  them  in  the  first  place,  they  have  transformed 
their  serfs  into  a  free  peasant  class,  they  have  seen 
the  rise  in  their  midst  of  cities  with  a  waxing  trade  and 
industry,  and  they  have  developed  to  an  extraordinary 
degree  the  community  feeling  which  we  call  patriotism. 
Present-day  Poland,  from  the  point  of  view  of  social 
structure,  is  a  modern  commonwealth,  to  all  appear- 


The  Polish  Question  233 

ances  provided  with  the  main  conditions  necessary  to 
twentieth  century  existence. 

And  now  observe:  should  Poland  in  the  future  be 
reconstituted,  it  is  very  certain  that  it  will  put  forth  a 
claim  to  the  Prussian  provinces  of  West  Prussia  and 
Posen;  Hotspur  Poles  will  go  further  and  also  demand 
Silesia  and  East  Prussia.  But  all  such  claims  will  be 
vigorously  resisted  by  Prussia  and  Germany  on  the 
ground  that  Silesia  and  East  Prussia  are  preponder- 
antly German,  while  West  Prussia  and  Posen  are  quite 
as  German  as  they  are  Polish  and  politically  necessary 
to  Germany's  position  in  central  Europe.  We  may 
therefore  confidently  affirm  that  the  Polish  question  in 
Prussia  is  a  serious  one,  grounded  in  stubborn  facts  and 
not  likely  to  yield  to  a  wash  of  sentimental  phrases.  It 
is  an  issue  of  power  between  a  strong  nation  constituted 
as  a  state  and  a  weaker  nation  which,  after  a  terrible 
experience,  has  been  lately  getting  stronger,  and  which 
fully  hopes  to  reconstitute  itself  as  a  state,  even  though 
it  will  have  to  bide  the  word  of  the  builder  Time. 

The  great  war  now  going  on  in  Europe  has  unques- 
tionably greatly  increased  the  chances  of  the  redemp- 
tion of  Poland.  Indeed  in  the  light  of  the  capital  events 
of  the  summer  of  1915  it  is  hardly  an  audacious  proph- 
ecy to  declare  that  a  Polish  kingdom  of  some  sort  has 
become  a  certainty.  Supposing  an  independent  Poland 
called  into  being  as  the  result  of  a  German  effort  to 
weaken  Russia  —  would  we  be  justified  in  deducing 
that  the  effect  will  be  a  reconciliation  between  Poles 
and  Germans  and  the  amicable  disposal  of  the  Polish 
troubles  in  Prussia?  Search  as  I  may,  I  can  discover 


234      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

no  reason  for  answering  such  a  question  with  an  opti- 
mistic affirmative;  for  the  issue  between  Poles  and  Ger- 
mans, as  my  whole  exposition  shows,  is  a  race  issue 
which  has  already  been  agitated  for  more  than  a  thou- 
sand years.  In  my  view  at  least,  since  nature  has  been 
so  careless  as  to  fail  to  provide  clear  geographical 
boundaries  between  Poles  and  Germans,  they  will  prob- 
ably go  on  disputing  the  soil  with  each  other  in  the 
future  as  in  the  past.  It  is  our  civilized  habit  to  lament 
and  whine  over  the  human  struggle  as  over  something 
utterly  unreasonable,  but  we  are  none  the  less  aware 
that  the  struggle  is  a  part  of  the  law  of  life  and  that 
to  engage  in  it  is  to  furnish  evidence  not  of  decay  but 
of  health  and  vigor. 


APPENDIX  G 

THE  EMS  DISPATCH 

T  F  I  return  to  the  Ems  dispatch  in  order  to  make  an 
•*  addition  to  my  brief  reference  in  Lecture  V,  p.  148, 
it  is  because  an  enormous  myth,  a  veritable  upas-tree 
of  luxuriant  misinformation  has  gathered  around  this 
episode.  The  myth  enjoys  such  general  currency  that 
quite  uninformed  people  will  tell  you  gravely  that  the 
Ems  dispatch  "  caused  "  the  Franco-German  war;  they 
will  admit,  on  inquiry,  that  they  never  troubled  to  read 
it,  but  they  have  been  told  by  somebody  —  no  matter 
who  —  or  read  somewhere  —  they  can't  remember 
where  —  that  it  was  a  diabolical  invention  of  Bismarck' 
who  thereby  successfully  tricked  the  innocent  French 
government  into  declaring  war.  As  the  most  effective 
method  I  know  for  dealing  with  this  mare's  nest  I  shall 
attempt  to  tell  the  unvarnished  tale  of  happenings  im- 
mediately preceding  and  following  the  famous  message. 
The  communication  known  as  the  Ems  dispatch  was 
of  course  but  a  single  feature  of  the  complex,  critical 
issue  between  France  and  Prussia,  occasioned  by  the 
candidature  of  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen 
for  the  Spanish  throne.  Over  this  candidature,  an- 
nounced in  the  early  days  of  July,  France  and  the 
French  government  might  justifiably  feel  an  alarm, 

[235] 


236      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

especially  in  view  of  the  very  acrid  relations  between 
Paris  and  Berlin  in  the  four  years  just  past,  1866-70. 
A  Hohenzollern  dynasty  beyond  the  Pyrenees  was  cer- 
tainly unpleasant  and  might  prove  perilous.  Since 
French  opinion  became  agitated,  the  government  could 
hardly  avoid  making  a  protest.  But  the  government  of 
Napoleon  III  needed  no  urging,  and  eagerly,  not  to  say 
precipitately,  dispatched  Count  Benedetti  to  the  water- 
ing-place of  Ems  where  King  William  of  Prussia  was 
taking  the  cure.  The  upshot  of  some  rather  exciting 
but  perfectly  polite  exchanges  was  that,  on  July  12, 
the  name  of  Prince  Leopold  was  withdrawn  by  means 
of  a  dispatch  addressed  by  the  young  man's  father  to 
the  Spanish  committee  which  had  solicited  the  candida- 
ture in  the  first  place.  Therewith  the  incident  was 
closed.  It  would  have  been  the  part  of  good  sense  for 
the  French  government  to  accept  the  situation  and  let 
the  world,  as  it  was  inclined  to  do,  interpret  the  with- 
drawal as  a  French  diplomatic  triumph. 

But  the  French  foreign  minister,  the  duke  of  Gra- 
mont,  resolved  not  to  take  this  view.  It  irked  him  that 
neither  Prussia  nor  its  king  was  involved  in  Prince 
Leopold's  withdrawal,  which  presented  itself  in  the  light 
of  a  voluntary,  unofficial  act.  By  an  extravagant  speech 
in  the  chamber  of  deputies  Gramont  had  lashed  public 
opinion  in  Paris  to  a  patriotic  fury  and  he  now  felt  his 
position  shaken  unless  he  should  succeed  in  adminis- 
tering some  sort  of  humiliation  to  the  Prussian  king  by 
personally  involving  him  in  his  relative's  declination. 
He  therefore  made  the  fatal  mistake  of  presenting  a 
new  demand,  just  as  it  seemed  to  the  diplomatic  world 


The  Ems  Dispatch  237 

that  the  crisis  had  happily  passed.  In  the  night  from 
July  12  to  July  13  he  wired  Benedetti  at  Ems  that  Leo- 
pold's withdrawal  was  not  enough,  and  that  it  would 
have  to  be  supplemented  with  the  promise  of  the  Prus- 
sian king  that  he  would  never  permit  a  renewal  of  the 
candidature  in  the  future.* 

On  the  morning  of  July  13,  Benedetti  accidentally 
met  King  William  on  the  public  promenade  and,  seizing 
the  opportunity,  then  and  there  communicated  the  new 
demand.  The  king  was  greatly  taken  back  and  in  a 
warm  but  courteous  manner  rejected  the  proposal;  and 
when  Benedetti  later  in  the  day  tried  to  get  another 
audience,  the  sovereign  had  him  informed  by  an 
adjutant  that  his  decision  of  the  morning  remained 
unaltered. 

The  unexpectedness  and  impertinence  of  the  new 
demand  —  for  as  distinctly  impertinent  it  presented 
itself  to  the  king  and  his  attendants  —  disturbed  the 
monarch's  equanimity  and  he  resolved  to  consult  his 
trusted  foreign  minister.  Bismarck  had  been  at  his 
country  place,  Varzin,  but  just  before  the  solution,  on 
July  12,  of  the  first  crisis  he  had  come  on  to  Berlin 
in  order  to  be  nearer  the  scene  of  disturbance.  To  Ber- 
lin, therefore,  the  king  had  a  secretary  of  the  foreign 
office,  Abeken  by  name,  send  a  report  of  the  day's  hap- 

*  On  the  afternoon  of  July  12,  Gramont  made  an  additional  demand 
through  the  Prussian  ambassador  in  Paris  to  the  effect  that  the  king 
was  to  write  a  letter  to  Napoleon,  which  in  purport  would  be  a  letter 
of  apology.  Since  this  demand  does  not  connect  up  with  the  events 
directly  leading  to  the  Ems  dispatch,  I  omit  it  from  my  story.  It  must 
be  considered,  however,  if  we  desire  to  appreciate  Gramont's  inflamed 
state  of  mind. 


238      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

penings.     It  came  into  Bismarck's  hands  at  6  P.  M.  of 
July  13,  and  read  as  follows: 

Abeken  to  Count  Bismarck. — His  Majesty,  the  king,  writes 
me :  "  During  an  accidental  encounter  with  Count  Benedetti 
upon  the  public  promenade  he  asked  me,  finally  in  a  most  ob- 
trusive manner,  to  authorize  him  to  telegraph  his  government 
that  I  would  bind  myself  never  to  give  my  consent  should  the 
Hohenzollerns  at  some  future  time  reconsider  the  candidacy  for 
the  Spanish  crown.  I  refused,  somewhat  sternly  in  the  end,  to 
comply  with  this  demand,  saying  that  I  neither  could  nor  would 
enter  into  an  engagement  of  this  nature  a  tout  jamais.  I  of 
course  told  him  that  I  had  as  yet  not  received  any  word  (from 
Prince  Leopold) ;  but  since  he  had  already  been  notified  through 
Paris  from  Madrid,  it  must  be  obvious  to  him  that  my  govern- 
ment had  no  part  in  this  transaction." 

Later  his  Majesty  received  a  letter  from  the  prince.  His 
Majesty  having  told  Count  Benedetti  that  he  expected  a  com- 
munication from  the  prince,  he  decided,  in  consideration  of  the 
demand  mentioned  above  and  upon  the  advice  of  Count  Eulen- 
burg  and  myself,  not  to  grant  Count  Benedetti  another  audience 
about  this  affair,  but  to  notify  him  by  an  adjutant  that  the 
prince's  letter  had  confirmed  the  intelligence  received  by  Bene- 
detti from  Paris,  and  that  his  Majesty  had  no  further  communi- 
cation to  make  to  the  ambassador. 

His  Majesty  leaves  it  to  your  decision  whether  this  new 
demand  presented  by  Benedetti  and  our  rejection  of  it  should 
not  immediately  be  made  known  to  our  ambassador  (at  Paris) 
and  the  press.* 

The  above  was  the  first  intimation  of  the  new  French 
demand  which  Bismarck  had  and,  in  his  prejudiced 
sight,  it  was  without  any  question  an  attempt  to  humil- 
iate his  sovereign.  He  was  glad  the  king  had  been 
firm  but  that  was  not  enough.  He  would  proclaim  the 

*  This  is  the  translation  given  in  the  English  version  of  H.  von 
Sybel,  The  Founding  of  the  German  Empire  by  William  i,  vol.  vu, 
394.  T.  Y.  Crowell  Co. 


The  Ems  Dispatch  239 

firmness  abroad  and  meet  the  challenger,  Gramont,  face 
to  face.  In  order  to  do  this  he  had  only  to  use  the  per- 
mission extended  by  King  William  at  the  close  of  his 
message.  With  Moltke  and  Roon  present  —  they  hap- 
pened all  three  to  be  sitting  at  dinner  —  he  took  out  a 
pencil  and  composed  the  following  communication : 

After  the  royal  government  of  Spain  had  officially  announced 
to  the  imperial  government  of  France  that  the  prince  of  Hohen- 
zollern  had  withdrawn  his  acceptance  of  the  Spanish  crown,  the 
French  ambassador  at  Erns  presented  a  further  demand  to  his 
Majesty,  the  king,  asking  him  for  authority  to  telegraph  to 
Paris  that  his  Majesty,  the  king,  would  bind  himself  never  to 
give  his  consent  should  the  Hohenzollerns  at  some  future  time 
reconsider  the  candidacy  for  the  Spanish  crown.  Hereupon  his 
Majesty  refused  to  grant  the  French  ambassador  another  audi- 
ence about  this  affair,  and  notified  him  by  an  adjutant  on  duty 
that  his  Majesty  had  no  further  communication  to  make  to  the 
ambassador.* 

Having  read  this  version  of  the  Ems  encounter  aloud 
to  his  visitors,  he  sent  it  at  once  to  the  Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine  Zeitung,  which  the  government  used  for 
conveying  information  to  the  public,  and  later  to  the 
representatives  of  Prussia  abroad  in  order  that  they 
might  be  informed  of  the  state  of  the  negotiations. 

Such  are  the  main  facts  touching  the  Bismarckian 
communication  to  the  press  about  the  Ems  develop- 
ments. With  regard  to  it  we  note,  first,  that  it  was 
fully  authorized  by  the  king;  second,  that  it  was  an 
exact  transcription  of  the  facts;  and  third,  that  it  was 
a  public,  categorical  rejection  of  Gramont's  second  de- 

*  The  Founding  of  the  German  Empire,  vol.  vn,  396. 


240      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

mand  and  obliged  that  inept  gentleman  either  to  eat 
his  words  or  else  follow  his  words  with  a  blow. 

Unluckily  for  Gramont,  he  and,  in  a  more  limited 
sense,  the  French  government,  the  chambers,  and  the 
Parisian  press  and  public,  had  committed  themselves 
too  utterly  to  an  advanced  position  to  recede  from  it 
without  loss  of  pride.  As  a  result  they  now  enthusias- 
tically decided  to  take  the  consequences.  On  July  15, 
with  the  cooperation  of  government,  chambers,  and  the 
boulevard  public,  war  was  declared. 

I  shall  conclude  this  narrative  of  facts  by  asking  and 
answering  a  few  questions. 

/. — Can  it  be  maintained  with  any  semblance  of 
reason  that  Bismarck  "falsified"  the  Ems  dispatch? 
Remember  it  was  sent  by  Abeken,  a  secretary  of  the 
Foreign  Office,  in  temporary  attendance  on  the  king. 
To  declare  for  "  falsification "  one  must  take  the 
ground  that  a  superior  is  obliged  to  communicate  ver- 
batim to  the  public  every  report  made  by  a  subordinate 
in  the  performance  of  his  duty.  Such  an  idea  is  absurd 
and  contrary  to  all  known  practice.  A  minister  must 
be  a  free  agent  and  communicate  to  the  public  as  much 
of  current  affairs  as  he  considers  expedient;  and  he  and 
not  one  of  his  clerks  must  accept  responsibility  for  his 
step.  Besides,  if  Bismarck  felt  any  doubt  about  his 
liberty  of  action,  there  was  the  express  permission  in 
the  telegram  to  take  the  press  into  his  confidence ! 
Consequently  the  question  whether  Bismarck  committed 
a  falsification  may  be  answered  with  an  emphatic  no. 

2. — Who  caused  the  Franco-Prussian  war?  My 
development  shows  that  the  turn  that  led  to  war  was 


The  Ems  Dispatch  241 

taken  when  Gramont  presented  his  second  demand, 
which  the  king  personally  and  emphatically  rejected. 
Of  course  I  hold,  and  have  maintained  in  Lecture  v, 
that,  in  the  last  analysis,  the  war  was  caused  by  a  much 
larger  issue,  by  the  question  of  German  unification 
which  Prussia  supported  and  France  opposed  during 
four  years  of  waxing  exasperation.  If,  however,  after 
the  fashion  of  a  certain  myopic  school  of  political  his- 
torians, the  incident  of  the  Spanish  candidature  be 
isolated  for  consideration,  the  responsibility  for  the 
war  must  undoubtedly  be  referred  not  to  what  King 
William  did  at  Ems  or  Bismarck  at  Berlin,  but  to  the 
duke  of  Gramont's  hasty  and  senseless  reopening  of  a 
quarrel  which  had  just  been  happily  composed. 

j. — Was  Bismarck  a  factor  in  bringing  about  the 
war?  To  this  question  I  do  not  see  how  it  is  possible  to 
answer  other  than  by  a  decided  yes.  The  chancellor  was- 
a  factor  in  two  ways :  first,  by  communicating  King  Wil- 
liam's rejection  of  Gramont's -demand  to  the  world 
and  deliberately  bringing  the  issue  to  a  show-down, 
that  is,  to  the  point  where  Gramont  would  have  to 
sheath  the  sword  he  had  been  too  carelessly  flourishing 
or  else  save  his  face  by  striking  a  blow  with  it;  and 
second,  he  was  a  factor  by  his  whole  policy  of  German 
unification  consistently  pursued  since  1862.  This  policy 
had  been  interfered,  with  by  France  in  1866,  and  her 
unfriendly  attitude  had,  if  anything,  grown  more  un- 
friendly since  then.  Bismarck  had  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  only  war  would  break  down  the  French 
opposition,  but  also  that  a  French  war  would  release 
such  patriotic  enthusiasm  throughout  the  whole  of  Ger- 


242       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

many  that  the  union  of  north  and  south  would  follow 
automatically. 

To  sum  up,  Bismarck  in  July,  1870,  had  ground  for 
thinking  that  war  with  France  would  come  sooner  or 
later,  that  it  was  good  diplomacy  to  choose  the  moment 
and  not  have  it  chosen  by  the  enemy,  and  finally,  that 
the  struggle  would  probably  prove  productive  of  na- 
tional good.  When  therefore  Gramont  and  the  French 
government  foolishly  and  to  the  loud  shrilling  of  the 
war-trumpet  delivered  themselves  into  his  hands,  he 
met  challenge  with  challenge,  fully  knowing  that  the 
final  implication  of  his  stand  was  war.  He  did  not 
play  and  coquette  with  the  situation,  he  was  in  dead 
earnest. 

It  always  takes  two  to  fight,  and  therefore  it  would 
be  absurd  on  its  face  to  contend  that  Bismarck  did  not 
help  produce  the  Franco-Prussian  war.  But  from  that 
position  to  an  exoneration  of  the  French  government, 
both  in  the  Spanish  affair  and  in  the  much  more  weighty, 
in  fact,  in  the  one  essential  issue,  that  of  German  uni- 
fication, is  a  step  that  no  sincere  student  will  be  able 
to  take. 


APPENDIX  H 

THE  ALSACE-LORRAINE  QUESTION 

T  F  I  undertake  to  make  an  addition  to  my  story  of  the 
^  cession  of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  told  in  Lecture  v,  it 
is  not  to  elaborate  the  famous  boundary  dispute  in  the 
light  of  the  many  wars  fought  and  treaties  signed  be- 
tween France  and  Germany.  Such  a  legal  and  military 
tale,  however  interesting  it  might  prove  to  be,  lies 
beyond  the  scope  of  a  volume  like  the  present.  Who- 
ever desires  to  know  the  strange  vicissitudes  of  the 
Alsace-Lorraine  border  can  obtain  them  in  a  clear, 
objective  presentation  by  Ruth  Putnam:  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, From  Caesar  to  Kaiser,  58  B.  c.-/#7/  A.  D.* 
A  chapter  called  "  After  the  Cession  "  exceeds  the 
promise  of  the  title,  for  it  carries  the  administrative 
history  of  the  region  down  to  1914. 

All  that  I  wish  to  do  in  this  note  is  to  submit  a  few 
data  which,  in  view  of  the  prominence  given  the  Alsace- 
Lorraine  question  in  the  present  war,  may  help  the 
reader  form  an  opinion  with  regard  to  existing  condi- 
tions in  the  disputed  territory. 

When  the  transfer  of  title  took  place  in  1871,  both 
the  French  and  the  German  people  entertained  illusions 
touching  Alsace-Lorraine,  to  which  they  gave  free  and 
even  extravagant  expression.  The  exceedingly  roman- 

*G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  N.  Y.,  1915. 

[243] 


244      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

tic  view  of  the  French  was  that  the  people  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  were  flesh  of  their  flesh  and  bone  of  their 
bone;  if  they  had  once  belonged  to  Germany,  it  was 
because  in  some  remote  age  they  had  been  filched  from 
France,  and  if  they  spoke  a  language  other  than  French, 
it  was  a  rude  German  patois  but  it  was  not  German. 
The  equally  romantic  view  of  the  Germans  was  that 
the  new  fellow-citizens  had  been  German  till  the  seven- 
teenth century  and  that  although  they  had  since  then 
acquired  a  regrettable  French  veneer,  they  would  hur- 
riedly cast  it  off  and  joyfully  be  assimilated  to  their 
brethren  across  the  Rhine. 

While  the  French  view  was  based  on  the  knowledge 
of  a  community  of  sentiment,  the  German  view  was 
inspired  by  trust  in  the  community  of  speech.  For  that 
the  Alsatian  tongue  was  a  patois  or  dialect  the  Germans 
admitted ;  but  so  was  the  spoken  language  of  the  Baden- 
ers,  the  Suabians,  the  Bavarians,  and  of  every  other 
tribe  which  has  been  merged  in  the  German  nation.  And 
if  the  Alsatians  did  not  command  literary  German,  that 
was  regrettable  but  not  unintelligible  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  the  French  government  had  given  the  people  in- 
sufficient opportunity  to  learn  German  in  their  schools. 

To  prove  their  contention  the  victors  of  1871  had  a 
census  taken  shortly  after  the  occupation,  and  lo  and 
behold!  the  German  view  seemed  to  be  established 
beyond  cavil.  Since  then  one  census  has  followed 
another  at  regular  intervals,  and  although  the  popula- 
tion has  increased  by  one-half,  there  has  been  no  par- 
ticular change  in  the  ratio  of  French  to  German  speech. 
The  most  recent  census,  that  of  1910,  may  serve  to 


The  Alsace-Lorraine  Question         245 

inform  us  how  that  ratio  stands :  those  who  speak  Ger- 
man are  given  at  1,634,260  and  those  who  speak  French 
at  204,262.*  The  French-speakers  are  mostly  in  Lor- 
raine ;  Alsace,  except  in  some  western  districts,  is  wholly 
German-speaking. 

Thus  the  Germans  with  their  figures  seemed  to  have 
triumphed  over  the  French  —  seemed,  for  no  sooner 
had  they  taken  control  than  they  discovered  that  speech 
has  nothing  to  do  with  sentiment,  at  least  in  this  ancient 
border-land,  and  that  the  French  patriotism  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  more  than  an  easily  remediable  habit  of 
mind.  There  cannot  be  the  least  question  that  at  the 
time  of  the  cession  the  profound  and  overwhelming 
sentiment  of  the  provinces  was  French.  Back  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  at  the  time  of  the  conquest  by 
France,  the  sentiment  was  undoubtedly  German, 
although  of  the  tempered  sort  in  keeping  with  the  pal- 
pable decline  of  German  nationality.  For  several 
generations  the  assimilation  to  France  proceeded  slowly. 
Travelers  continued  to  note  the  German  character  of 
Alsace,  and  as  late  as  1770,  the  young  Goethe,  pur- 
suing his  university  studies  in  Strassburg,  reported 
conditions  in  town  and  country  that  were  essentially 
German. 

Then  came  the  French  Revolution.  The  heroic  over- 
throw of  a  hateful  regime  coupled  as  it  was  with  the 
prophecy  of  a  new  world  of  democratic  justice  won  the 
hearts  of  the  Alsatians  and  caused  them  to  merge  their 
consciousness  with  that  of  their  French  fellow-citizens. 
From  1789  to  1870  they  shared  in  the  vast  transforma- 

•  The  Statesman's  Year-book,  1915. 


246       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

tion  that  made  France  into  a  modern,  bourgeois,  and 
industrial  commonwealth,  and  although  they  still  held 
fast  to  their  German  speech,  they  became  filled  with 
a  definite  French  patriotism.  No  wonder  therefore  that 
in  1870  they  resented  their  incorporation  in  the  new 
German  Empire. 

Since  that  event  some  forty  years  have  passed,  and 
the  question  arises:  Has  there  been  any  change  in  the 
sentiment  of  Alsace-Lorraine?  An  enormous  amount 
of  partisan  and  conflicting  evidence  makes  it  impossible 
to  give  a  conclusive  and  unchallengeable  answer.  That 
the  German-speakers  have  adopted  a  German  conscious- 
ness, as  it  was  hoped  in  1871  they  would  do,  may  be 
denied;  but  it  may  also  be  denied  that  they  have  retained 
the  passionate  French  consciousness  which  character- 
ized them  at  the  time  of  the  treaty  of  Frankfort.  The 
tendency,  open  and  confessed,  has  been  toward  an 
Alsatian  consciousness  which  was  to  be  neither  French 
nor  German,  but  to  be  made  up  in  equal  shares  of  either 
element. 

An  investigation  of  the  native  sentiment  and  opinion, 
conducted  with  the  strict  desire  to  know  the  facts,  would 
do  well  to  abandon  the  consideration  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
in  the  bulk,  and  to  turn  its  attention  to  the  different 
geographical  regions  and  to  the  various  strata  of  the 
population,  since  from  time  immemorial  the  sectional 
and  factional  character  of  the  border-land  has  been 
marked.  As  such  a  detailed  review  is  out  of  the  ques- 
tion here  —  even  if  reliable  material  were  at  our  dis- 
posal —  I  shall  content  myself  with  noting  a  few 
matters  indicative  of  the  present-day  situation. 


The  Alsace-Lorraine  Question         247 

In  the  first  place,  the  population  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
has  suffered  an  important  structural  change  since  1871. 
Several  hundred  thousand  people,  too  French  in  feeling 
to  submit  to  the  new  regime,  carried  themselves  and 
their  goods  across  the  Vosges  mountains.  The  official 
figure  of  these  emigrants  is  270,000,  but  their  number 
was  probably  much  larger.*  Their  place  was  promptly 
taken  by  immigrants  from  Alt-Deutschland,  while  in 
addition,  the  government  brought  in  thousands  of  em- 
ployees to  fill  railroad,  financial,  or  other  posts,  for 
which  there  were  at  first  no  native  applicants  or  for 
which  it  was  thought  the  natives  could  not  be  trusted. 
Although  the  exact  figures  of  this  invasion  are  unob- 
tainable, they  are  considerable  enough  to  make  the  neo- 
German  element  a  weighty  factor  in  all  the  adminis- 
trative and  commercial  centers. 

An  interesting  native  element,  though  at  best  a. 
minority,  are  the  Protestants  of  Lower  Alsace 
(Unterelsass).  There  are  several  hundred  thousand 
of  these  whose  protestantism  is  of  German  origin,  and 
who,  besides,  are  involved  in  daily  economic  and  intel- 
lectual exchange  with  their  German  neighbors.  That 
their  French  political  sentiment  has  suffered  impair- 
ment is  shown  by  the  fact  that  within  a  score  of  years 
of  their  incorporation  in  Germany,  they  returned  mem- 
bers to  the  Reichstag  who  modified  their  attitude  of 
protest  by  attaching  themselves  to  one  of  the  acknowl- 
edged German  parties. 

Before  the  beginning  of  the  new  century  several 

*  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  from  Caesar  to  Kaiser,  58  B.  €.-1871  A.  D., 
p.  191. 


248       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

other  districts,  some  of  them  with  Catholic  constituents, 
instructed  their  Reichstag  representatives  to  do  the 
same.  Unquestionably  as  late  as  1914  the  fifteen  mem- 
bers which  Alsace-Lorraine  sends  to  Berlin  still  pre- 
served a  strong  provincial  sentiment,  but  only  two  of 
the  number  declared  for  France  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  while  the  other  thirteen,  doubtless  not  without 
great  agony  of  spirit,  threw  in  their  lot  with  Germany. 
This  decision  of  the  majority,  which  we  are  probably 
justified  in  assuming  to  be  in  line  with  the  opinion  of 
their  constituents,  was  so  movingly  expressed  by  Repre- 
sentative Ricklin  that  I  shall  cite  his  letter  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Reichstag.  Dr.  Ricklin  not  only  sits  for 
Alsace  in  the  Reichstag  but  is  also  the  presiding  officer 
of  the  Alsatian  lower  house.  He  was  hindered  by  ill- 
ness from  attending  the  Reichstag  session  of  August 
4,  1914,  which  voted  the  credits  for  the  war.  To 
explain  his  absence  he  wrote  a  letter  to  the  chief  official 
of  the  German  parliament  part  of  which  reads: 

The  idea  of  war  between  Germany  and  France  is  so  terrible 
and  awful  for  us  people  in  Alsace-Lorraine  that  we  hardly  dare 
to  think  of  it.  We  do  not  want  a  war  between  Germany  and 
France  at  any  cost,  certainly  not  for  the  sake  of  altering  our 
political  position.  People  who  have  spread  a  different  view 
among  the  French  and  have  thereby  fanned  the  French  thoughts 
of  war  are  traitors  to  our  people  and  have  drawn  upon  them  the 
curses  of  thousands  of  our  people,  fathers,  mothers,  and  wives, 
who  with  bleeding  hearts  must  see  their  sons  and  husbands  go 
into  the  most  terrible  of  all  wars. 

To  the  last  we  hoped  that  we  might  be  spared  the  terrors  of 
a  war  between  Germany  and  France,  and  even  now  our  people 
refuse  to  give  up  hope.  If,  however,  God  has  decreed  otherwise, 
well — then  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  will  do  their  whole 
duty  and  they  will  do  it  without  a  single  reservation. 


The  Alsace-Lorraine  Question          249 

The  rules  of  the  Reichstag  do  not  permit  a  representative  to 
vote  by  mail,  but  I  have  the  right  to  inform  you  that  I  should 
have  voted,  if  I  had  been  present,  in  favor  of  all  the  bills  which 
the  present  state  of  affairs  demanded,  including  the  bill  grant- 
ing the  necessary  funds  for  carrying  on  the  war.* 

One  last  consideration  touching  this  difficult  matter 
of  Alsatian  sentiment.  The  opinion  in  Alsace  that  gets 
itself  expressed  in  newspaper  and  magazine  is  naturally 
that  of  the  educated  classes  who  dwell  in  towns  and 
constitute  the  bourgeoisie.  But  precisely  this  is  the 
element  affected  by  French  culture  and  generally  de- 
voted to  French  speech  and  French  traditions.  The 
broad  masses,  the  peasants  and  artisans,  constituting 
a  clear  majority  of  the  population,  have  been  barely 
touched  by  French  literary  or  social  influences  and 
remain  an  essentially  German  group.  However,  if 
the  majority  employed  in  field  and  shop  have  pre- 
served a  German  consciousness  that  fact  is  not  much 
bruited  about,  for  it  is  the  educated  townsman  with 
his  Gallicized  or  semi-Gallicized  consciousness  who 
does  the  talking  and  writing  and  boldly  proclaims  his 
voice  as  that  of  the  whole  province. 

The  local  administrative  story  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  in 
the  period  1871-1914,  confirms  the  impression  conveyed 
by  the  action  of  the  Reichstag  representatives  in  1914 
of  a  slow  reassimilation  to  Germany.  It  was  under  the 
title  of  Reichsland  that  Alsace-Lorraine  was  incor- 
porated in  Germany.  Owing  to  the  prevailing  hostile 
sentiment,  exceptional  regulations  were  kept  in  force 

*  Edmund  von  Mach,  Germany's  Point  of  Viev),  p.  87-88.  A.  C. 
McClurg  &  Co.,  Chicago. 


250       The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

for  a  long  time  and  only  gradually  relaxed.  The  first 
considerable  concession  was  made  in  1874,  when  the 
province  was  accorded  a  representation  of  fifteen  mem- 
bers in  the  Reichstag. 

The  second  notable  concession  belongs  to  the  year 
1879,  when  a  general  local  government  was  established 
which,  however,  gave  but  a  limited  voice  to  the  indig- 
enous population.  Not  till  1911  did  Alsace-Lorraine 
get  a  constitution  of  a  fairly  liberal  character.  By  vir- 
tue of  this  instrument  Alsace-Lorraine  is  accorded  three 
votes  in  the  Bundesrath,  and  the  emperor,  the  acknowl- 
edged chief  executive  of  the  Reichsland,  appoints  a  rep- 
resentative or  Statthalter  who  takes  up  his  residence 
at  Strassburg.  A  Landtag  of  two  houses  is  entrusted 
with  the  legislative  rights. 

The  upper  house  is  composed  of  about  forty  mem- 
bers appointed  partly  by  the  emperor  and  partly  by 
various  local  corporations,  while  the  lower  house  is 
elected  by  the  people  on  the  basis  of  universal  direct 
male  suffrage  exercised  by  secret  ballot.  How  this 
constitution  will  work  it  is  yet  too  early  to  say.  Some 
intelligent  foreign  observers  have  voiced  the  opinion 
that  the  constitution,  if  followed  by  further  conciliatory 
measures,  will  satisfy  the  native  population  and  lead 
them  to  take  their  stand  once  and  for  all  on  "  home- 
rule  within  the  German  Empire."  *  But  since  then  the 
war  has  broken  out  and  the  fate  of  Alsace-Lorraine  is 
once  again  as  so  often  before,  to  be  decided  by  the 
sword. 

*  Alsace-Lorraine,  from  Caesar  to  Kaiser,  58  B.  €.-1871  A.  D.t 
p.  194  (note),  names  the  American,  Dr.  David  Starr  Jordan  and  the 
Italian,  Professor  Ferrero,  as  supporting  the  above  opinion. 


From  Haxen't  £aro«>«  Sine*  1815.    Cc 

With  the  aid  of  thii  map  of  Germany  in  1914  the    reader  can  follow  the  territorial 
in  the  German  east,  and  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna  (1815)  its  eastern  development  had 
on  the  Rhine  by  making  over  to  her  the  provinces  called  the  Rhinelands    and    Westpha 
bulk  of  the  monarchy,  and  this  weakness  was  remedied  when,  after  the  successful  war 
Therewith  Prussia  reached  the  territorial  extent  she  has  retained  to  this  day  (1915). 
Her    admitted    predominance    in    the    empire,    even    if    there  were  no  historical  reasoir 
134,000  square  miles  of  territory. 


THE 

GERMAX  EMPIRE 
1914. 

Abbreviations: 

B  .-Hntnsividt  !./////»• 

RA  Ili'uss  rtilfr  Luir.  R.-1.-K  fuss  younger  Ijnr 

SA.Sajir.lHe/ilmiy.  Sf.C^Sajrrolwy-ffaaka 

|  S.M.  V//.IY'.  '//•///«///('//  S  \V  .lnr>'  )li  //»«r 

S  I,  SrhuHiHhunt  tippe  S  R  J>*IHVT^  AflWatK* 

«  ' 


fl 


:,  1910,  by  Henry  Holt  and  Company. 

>pment  of  Prussia  in  the  nineteenth  century.  The  state  of  Brandenburg-Prussia  began 
rd  the  boundaries  which  it  still  enjoys.  But  this  same  Congress  strengthened  Prussia 
It  was  an  undoubted  weakness  that  these  western  lands  were  not  contiguous  with  the 
,  Bismarck  incorporated  Hanover,  Hesse-Cassel,  and  Nassau  in  the  kingdom  of  Prussia, 
mce  will  show  that  Prussia  is  larger  than  all  the  other  German  states  taken  together. 
,  is  sufficiently  explained  on  the  sole  ground  of  the  material  importance  conferred  by 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

THE  following  titles  are  submitted  in  the  hope  of  giving  assist- 
ance to  the  reader  who  desires  fuller  information  on  the 
many  questions  too  lightly  touched  upon  in  the  foregoing  pages. 
While  I  have  confined  myself,  in  the  main,  to  English  titles,  I 
have  added  a  few  German  ones  for  the  convenience  of  those 
familiar  with  that  language. 

BOOKS  ON   POLITICAL  AND  CONSTITUTIONAL   HISTORY 

ERDMANNSDORFFER,  B.     Deutsche  Geschichte  von  1648-1740. 
Published  in  Oncken's  Allgemeine  Geschichte. 

FRIEDJUNG,  H.    Der  Kampf  um  die  Vorherrschaft  in  Deutsch- 
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HARRIS,    N.    D.      Intervention    and    Colonization    in    Africa. 
Houghton  Mifflin  Co. 

HEADLAM,  J.  W.     Bismarck  and  the  Foundation  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire,  1815-1871.     G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons. 

HENDERSON,  E.  F.    A  Short  History  of  Germany.    2  vols.    The 
Macmillan  Company. 

HOWARD,  B.  E.     The  German  Empire.    The  Macmillan  Com- 
pany. 

HUE  DE  GRAIS.    Handbuch  der  Verfassung  und  Verwaltung  in 
Preussen  und  dem  Deutschen  Reich.     Berlin. 

LOWELL,  A.  L.     Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Eu- 
rope.   2  vols.     Houghton  Mifflin  Co. 

PRIEST,  G.  M.    Germany  since  1740.    Ginn  and  Co. 

PUTNAM,  RUTH.    Alsace  and  Lorraine  from  Caesar  to  Kaiser, 
58  B.  C.-I8JI  A.  D.    G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons. 

ROBINSON,  J.   H.     Constitution  of  the  Kingdom   of  Prussia. 
Am.  Acad.  of  Polit.  and  Social  Sci.,  1894. 

STERN,  A.     Geschichte  Europas  von  1815  bis  zum  Frankfurter 
Frieden  von  1871.    6  vols.    Berlin. 
[251] 


252      The  Making  of  Modern  Germany 

SYBEL,  H.  VON.  The  Founding  of  the  Gennan  Empire  by  Wil- 
liam I.  7  vols.  Thomas  Y.  Crowell  Co. 

TREITSCHKE,  H.  VON.  Deutsche  Geschichte  im  19  Jahrhun- 
dert.  5  vols.  Leipzig.  An  interesting  work  by  a  passionate 
patriot;  going  unfortunately  only  to  the  year  1848. 

TUTTLE,  H.  History  of  Prussia.  4  vols.  Hough  ton  Mifflin 
Co.  This  is  an  unfinished  work,  going  from  the  beginnings 
of  Brandenburg  to  the  middle  of  the  Seven  Years'  War. 

BOOKS    ON    CIVILIZATION,    WITH    PARTICULAR    REFERENCE    TO 
ECONOMIC    AND    SOCIAL    DEVELOPMENT 

DAWSON,  W.  H.  Prince  Bismarck  and  State  Socialism;  The 
German  Workman;  The  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany. 
Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  Municipal  Life  and  Government 
in  Germany.  Longman's,  Green,  &  Co. 

DEWEY,  JOHN.  German  Philosophy  and  Politics.  Henry  Holt 
&Co. 

FRANCKE,  KUNO.  A  History  of  German  Literature  as  De- 
termined by  Social  Forces.  Henry  Holt  &  Co. 

HINTZE,  O.  Historische  und  Politische  Aufsdtze.  4  vols. 
Berlin. 

HELFFERICH,  K.  Germany's  Economic  Progress  and  National 
Wealth.  Berlin. 

HOWE,  F.  C.    Socialized  Germany.    Charles  Scribner's  Sons. 

LICHTENBERGER,  HENRI.  Germany  and  its  Evolution  in  Mod- 
ern Times.  Henry  Holt  &  Co. 

SCHMOLLER,  G.  Staats  und  Sozialwissensthaftliche  Forschun- 
gen.  Leipzig. 

WHITMAN,  S.    Imperial  Germany.    Chautauqua  Press. 

BIOGRAPHIES  AND  MEMOIRS 

BISMARCK,  OTTO,  PRINCE  VON.    Reflections  and  Reminiscences. 

Harper  and  Brothers. 
CARLYLE,  THOMAS.     Life  of  Frederick  the  Great.     8  vols. 

Charles  Scribner's  Sons. 
HEADLAM,  J.  W.    Bismarck  and  the  Foundation  of  the  German 

Empire.    G.  P-  Putnam's  Sons. 


Bibliography  253 

HENDERSON,  E.  F.  Blucher  and  the  Uprising  of  Prussia  against 
Napoleon.  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons. 

KoSER,  R.    Koenig  Friedrich  der  Grosse.     2  vols.     Stuttgart. 

LEHMANN,  M.  Freiherr  vom  Stein.  3  vols. ;  Scharnhorst. 
Leipzig. 

MARCKS,  E.  Kaiser  Wilhelm  I.  Leipzig.  Bismarck  (not  yet 
complete).  Stuttgart. 

METTERNICH,  PRINCE.  Memoirs.  4  vols.  Harper  and 
Brothers. 

REDDAWAY,  W.  F.  Frederick  the  Great  and  the  Rise  of  Prus- 
sia. G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons. 

SEELEY,  J.  R.  Life  and  Times  of  Stein.  3  vols.  G.  P.  Put- 
nam's Sons. 

SMITH,  MUNROE.  Bismarck  and  German  Unity.  The  Mac- 
millan  Company. 

WAR  BOOKS 

Under  this  head  I  have  enumerated  a  number  of  works  deal- 
ing with  the  policy  and  general  situation  of  Germany  before 
and  after  the  war. 

BERNHARDI,  F.  VON.  Germany  and  the  Next  War.  Long- 
man's, Green,  &  Co. 

BULOW,  PRINCE  VON.    Imperial  Germany.    Dodd,  Mead  &  Co. 

BURGESS,  J.  W.  The  European  War  of  1914.  A.  C.  McClurg 
&Co. 

CLAPP,  E.  J.  Economic  Aspects  of  the  War.  Yale  University 
Press. 

CRAMB,  J.  A.    Germany  and  England.    E.  P.  Button  &  Co. 

FROBENIUS.  The  German  Empire's  Hour  of  Destiny.  Mc- 
Bride  &  Nast. 

GOLTZ,  VON  DER.  The  Nation  in  Arms:  A  treatise  on  Modern 
Military  Systems  and  the  Conduct  of  War.  Translated 
by  P.  A.  Ashworth.  George  H.  Doran  Co. 

MACH,  EDMUND  VON.  Germany's  Point  of  View.  A.  C.  Mc- 
Clurg &  Co. 


INDEX 


Alsace,  ceded  to  France  in 
1648,  17;  and  part  of  Lor- 
raine ceded  to  Germany, 
I52'3>'  prize  of  victor  in 
war  of  1914,  2OO;  discussion 
of  issues  of,  243-50 

Austria,  formation  of  state  of, 
46-47 ;  nominal  headship  of 
Germany,  47;  loses  ground 
in  Germany  at  Congress 
of  Vienna,  90-92;  renewed 
rivalry  with  Prussia,  103; 
allied  with  Prussia  in  Dan- 
ish war,  138-39;  in  war  of 
1866,  140-43;  alliance  of 
with  German  Empire,  176; 
ultimatum  to  Serbia,  199 

Bismarck,  historic  role  of  uni- 
fier of  Germany,  128;  be- 
comes prime  minister  of 
Prussia,  132;  biography  of, 
132-33;  develops  anti-Aus- 
trian program,  134-5;  con- 
ducts the  Danish  war,  138; 
makes  war  on  Austria,  140- 
42;  and  the  Spanish  inci- 
dent, 148;  chancellor  of  the 
Empire,  168;  inaugurates 
the  Kulturkampf,  168-69; 
passes  Insurance  Laws, 
171-2;  his  foreign  policy 
after  1870,  I75'77;  dis- 

[255 


missal  from  office,  177-8; 
and  Ems  dispatch,  235-42 

Bliicher,  at  head  of  Prussian 
army,  83 ;  in  campaign  of 
1813,  86;  in  Waterloo  cam- 
paign, 87-88 

Brandenburg,  nucleus  of 
modern  Germany,  22 ;  early 
history  of,  22-24;  merged 
in  Prussia,  36 

Bund,  established  in  1815, 
104;  Bismarck's  contempt 
for,  134-5 

Carlyle,  mediates  German 
thought,  113 

Civilization,  what  we  mean 
by,  200-1 

Charles  v,  Emperor,  and  the 
Reformation,  1 1  - 1 2 

Charles  vi,  Emperor,  last 
male  of  Hapsburg  line,  49 

Chemistry  (German),  182-3 

Church,  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
7;  quarrels  with  the  Em- 
pire, 8 

City  government  in  Germany, 
186-89;  Dawson's  praise 
of,  189 

Cleves,  on  lower  Rhine  ac- 
quired by  Brandenburg,  24 

Collectivism,  Prussian  tenden- 
cies toward,  95 ;  its  triumph 


256 


Index 


in  modern  Germany,  163- 
68,  1 84-5 ;  scorned  by  in- 
dividualists, 1 80- 1 ;  question 
of  involved  in  war  of  1914, 
205 

Colonial  movement  of  the 
European  powers,  194-5, 
219-21 

Congress  of  Vienna,  89-91 

Conscription  law  of  1814,  92; 
reform  of  as  proposed  by 
William  I,  129-30 

Constitution  of  Germany, 
145-6;  powers  of  emperor 
under,  212-14 

Constitution  of  Prussia, 
granted  in  1850,  119;  de- 
scribed, 119-20 

Czarina  Elizabeth,  death  of, 
54 

Danish  war  of  1864,  137-9 
Democracy,    in   modern    Ger- 
many, 164-68;  and  Liberal- 
ism contrasted,  166-7 
Dual  Alliance,  of  France  and 
Russia,  190 

Education,  compulsory  in 
Prussia,  108-9  >'  develop- 
ment of  in  modern  Ger- 
many, 185 

Edward  vn  (of  England), 
anti-German  policy  of, 
192 

Ems  dispatch,  148,  235-42 

Fichte  (philosopher),  93 
France,   brought   into   rivalry 
with  Prussia  at  Congress  of 
Vienna,  91 ;  rivalry  of  1866- 


70,  146-7;  permanent  es- 
trangement from  Germany, 
175;  dual  alliance  with 
Russia,  190;  entente  with 
Great  Britain,  192 
Frederick  William,  the  Great 
Elector,  25;  territory  gov- 
erned by,  26;  unifying  pol- 
icy of,  27-28 ;  and  the  army, 

29 

Frederick  William  I,  father  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  44; 
quarrels  with  his  son,  45 

Frederick  William  n,  meets 
the  French  Revolution, 
71-72 

Frederick  William  in,  de- 
feated and  crushed  at  Jena, 
73  J  signs  peace  of  Tilsit, 
73 ;  is  forced  to  make  war 
on  Napoleon,  83 ;  opposes  a 
constitution,  105-7  >  death 
of,  114 

Frederick  William  iv,  charac- 
ter of,  114;  bows  to  revo- 
lution of  1848,  115-16; 
offered  German  imperial 
crown,  117-18;  grants  Prus- 
sia a  constitution,  119;  dies 
discredited,  128 

Frederick  n,  called  the  Great, 
35 ;  his  youth,  42-43 ;  quar- 
rels with  his  father,  44-45 ; 
relation  with  Voltaire,  43 ; 
challenges  ascendancy  of 
Austria  in  Germany,  48; 
his  motives  in  entering 
Silesia,  50;  engages  in 
Seven  Years'  War,  52-54; 
statesman  and  warrior,  55- 
56;  develops  manufactures, 


Index 


257 


56-57;  his  method  of  work, 
59;  his  army,  60-61 ;  fails  to 
understand  German  re- 
vival, 62 ;  his  death,  63 
French  Revolution,  67-69 ; 
produces  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte, 70;  and  Prussia,  71; 
effect  on  Germany,  99- 
IOI 

German  Colonies,  194-5,  219- 
21 

German  Emperor,  powers  of, 
212-14 

German  Science,  in  nineteenth 
century,  181-2 

Germany,  eighteenth  century 
revival  in,  61-62;  recon- 
struction of  at  Congress  of 
Vienna,  102-4;  early  nine- 
teenth century  revival  in, 
112-13;  revolution  of  1848 
in,  116-121;  unification  of 
begins,  145  ;  in  war  of  1870, 
149-51;  unification  com- 
pleted, 152;  government  of 
described,  160-8;  antag- 
onizes Great  Britain,  191-2, 
195  (note) 

Goethe,  on  rebirth  of  German 
nationalism,  63 

Great  Britain,  sides  with 
Prussia  in  Seven  Years' 
War,  52 ;  its  system  of  gov- 
ernment, 94-95 ;  its  foreign 
policy  in  recent  times,  190- 
3 ;  entente  with  France, 
192;  continued  sea  suprem- 
acy at  stake  in  war  of  1914, 
200;  individualism  of  at 
stake,  205 


Gustavus  Adolphus,  King  of 
Sweden,  17 

Hardenberg,  successor  of 
Stein,  79 

Hohenzollern,  house  of  in 
Brandenburg,  25 ;  their 
dynastic  tradition  of  service, 
40-42 

Holy  Alliance,  107 

Holy  Roman  Empire  (Ger- 
many), decay  of  at  end  of 
Thirty  Years'  War,  13-14; 
Austrian  control  of,  47-48; 
end  of  in  1806,  100-101. 

Humboldt,  Wilhelm,  reor- 
ganizes system  of  instruc- 
tion, 80-8 1 

Individualism,  as  a  political 
theory,  38;  waning  of  in 
the  United  States,  39-40; 
triumph  of  in  England,  95, 
163;  also  in  United  States, 
163,  166-7;  versus  collectiv- 
ism, 1 80- 1 ;  challenged  in 
war  of  1914,  205 

Industrial  courts,  185 

Industrial  development  of 
Germany,  1 70-7 1  ;  illus- 
trated by  iron  production, 
183;  by  foreign  trade, 

183-4 

Insurance  Laws  (German), 
171-72;  copied  by  Great 
Britain,  172-73. 

Junkers,  in  Prussia,  58;  their 
role  after  Jena,  77 

Kant  (philosopher),  61 ;  his 
doctrine  of  duty,  93 


258 


Index 


Koeniggraetz,  battle  of,  142 
Koerner   (poet),  dies  in  War 

of  Liberation,  84 
Kultur,    meaning    of,    203-4; 

its    relation    to    militarism, 

204 
Kulturkampf,  168-9 

Leipzig,  battle  of,  85 

Liberalism,  growth  of  in  Prus- 
sia, 105-6;  opposed  to  army 
reform,  131,  135-6;  opposed 
to  Democracy,  166-7 

Louise,  Queen  of  Prussia,  75 ; 
death  of,  82-83 

Luther,  Martin,  10,  n 

Maria  Theresa,  Empress,  suc- 
ceeds her  father,  49;  her 
character,  51;  engages  in 
Seven  Years'  War,  52-54 

Marx,  Karl,  father  of  German 
Socialism,  173 

Militarism  (German),  at- 
tacked by  allies  in  war  of 
1914,  2O2;  compared  with 
French,  Russian,  and  Brit- 
ish variety  of,  202-3 

Moltke,  in  war  of  1866,  141- 
42;  in  war  of  1870,  150 

Morocco,  French  claims  to, 
192 

Motley,  friendship  of  with 
Bismarck,  132-33 

Napoleon  Bonaparte,  seizes 
power  in  France,  70;  begins 
his  conquest  of  Europe,  72; 
invades  Russia,  82 ;  his  over- 
throw, 84-89;  destroys  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  101 

Napoleon   in,    attitude   of   in 


war  of  1866,  143-4;  nego- 
tiates with  Prussia,  146-7 ; 
captured  at  Sedan,  151 
North  German  Confederation, 
145-6;  merged  in  German 
Empire,  152 

Paris,  siege  of,  151 

Parliament  (German)  of 
1848,  116-18 

Parliament  (Prussian)  of 
1848,  118-19;  quarrels  with 
king  over  army  reform,  130- 

32 
Patriarchal  system  of  Prussia, 

38-40,     56;     modified     by 

Stein,  92 
Peace  of  Frankfort  of   1871, 

151 
Peace     of     Prague      (1866), 

H2-3 

Peace  of  Tilsit,  73 

Peace  of  Westphalia,  con- 
cluded in  1648,  13;  state  of 
Germany  at  time  of,  15-16; 
intellectual  decline  at  time 
of,  16;  losses  of  German 
territory  at  time  of,  17 

Persia,  divided  between  Russia 
and  Great  Britain,  192-3 

Polish    question     in     Prussia, 

222-34 

Pomerania,    part   of    acquired 

by  Brandenburg,  24 
Pope,  quarrels  with  emperor,  9 
Pragmatic    Sanction,     regula- 
tion of  Austrian  succession 

by,  49 

Protection  (economic  system) 
adopted  by  Germany  in 
1879,  169-70 


Index 


259 


Prussia,  duchy  of  on  Baltic, 
23 ;  passes  into  hands  of 
elector  of  Brandenburg,  23  ; 
history  of,  223-5 

Prussia,  kingdom  of  created  in 
1700,  36;  patriarchal  sys- 
tem of,  38-40,  56;  an  agri- 
cultural state,  57-58;  and 
the  French  Revolution,  70- 
72;  revival  of  after  Jena, 
74-81 ;  makes  war  on  Napo- 
leon, 83;  at  Congress  of 
Vienna,  89-91 ;  renewed 
rivalry  with  Austria,  103 ; 
continued  reforms  after 
1815,  108-11;  revolution  of 
1848  in,  115;  puts  Austria 
out  of  Germany,  143;  its 
Polish  problem,  222-34 

Reichstag,  145;  suffrage  pro- 
visions for,  216-7 

Reformation,  in  Germany,  IO 

Roman  Empire,  persistence  of 
idea  of,  6 

Russia,  allied  with  France, 
190;  draws  close  to  Great 
Britain,  192;  preparedness 
of  for  war  of  1914,  198 
(note) 

Scharnhorst,  reorganizes  the 
Prussian  army,  79-80,  92 

Schleswig  and  Holstein,  issue 
of  stated,  136-7 

Serbia,  its  part  in  war  of  1914, 
199,  200 

Serfs,  in  Prussia,  58;  libera- 
tion of,  77-78 

Seven  Years'  War,  52-54 

Silesia,  invaded  by  Frederick 
n,  48-49 


Socialism,  173-4 

Spanish  Incident  of  1870, 
147-8 

Stael,  Madame  de,  on  Ger- 
many, 113 

Stein,  reorganizes  Prussia,  76- 
79;  put  under  the  ban  by 
Napoleon,  79 

Three  Class  system  of  fran- 
chise, described,  120-21, 
216-18 

Thirty  Years'  War,  12;  con- 
cluded by  Peace  of  West- 
phalia, 13;  political  conse- 
quences of,  13;  economic 
and  moral  consequences  of, 
15-17 

Triple  Alliance,  formation  of, 
177;  190 

Triple  Entente,  formation  of, 

193 

Voltaire,    and    Frederick    the 

Great,  43 
Voyages   of   Discovery,    effect 

of  on  Europe,  19-20 

War  of  1914,  origin  of,  193- 

99 

Waterloo,  battle  of,  88 
Wellington,  at  Waterloo,  88 
William  i,  his  character,  128; 
proposes  army  reform,  129; 
proclaimed      German      em- 
peror, 152;  death,  178 
William  11,  dismisses  Bismarck 
from  office,    178;  character 
of,    179-80;    foreign    policy 
under,  190-1 

Zollverein,  described,  iio-n; 
169 


L  005  827  637  9 


001  205  667    7 


